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Abstract
This dissertation considers decentralized optimization and its applications. On the one hand, we
address privacy preservation for decentralized optimization, where N agents cooperatively minimize the
sum of N convex functions private to these individual agents. In most existing decentralized optimization
approaches, participating agents exchange and disclose states explicitly, which may not be desirable when
the states contain sensitive information of individual agents. The problem is more acute when adversaries
exist which try to steal information from other participating agents. To address this issue, we first propose
two privacy-preserving decentralized optimization approaches based on ADMM (alternating direction method
of multipliers) and subgradient method, respectively, by leveraging partially homomorphic cryptography. To
our knowledge, this is the first time that cryptographic techniques are incorporated in a fully decentralized
setting to enable privacy preservation in decentralized optimization in the absence of any third party or
aggregator. To facilitate the incorporation of encryption in a fully decentralized manner, we also introduce a
new ADMM which allows time-varying penalty matrices and rigorously prove that it has a convergence rate
of O(1/t). However, given that encryption-based algorithms unavoidably bring about extra computational
and communication overhead in real-time optimization [61], we then propose another novel privacy solution
for decentralized optimization based on function decomposition and ADMM which enables privacy without
incurring large communication/computational overhead.
On the other hand, we address the application of decentralized optimization to the event localization
problem, which plays a fundamental role in many wireless sensor network applications such as environ-
mental monitoring, homeland security, medical treatment, and health care. The event localization problem
is essentially a non-convex and non-smooth problem. We address such a problem in two ways. First, a
completely decentralized solution based on augmented Lagrangian methods and ADMM is proposed to
solve the non-smooth and non-convex problem directly, rather than using conventional convex relaxation
techniques. However, this algorithm requires the target event to be within the convex hull of the deployed
ii
sensors. To address this issue, we propose another two scalable distributed algorithms based on ADMM and
convex relaxation, which do not require the target event to be within the convex hull of the deployed sensors.
Simulation results confirm effectiveness of the proposed algorithms.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Intensive applications and problems in statistics, machine leaning, multi-agent systems, and power
grids can be modeled in the framework of optimization. Some examples include the sparse linear regression
[77], event localization [78], wide-area oscillation monitoring [83], etc. Although these problems arise in
various domains, they share some universal characteristics such as data being collected or stored in different
local agents. Given this distributed manner, it is natural to look to decentralized optimization in which data are
processed in a decentralized and cooperative manner.
This dissertation addresses decentralized optimization and its application to event localization.
In recent years, numerous algorithms were proposed for decentralized optimization such as distributed
(sub)gradient based algorithms [69,86,87], augmented Lagrangian methods (ALM) [44,47], and the alternating
direction method of multipliers (ADMM) as well as its variants [16, 44, 47, 64, 65], etc. However, most of
these approaches require agents to exchange and disclose their states explicitly to neighboring agents in
every iteration, which may not be desirable when the estimates contain sensitive information of individual
agents. To address this privacy issue, this dissertation will first develop privacy-preserving decentralized
optimization algorithms. Then, this dissertation will address the application of decentralized optimization to
the event localization problem, which plays a fundamental role in many wireless sensor network applications
such as environmental monitoring [15], target tracking [21], underwater detection [50], and acoustic gunfire
localization [34], [105]. The following two sections will introduce the two topics in more depth.
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1.1 Decentralized optimization
The problem of decentralized optimization has attracted remarkable attention in recent years due to
its wide applications in various domains, ranging from multi-agent systems [69, 86, 87], machine learning
[23, 123, 134], statistics [67, 77], communications and networking [69, 78, 86, 87], to power grids [35, 83]. In
these applications, data are collected and processed in a decentralized and cooperative manner among multiple
agents. Such a decentralized manner of processing provides several key advantages over its conventional
computing-server based counterpart. For example, it leads to enhanced scalability and flexibility, and brings
higher robustness to the problems of network traffic bottleneck and single point of failure.
Typical decentralized optimization algorithms include distributed (sub)gradient based algorithms
[69,86,87], augmented Lagrangian methods (ALM) [44,47], and the alternating direction method of multipliers
(ADMM) as well as its variants [16, 44, 47, 64, 65], etc. In (sub)gradient based solutions, (sub)gradient
computations and averaging among neighbors are conducted iteratively to achieve convergence to the minimum.
In augmented Lagrangian and ADMM based solutions, iterative Lagrangian minimization is employed, which,
coupled with dual variable update, guarantees that all agents agree on the minimization solution.
However, most of the aforementioned decentralized approaches require agents to exchange and
disclose their states explicitly to neighboring agents in every iteration [16, 47, 64, 65, 86]. This brings about
serious privacy concerns in many practical applications [61]. For example, in projection based source
localization, intermediate states are positions of points lying on the circles centered at individual nodes’
positions [101], and thus a node may infer the exact position of a neighboring node using three intermediate
states, which is undesirable when agents want to keep their position private [4]. In the rendezvous problem
where a group of individuals want to meet at an agreed time and place [63], exchanging explicit states
may leak their initial locations which may need to be kept secret instead [80]. Other examples include the
agreement problem [24], where a group of individuals want to reach consensus on a subject without leaking
their individual opinions to others [80], and the regression problem [77], where individual agent’s training
data may contain sensitive information (e.g., salary, medical record) and should be kept private. In addition,
exchanging explicit states without encryption is susceptible to eavesdroppers which try to intercept and steal
information from exchanged messages.
To enable privacy preservation in decentralized optimization, one commonly used approach is dif-
ferential privacy [42, 54, 89], which adds carefully-designed noise to exchanged states or objective functions
to cover sensitive information. However, the added noise also unavoidably compromises the accuracy of
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optimization results, leading to a trade-off between privacy and accuracy [42, 54, 89]. In fact, as indicated
in [89], even when no noise perturbation is added, differential-privacy based approaches may fail to converge
to the accurate optimal solution. It is worth noting that although some differential-privacy based optimization
approaches can converge to the optimal solution in the mean-square sense with the assistance of a third party
such as a cloud (e.g., [38], [39]), those results are not applicable to the completely decentralized setting
discussed here where no third parties or aggregators exist. Observability-based design has been proposed
for privacy preservation in linear multi-agent networks [5, 96]. By properly designing the weights for the
communication graph, agents’ information will not be revealed to non-neighboring agents. However, this
approach cannot protect the privacy of the direct neighbors of compromised agents and it is susceptible to
external eavesdroppers. Another approach to enabling privacy preservation is encryption. However, despite
successful applications in cloud based control and optimization [29,104,111,122], conventional cryptographic
techniques cannot be applied directly in a completely decentralized setting without the assistance of aggre-
gators/third parties (note that traditional secure multi-party computation schemes like fully homomorphic
encryption [33] and Yao’s garbled circuit [125] are computationally too heavy to be practical for real-time
optimization [61]). Other privacy-preserving optimization approaches include [31, 74] which protect privacy
via perturbing problems or states.
To enable privacy preservation without compromising the optimality of the solution, this dissertation
first proposes a novel approach that enables privacy-preservation in decentralized optimization through incor-
porating partially homomorphic cryptography in existing optimization algorithms. We show that cryptographic
techniques can be incorporated in a fully decentralized manner to enable privacy-preservation in decentralized
optimization in the absence of any third party or aggregator. This is significant in that, to our knowledge, all
existing cryptographic based optimization approaches rely on the assistance of a third-party or aggregator to
protect the privacy of all parties. However, given that encryption unavoidably brings about significant extra
computational and communication overhead in real-time optimization [61], this dissertation also proposes a
novel privacy solution for decentralized optimization based on function decomposition which enables privacy
without incurring large communication/computational overhead. Our contributions can be summarized as
follows:
1. A privacy-preserving decentralized optimization approach is proposed based on ADMM and partially
homomorphic cryptography. To facilitate the incorporation of homomorphic encryption in ADMM in a
fully decentralized manner, we also propose a new ADMM which allows time-varying penalty matrices
and rigorously characterize its convergence rate of O(1/t).
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2. A privacy-preserving decentralized optimization approach based on subgradient method and partially
homomorphic cryptography is proposed, which can be used in time-varying networks.
3. A novel privacy-preserving decentralized optimization approach is proposed based on ADMM and
function decomposition. Compared with encryption-based approaches which suffer from heavy com-
putational and communication burden, the proposed approach incurs little extra computational and
communication overhead; In addition, we prove that when the global objective function is strongly con-
vex, proximal Jacobian ADMM can achieve Q-linear convergence rate even if local objective functions
are only convex, which generalizes existing results on proximal Jacobian ADMM requiring strongly
convex local objective functions to achieve Q-linear convergence rate.
4. In contrast to differential-privacy based optimization approaches [42, 54, 89], our work can enable
privacy preservation without sacrificing accuracy.
1.2 Event localization
With the ability to transmit/receive information and fuse data, smart sensors enabled and greatly
advanced numerous applications such as environmental monitoring [15], target tracking [21], underwater
detection [50], and acoustic gunfire localization [34], [105]. Among these applications, event localization is a
significant and essential component or even the ultimate goal. Taking the gunfire localization as an example,
if some threat sources or impulsive events (e.g., shooting or explosion) occur, it is of imperative importance
to localize these threat sources to make prompt reactions (e.g., giving warning, providing aid). A typical
example is the PinPointTM mobile acoustic localization sensor network [18, 25], which provides the capability
for detection and localization of impulsive threat events on battlefields. In fact, sensor network based event
localization has received significant attentions and plenty of techniques have been proposed in the literature,
using either angle-of-arrival measurements [32, 57, 100], time-of-arrival (ToA) (including time-difference-of-
arrival, i.e., TDoA) measurements [51, 124], or received signal strength (RSS) [13, 79, 101, 113–115, 126, 135].
There are also some work that discussed the event localization problem based on noisy range measurements
directly, which can be obtained based on ToA, TDoA, or RSS information [10, 30, 56, 91, 92]. Generally
speaking, these existing methods for event localization formulate the localization problem as a maximum
likelihood estimation problem [91] or a least squares problem [126], which is solved by minimizing the
non-convex objective function iteratively [13] or by applying various convex relaxations [124].
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From the implementation point of view, existing event localization algorithms can be cast into two
categories: centralized approaches and distributed approaches. Centralized approaches always gather (noisy)
measurements (e.g., range measurements) obtained by all sensors to a processing center, which then estimates
the event location using a certain centralized optimization algorithm. Typical centralized methods include the
parallel projection method [56], convex relaxation plus semidefinite programming (SDP) or second-order cone
programming method [30,91,92,113,114,124,126]. However, a severe shortcoming of centralized localization
algorithms is that the computation complexity at the processing center might be quite high which poses
great challenges for low-cost sensor nodes with limited computational capabilities. In addition, the required
communication to collect all measurements to a single central node may be problematic due to possible traffic
bottleneck and severe constraints on communication ranges. Moreover, once the central node fails due to, e.g.,
attacks or power depletion, the entire network slips into a state of paralysis. Therefore, techniques solving the
event localization problem in a distributed way are crucial for sensor network based event localization.
In contrast to centralized algorithms, distributed localization algorithms are designed to run the
computation over the entire network instead of on a processing center. In general, distributed algorithms are
often established on massive parallelism or sequential calculations and mutual collaboration [9]. So compared
with centralized algorithms, distributed designs have better scalability, flexibility, and failure resilience. One
typical distributed approach for event localization is projection-based algorithms. For example, Blatt and
coauthors in [13] proposed a projection-onto-convex-sets (POCS) method which solves the event localization
problem via projecting an initial estimate to sensing disks that center at individual sensors’ positions. The
authors in [101] proposed a nearest local minimum (PONLM) method that projects initial estimates to sensing
circles rather than disks, which improved the performance of event localization. The authors in [115] proposed
a boundary-of-convex-sets algorithm, with convergence guaranteed in the case of two anchor sensors. Wang
and coauthors [112] recently proposed a recursive weighted least squares (RWLS) algorithm which takes
information reliability into account by adding weighting factors of the previous estimates in each iteration.
However, these projection-based algorithms update local estimates sequentially, which requires a global
updating order and hence is not amenable for parallelization. The sequential nature entails a reschedule of
global updating order whenever the network topology changes, due to e.g., a sensor’s joining or leaving the
network, and hence is not as flexible as parallel algorithms. To address this issue, Zhang and coauthors [135]
proposed a parallel distributed alternating projection algorithm (DAPA) which formulates the event localization
problem as a ring intersection problem. However, this approach does not work well when the target event lies
outside the convex hull of sensors.
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In this dissertation, we address the event localization problem by applying the alternating direction
method of multipliers [16], which has been proven extremely suitable in distributed convex optimization
and some non-convex problems [73, 107, 120]. We used ADMM because it has several advantages. First,
ADMM has a fast convergence speed in both primal and dual iterations [64]. By incorporating a quadratic
regularization term, ADMM has been shown to be able to obtain satisfactory convergence speed even in
ill-conditioned dual functions [65]. Secondly, from the implementation point of view, not only is ADMM
easy to parallelize and implement, but it is also robust to noise and computation errors [106]. Our proposed
algorithms takes full advantages of ADMM which decomposes a general optimization problem into multiple
local optimization subproblems with each subproblem solved by an individual part. Through cooperations in
the computation process among neighboring sensors, a consistent estimate of the event position across the
entire network can be achieved. Our main contributions for the event localization problem are summarized as
follows:
1. An algorithm is applied to directly solve the general non-smooth and non-convex event localization
problem without using convex relaxation. The avoidance of convex relaxation is significant in that
convex relaxation based methods generally suffer from high computational complexity. The proposed
algorithm takes full advantages of alternating direction method of multipliers and accomplishes the
event localization in a decentralized way. Therefore, compared with centralized approach in which a
processing center performs the whole heavy computation, the algorithm is highly scalable, flexible,
robust to network topology changes, and thus is more favorable in practical implement;
2. Two distributed event localization algorithms based on ADMM and convex relaxation are proposed.
Compared with existing centralized SDP relaxation based algorithms for event localization, the two
algorithms divide the computation on a central node to different clusters to avoid possible center
failure and traffic bottleneck, and in the mean time, guarantee consistency of the estimates across all
clusters among which only limited communications are available. Furthermore, the two algorithms take
advantages of SDP relaxation to avoid the convex hull problem compared with existing projection-based
algorithms. Moreover, the algorithms are proven to converge with a convergence rate of O(1/t) where t
is the iteration time.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 gives more details on two typical
decentralized optimization algorithms and the homomorphic Paillier cryptosystem, which is used to enable
privacy-preservation in decentralized optimization. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 propose a privacy-preserving
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decentralized optimization algorithm based on ADMM and subgradient method, respectively, by leveraging
partially homomorphic cryptography. Chapter 5 proposes a novel privacy-preserving decentralized optimization
algorithm based on ADMM and function decomposition. Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 address the application of
ADMM to the event localization problem. Finally, we conclude our findings in Chapter 8.
It is worth noting that this dissertation interpolates material from four papers by the author [129–132].
Chapter 3 uses materials from Ref [129], Chapter 4 uses materials from Ref [131], Chapter 6 uses materials
from Ref [132], and Chapter 7 uses materials from Ref [130].
7
Chapter 2
Background and Preliminaries
2.1 Typical Decentralized Optimization Algorithms
2.1.1 Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers
ADMM is an algorithm which is suitable to solve problems in the following form [16]:
min
x,z
f(x) + g(z)
subject to Cx+ Fz = c.
(2.1)
where x ∈ Rn, z ∈ Rm, C ∈ Rp×n, F ∈ Rp×m, c ∈ Rp, and f(x) and g(z) are convex functions. To get
the optimal value p∗ = inf{f(x) + g(z) | Cx+ Fz = c} for problem (2.1), one can first form an augmented
Lagrangian function:
Lρ(x, z,λ) = f(x) + g(z) + λT (Cx+ Fz − c) +
ρ
2
‖ Cx+ Fz − c ‖2,
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint Cx+ Fz = c and ρ > 0 is a predefined
penalty parameter. Then ADMM solves problem (2.1) by updating x, z,λ in the following sequence: first an
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x-minimization step (2.2), then a z-minimization step (2.3), and finally a dual variable update (2.4):
xk+1 = argminxLρ(x, zk,λk), (2.2)
zk+1 = argminzLρ(xk+1, z,λk), (2.3)
λk+1 = λk + ρ(Cxk+1 + Fzk+1 − c). (2.4)
Under the assumptions that both f and g are closed, proper, convex, and the Lagrange function
L(x, z,λ) = f(x)+g(z)+λT (Cx+Fz−c) has a saddle point, ADMM has primary residual convergence,
i.e., Cxk + Fzk − c → 0, objective convergence, i.e., pk = f(xk) + g(zk) → p∗, and dual residual
convergence, i.e., ρCTF (zk − zk−1) → 0 when k → ∞. Variations and extensions to standard ADMM
algorithm can refer to proximal ADMM [26], linearized ADMM [66], weighted ADMM [64], etc.
2.1.2 Subgradient Method
Given a function f(x) : Rn → R. To minimize f , the subgradient method takes the following
iteration [17]:
xk+1 = xk − αkdk.
Here xk is the kth iterate, αk > 0 is the step size, and dk is a subgradient of f at xk. The subgradient method
is very simple. Under the assumptions that the step size αk is diminishing ( lim
k→∞
αk = 0,
∑∞
k=1 αk =∞) and
function f is convex, the subgradient method is guaranteed to converge to the optimal value [17].
A typical extension to subgradient method is projected subgradient method which solves a constrained
convex optimization problem as follows:
min
x
f(x)
subject to x ∈ X
where X is a convex set. The projected subgradient method takes the following iteration [17]:
xk+1 = PX (x
k − αkdk).
Here PX [·] denotes the projection operation onto the set X , i.e., PX [r] = argmin
y∈X
‖ y − r ‖. In addition,
when the objective function f is a sum of N ≥ 2 individual functions, the (projected) subgradient method can
9
be easily implemented in a decentralized manner (c.f. [86, 87]).
2.2 Paillier Cryptosystem
The Paillier cryptosystem is a public-key cryptosystem which uses a pair of keys: a public key and a
private key. The public key can be disseminated publicly and used by any person to encrypt a message, but the
message can only be decrypted by the private key. The Paillier cryptosystem includes three algorithms, which
are detailed below:
Paillier cryptosystem
Key generation:
1. Choose two large prime numbers p and q of equal bit-length and compute n = pq.
2. Let g = n+ 1.
3. Let λ = φ(n) = (p− 1)(q − 1), where φ(·) is the Euler’s totient function.
4. Let µ = φ(n)−1 mod n which is the modular multiplicative inverse of φ(n).
5. The public key kp for encryption is (n, g).
6. The private key ks for decryption is (λ, µ).
Encryption (c = E(m)): Recall the definitions of Zn = {z|z ∈ Z, 0 ≤ z < n} and Z∗n = {z|z ∈ Z, 0 ≤
z < n, gcd(z, n) = 1}.
1. Choose a random r ∈ Z∗n.
2. The ciphertext is given by c = gm · rn mod n2, where m ∈ Zn, c ∈ Z∗n2 .
Decryption (m = D(c)):
1. Define the integer division function L(µ) = µ−1n .
2. The plaintext is m = L(cλ mod n2) · µ mod n.
A notable feature of Paillier cryptosystem is that it is additively homomorphic, i.e., the ciphertext of
m1 +m2 can be obtained from the ciphertext of m1 and m2 directly when 0 ≤ m1 +m2 < n holds:
E(m1, r1) · E(m2, r2) = E(m1 +m2, r1r2), (2.5)
E(m)k = E(km), k ∈ Z+. (2.6)
Due to the existence of random r, the Paillier cryptosystem is resistant to the dictionary attack [36]. Since r1
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and r2 play no role in the decryption process, (2.5) can be simplified as
E(m1) · E(m2) = E(m1 +m2). (2.7)
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Chapter 3
Privacy-preserving Decentralized
Optimization Based on ADMM
3.1 Introduction
An important class of decentralized optimization problems is to minimize an objective function
that is the sum of N convex functions private to N individual agents [54, 69, 86, 87]. Such decentralized
optimization has been playing key roles in applications as diverse as rendezvous in multi-agent systems [63],
spectrum sensing in cognitive networks [128], support vector machine [23] and classification [134] in machine
learning, online learning [123], data regression in statistics [77], source localization in sensor networks [130],
and monitoring of smart grids [83]. This chapter considers such a decentralized problem in which N agents
cooperatively solve an unconstrained optimization:
min
x̃
N∑
i=1
fi(x̃), (3.1)
where variable x̃ ∈ RD is common to all agents, function fi : RD → R is the local objective function
of agent i. We propose a new privacy-preserving decentralized optimization approach based on ADMM
and partially homomorphic cryptography to solve (3.1) in this chapter. To facilitate the incorporation of
homomorphic encryption in ADMM in a fully decentralized manner, we also propose a new ADMM which
allows time-varying penalty matrices and rigorously characterize its convergence rate of O(1/t).
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It is worth noting that privacy has different meanings under different settings. For example, in
the distributed optimization literature, privacy has been defined as the non-disclosure of agents’ states
[38], objective functions or subgradients [71, 89, 123]. In this chapter, we define privacy as preserving the
confidentiality of agents’ intermediate states, gradients of objective functions, and objective functions. We
protect the privacy of objective functions through protecting intermediate states. In fact, if left unprotected,
intermediate states could be used by an adversary to infer the gradients or even objective functions of other
nodes through, e.g., data mining techniques. For example, in the regression problem in [77], the objective
functions take the form fi(x̃) = 12 ‖ si − Bix̃ ‖
2
2, in which si and Bi are raw data containing sensitive
information such as salary and medical record. When the subgradient method in [86] is used to solve the
optimization problem min
x̃
N∑
i=1
fi(x̃), agent i updates its intermediate states in the following way:
xk+1i =
N∑
j=1
aijx
k
j − αkOfi(xki )
where aij are weights, αk is the stepsize, and Ofi(x) = BTi Bix − BTi si is the gradient. In this case, an
adversary can infer Ofi(xki ) based on exchanged intermediate states xi if the weights aij and stepsize αk
are publicly known. We consider two adversaries in this chapter: Honest-but-curious adversaries are agents
who follow all protocol steps correctly but are curious and collect all intermediate and input/output data in an
attempt to learn some information about other participating agents [62]. External eavesdroppers are adversaries
who steal information through wiretapping all communication channels and intercepting exchanged messages
between agents. Protecting agents’ intermediate states can avoid eavesdroppers from inferring any information
in optimization.
Organization: The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Sec. 3.2 first presents the conventional
ADMM solution to (3.1), and then introduces a new ADMM which allows time-varying penalty matrices with
guaranteed convergence. Based on the new ADMM and partially homomorphic cryptography, a completely
decentralized privacy-preserving approach to solving problem (3.1) is proposed in Sec. 3.3. Rigorous analysis
of the guaranteed privacy of the approach are addressed in Sec. 3.4 and its implementation details are discussed
in Sec. 3.5. Numerical simulation results are given in Sec. 3.6 and Sec. 3.7 to confirm the effectiveness and
computational efficiency of the proposed approach. In the end, we draw summaries in Sec. 3.8.
13
3.2 A New ADMM with Time-varying Penalty Matrices
In this section, we propose a new ADMM with time-varying penalty matrices for (3.1), which is
key for enabling the incorporation of partially homomorphic cryptography in a completely decentralized
optimization problem for privacy protection.
3.2.1 Problem Formulation
We assume that each fi in (3.1) is private and only known to agent i, and all N agents form a
bidirectional connected network. Using the graph theory [14], we represent the communication pattern of
a multi-agent network by a graph G = {V,E}, where V denotes the set of agents and E denotes the set of
communication links (undirected edges) between agents. Denote the total number of communication links in
E as |E|. If there exists a communication link between agents i and j, we say that agent j is a neighbor of i
(agent i is a neighbor of j as well) and denote the communication link as ei,j ∈ E if i < j is true or ej,i ∈ E
if i > j is true. Moreover, we denote the set of all neighboring agents of i as Ni (we consider agent i to be a
neighbor of itself in this chapter, i.e., i ∈ Ni, but ei,i /∈ E).
3.2.2 Proximal Jacobian ADMM
To solve (3.1) in a decentralized manner, we reformulate (3.1) as follows (which avoids using dummy
variables in conventional ADMM [103]):
min
xi∈RD, i∈{1,2,...,N}
N∑
i=1
fi(xi)
subject to xi = xj , ∀ei,j ∈ E,
(3.2)
where xi is considered as a copy of x and belongs to agent i. To solve (3.2), each agent first exchanges its
current state xi with its neighbors. Then it carries out local computations based on its private local objective
function fi and the received state information from neighbors to update its state. Iterating these computations
will make every agent reach consensus on a solution that is optimal to (3.1) when (3.1) is convex. Detailed
implementation of the ADMM algorithm based on Jacobian update is elaborated as follows [26]:
 x
t+1
i = argmin
xi
L(xt1,xt2, ...,xti−1,xi,xti+1, ...,xtN ,λt) +
γi
2
‖ xi − xti ‖2, (3.3)
λt+1i,j = λ
t
i,j + ρ(x
t+1
i − x
t+1
j ), ∀j ∈ Ni (3.4)
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for i = 1, 2, ..., N . Here, t is the iteration index, γi > 0 (i = 1, 2, ..., N) are proximal coefficients, and L is
the augmented Lagrangian function
L(x,λ) =
N∑
i=1
fi(xi) +
∑
ei,j∈E
(λTi,j(xi − xj) +
ρ
2
‖ xi − xj ‖2). (3.5)
In (3.5), x = [xT1 ,x
T
2 , ...,x
T
N ]
T ∈ RND is the augmented state, λi,j is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding
to the constraint xi = xj , and all λi,j for ei,j ∈ E are stacked into λ ∈ R|E|D. ρ is the penalty parameter,
which is a positive constant scalar.
The above ADMM algorithm cannot protect the privacy of participating agents as states are exchanged
and disclosed explicitly among neighboring agents. To facilitate privacy design, we propose a new ADMM with
time-varying penalty matrices in the following subsection, which will enable the integration of homomorphic
cryptography and decentralized optimization in Sec. 3.3.
3.2.3 ADMM with Time-varying Penalty Matrices
Motivated by the fact that ADMM allows time-varying penalty matrices [45, 58], we present in the
following an ADMM with time-varying penalty matrices. It is worth noting that [45, 58] deal with a two-block
(N = 2) problem. While in this chapter, we consider a more general problem with N ≥ 3 blocks, whose
convergence is more difficult to analyze. The generalization from N = 2 to N ≥ 3 is highly non-trivial.
In fact, as indicated in [22], a direct extension from two-block to multi-block convex minimization is not
necessarily convergent.
We first reformulate (3.1) in a more compact form:
min
x
f(x)
subject to Ax = 0,
(3.6)
where x = [xT1 ,x
T
2 , ...,x
T
N ]
T ∈ RND, f(x) =
N∑
i=1
fi(xi), and A = [am,n] ⊗ ID ∈ R|E|D×ND is the
edge-node incidence matrix of graph G as defined in [118], with its |E|D rows corresponding to the |E|
communication links and the ND columns corresponding to the N agents. The symbol ⊗ denotes Kronecker
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product. The am,n element is defined as
am,n =

1 if the mth edge originates from agent n,
−1 if the mth edge terminates at agent n,
0 otherwise.
Here we define that each edge ei,j originates from agent i and terminates at agent j.
Let λi,j be the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the constraint xi = xj , then we can form an
augmented Lagrangian function of problem (3.6) as
L(x,λ,ρ) =
N∑
i=1
fi(xi) +
∑
ei,j∈E
(λTi,j(xi − xj) +
ρi,j
2
‖ xi − xj ‖2), (3.7)
or in a more compact form:
L(x,λ,ρ) = f(x) + λTAx+ 1
2
‖ Ax ‖2ρ, (3.8)
where λ = [λi,j ]ij,ei,j∈E ∈ R|E|D is the augmented Lagrange multiplier,
ρ = diag{ρi,jID}ij,ei,j∈E ∈ R|E|D×|E|D, ρi,j > 0
is the time-varying penalty matrix, and ‖ Ax ‖2ρ= xTATρAx.
Note that if ρi,jID is the mth block in ρ, then ei,j is the mth edge in E, i.e., for the one-dimensional
case, am,i = 1 and am,j = −1, and for high dimensional cases, the (m, i)th block of A is ID and the (m, j)th
block of A is −ID.
Now, inspired by [45], we propose a new ADMM which allows time-varying penalty matrices based
on Jacobian update [99]:

xt+1i = argmin
xi
L(xt1,xt2, ...,xti−1,xi,xti+1, ...,xtN ,λt,ρt) +
γi
2
‖ xi − xti ‖2, (3.9)
ρti,j → ρt+1i,j , (3.10)
λt+1i,j = λ
t
i,j + ρ
t+1
i,j (x
t+1
i − x
t+1
j ), ∀j ∈ Ni (3.11)
for i = 1, 2, ..., N . It is worth noting that although the communication graph is undirected, we introduce both
λi,j and λj,i for ei,j ∈ E in (3.4) and (3.11) to unify the algorithm description. More specifically, we set
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λ0i,j = ρ
0
i,j(x
0
i − x0j ) at t = 0 such that λti,j = −λtj,i holds for all i = 1, 2, · · · , N, j ∈ Ni. In this way, we
can unify the update rule of agent i without separating i > j and i < j for j ∈ Ni, as shown in (3.13).
Remark 1. The proximal Jacobian ADMM (3.3)-(3.4) can be considered as a special case of (3.9)-(3.11)
by assigning the same and constant weight ρi,j = ρ to different equality constraints xi = xj . Different
from the ADMM which uses the same ρ (which might be time-varying in, e.g., the two-block optimization
problem [48]) for all equality constraints, the new approach uses different and time-varying ρi,j for different
equality constraints xi = xj . As indicated later, this is key for enabling privacy preservation.
Remark 2. We did not use Gauss-Seidel update [118], which requires a predefined global order and hence as
indicated in [26], is not amenable to parallelism. Different from [26] which has a constant penalty parameter,
we intentionally introduce time-varying penalty matrix to enable privacy preservation. Despite enabling
new capabilities in privacy protection (with the assistance of partially homomorphic Paillier encryption),
introducing time-varying penalty matrix also reduces convergence rate to O(1/t), in contrast to the o(1/t)
rate in [26]. Besides giving new capabilities in privacy and different result in convergence rate, the novel
idea of intentional time-varying penalty matrix also leads to difference in theoretical analysis in comparison
with [26].
It is obvious that the new ADMM (3.9)-(3.11) can be implemented in a decentralized manner. The
detailed implementation procedure is outlined in Algorithm 1.
Remark 3. A weighted ADMM which also assigns different weights to different equality constraints is
proposed in [64]. However, the weights in [64] are constant while Algorithm 1 allows time-varying weights in
each iteration, which, as shown later, is key to enable the integration of partially homomorphic cryptography
with decentralized optimization.
3.2.4 Convergence Analysis
In this subsection, we rigorously prove the convergence of Algorithm 1 under the following standard
assumptions [118]:
Assumption 1. Each private local function fi : RD → R is convex and continuously differentiable.
Assumption 2. Problem (3.6) has an optimal solution, i.e., the Lagrangian function
L(x,λ) = f(x) + λTAx (3.15)
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Algorithm 1
Initial Setup: Each agent i initializes x0i , ρ0i,j .
Input: xti, λ
t−1
i,j , ρ
t
i,j
Output: xt+1i , λti,j , ρ
t+1
i,j
1. Each agent i sends xti, ρ
t
i,j to its neighboring agents, and then set ρ
t
i,j = min{ρti,j , ρtj,i}. It is clear that
ρti,j = ρ
t
j,i holds.
2. Each agent i updates λti,j as follows for j ∈ Ni
λti,j = λ
t−1
i,j + ρ
t
i,j(x
t
i − xtj). (3.12)
It is clear that λti,j = −λtj,i holds (note that when t = 0, we set λ0i,j = ρ0i,j(x0i − x0j )).
3. All agents update their local vectors in parallel:
xt+1i ∈ argminxifi(xi) +
γi
2
‖ xi − xti ‖2 +
∑
j∈Ni
((λti,j)
Txi +
ρti,j
2
‖ xi − xtj ‖2). (3.13)
Here we added two proximal terms
ρti,i
2 ‖ xi−x
t
i ‖2 and
γi
2 ‖ xi−x
t
i ‖2 to accommodate the influence
of xti. For all γi > 0, ρ
t
i,i is set to
ρti,i = 1−
∑
j∈Ni,j 6=i
ρti,j . (3.14)
4. Each agent i updates ρt+1i,j for all j ∈ Ni and sets t = t+ 1. The detailed update rule for ρi,j will be
elaborated later in Theorem 1.
has a saddle point (x∗,λ∗) such that
L(x∗,λ) ≤ L(x∗,λ∗) ≤ L(x,λ∗)
holds for all x ∈ RND and λ ∈ R|E|D.
Denote the iterating results in the kth step in Algorithm 1 as follows:
xk = [xkT1 ,x
kT
2 , ...,x
kT
N ]
T ∈ RND,
λk = [λki,j ]ij,ei,j∈E ∈ R|E|D,
ρk = diag{ρki,jID}ij,ei,j∈E ∈ R|E|D×|E|D.
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Further augment the coefficients γi (i = 1, 2, ..., N) in (3.13) into the matrix form
QP = diag{γ1, γ2, . . . , γN} ⊗ ID ∈ RND×ND,
and augment ρki,j into the following matrix form
QkC = diag{
∑
j∈N1
ρk1,j ,
∑
j∈N2
ρk2,j , . . . ,
∑
j∈NN
ρkN,j} ⊗ ID,
and QkC ∈ RND×ND. By plugging (3.14) into QkC , we have QkC = IND, i.e., QkC is an identity matrix.
Now we are in position to give the main results of this subsection:
Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, Algorithm 1 is guaranteed to converge to an optimal
solution to (3.6) if the following two conditions are met:
Condition A: The sequence {ρk} satisfies
0 ≺ ρ0  ρk  ρk+1  ρ̄, ∀k ≥ 0,
where ρ0  0 means that ρ0 is positive definite, and similarly ρk  ρk+1 means that ρk+1 − ρk is positive
semi-definite.
Condition B: QP +QkC  AT ρ̄A.
Proof: The proof is provided in the Appendix A.1. 
Theorem 2. The convergence rate of Algorithm 1 is O(1/t), where t is the iteration time.
Proof: The proof is provided in the Appendix A.2. 
3.3 Privacy-Preserving Decentralized Optimization
Algorithm 1 requires agents to exchange and disclose states explicitly in each iteration among
neighboring agents to reach consensus on the final optimal solution. In this section, we combine partially
homomorphic cryptography with Algorithm 1 to propose a privacy-preserving approach for decentralized
optimization. We first give the definition of privacy used in this chapter.
Definition 1. A mechanismM :M(X ) → Y is defined to be privacy preserving if the input X cannot be
uniquely derived from the output Y .
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This definition of privacy is inspired by the privacy-preservation definitions in [19, 27, 41, 68, 71, 123]
which take advantages of the fact that if a system of equations has infinite number of solutions, it is impossible
to derive the exact value of the original input data from the output data. Therefore, privacy preservation is
achieved (see, e.g, Part 4.2.2 in [41]). Next, we introduce our privacy-preserving approach based on the Paillier
cryptosystem in Sec. 2.2. We combine Paillier cryptosystem with Algorithm 1 to enable privacy preservation
in the decentralized solving of optimization problem (3.1). First, note that solving (3.13) amounts to solving
the following problem:
Ofi(xi) +
∑
j∈Ni
(λti,j + ρ
t
i,j(xi − xtj)) + γi(xi − xti) = 0. (3.16)
Let λi =
∑
j∈Ni
λi,j , then (3.16) reduces to the following equation
Ofi(xi) + (
∑
j∈Ni
ρti,j + γi)xi + λ
t
i −
∑
j∈Ni
ρti,jx
t
j − γixti = 0. (3.17)
Given that we have set ρti,i = 1−
∑
j∈Ni,j 6=i
ρti,j in (3.14), we can further reduce (3.17) to
Ofi(xi) + (1 + γi)xi + λ
t
i −
∑
j∈Ni
ρti,j(x
t
j − xti)− (1 + γi)xti = 0. (3.18)
By constructing ρti,j , i 6= j as the product of two random positive numbers, i.e., ρti,j = btij × btji =
ρtj,i, with b
t
ij only known to agent i and b
t
ji only known to agent j, we can propose a privacy-preserving
solution to (3.1) based on Algorithm 1, which is described in Algorithm 2.
Several remarks are in order:
1. The only situation that a neighbor knows the state of agent i is when xti = x
t
j is true for j ∈ Ni.
Otherwise, agent i’s state xti is encrypted and will not be revealed to its neighbors.
2. Agent i’s state xti and its intermediate communication data b
t
ji(x
t
j−xti) will not be revealed to outside
eavesdroppers, since they are encrypted.
3. The state of agent j ∈ Ni will not be revealed to agent i, because the decrypted message obtained by
agent i is btji(x
t
j − xti) with btji only known to agent j and varying in each iteration.
4. We encrypt Ei(−xti) because it is much easier to compute addition in ciphertext. The issue regarding
encryption of signed values using Paillier will be addressed in Sec. 3.5.
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Algorithm 2
Initial Setup: Each agent initializes x0i .
Input: xti, λ
t−1
i,j
Output: xt+1i , λti,j
1. Agent i encrypts −xti with its public key kpi:
xti → Ei(−xti).
Here the subscript i denotes encryption using the public key of agent i.
2. Agent i sends Ei(−xti) and its public key kpi to neighboring agents.
3. Agent j ∈ Ni encrypts xtj with agent i’s public key kpi:
xtj → Ei(xtj).
4. Agent j ∈ Ni computes the difference directly in ciphertext:
Ei(xtj − xti) = Ei(xtj) · Ei(−xti).
5. Agent j ∈ Ni computes the btji-weighted difference in ciphertext:
Ei(btji(xtj − xti)) = (Ei(xtj − xti))b
t
ji .
6. Agent j ∈ Ni sends Ei(btji(xtj − xti)) back to agent i.
7. Agent i decrypts the message received from j with its private key ksi and multiples the result with btij
to get ρti,j(x
t
j − xti).
8. Computing (3.12), agent i obtains λti,j .
9. Computing (3.18), agent i obtains xt+1i .
10. Each agent updates btij to b
t+1
ij and sets t = t+ 1.
5. Paillier encryption cannot be performed on vectors directly. For vector messages xti ∈ RD, each element
of the vector (a real number) has to be encrypted separately. For notation convenience, we still denote it
in the same way as scalars, e.g., Ei(−xti).
6. Paillier cryptosystem only works for integers, so additional steps have to be taken to convert real values
in optimization to integers. This may lead to quantization errors. A common workaround is to scale the
real value before quantization, as discussed in detail in Sec. 3.5.
7. By incorporating Paillier cryptosystem, it is obvious that the computation complexity and communication
load will increase. However, we argue that the privacy provided matters more than this disadvantage
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when privacy is of primary concern. Furthermore, our experimental results on Raspberry Pi boards
confirm that the added communication and computation overhead is fully manageable on embedded
microcontrollers (cf. Sec. 3.7).
8. Our approach is more suitable for small and medium sized optimization problems such as the power
system monitoring problem [117] addressed in our prior work.
The key to achieve privacy preservation is to construct ρti,j , i 6= j as the product of two random
positive numbers btij and b
t
ji, with b
t
ij generated by and only known to agent i and b
t
ji generated by and
only known to agent j. Next we show that the privacy preservation mechanism does not affect the convergence
to the optimal solution.
Theorem 3. The privacy-preserving algorithm 2 will generate a solution in an ε ball around the optimum if
btij , b
t
ji, and γi are updated in the following way (where ε depends on the quantization error):
1. btij is randomly chosen from [b
t−1
ij , b̄ij ], with b̄ij > 0 denoting a predetermined constant only known
to agent i;
2. γi is chosen randomly in the interval [Nb̄2, b̄], with b̄ > max{b̄ij} denoting a predetermined positive
constant known to everyone and b̄ a threshold chosen arbitrarily by agent i and only known to agent i.
Proof: It can be easily obtained that if btij is updated following 1, and γi is updated following 2,
then Condition A and Condition B in Theorem 1 will be met automatically. Therefore, the states in algorithm
2 should converge to the optimal solution. However, since Paillier cryptosystem only works on unsigned
integers, it requires converting real-valued states to integers using e.g., fixed-point arithmetic encoding [2]
(after scaled by a large number Nmax, cf. Sec. 3.5), which leads to quantization errors. The quantization errors
lead to numerical errors on the final solution and hence the “ε-ball” statement in Theorem 3. It is worth noting
that the numerical error here is no different from the conventional quantization errors met by all algorithms
when implemented in practice on a computer. A quantized analysis of the ε-ball is usually notoriously involved
and hence we refer interested readers to [136] which is dedicated to this problem. Furthermore, we would like
to emphasize that this quantization error can be made arbitrarily small by using an arbitrarily large Nmax. In
fact, our simulation results in Sec. 3.6.2 showed that under Nmax = 106, the final error was on the order of
10−14. 
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3.4 Privacy Analysis
As indicated in the introduction, our approach aims to protect the privacy of agents’ intermediate
states xtis and gradients of fis as well as the objective functions. In this section, we rigorously prove that these
private information cannot be inferred by honest-but-curious adversaries and external eavesdroppers, which
are commonly used attack models in privacy studies [62] (cf. definition in Sec. 3.1). It is worth noting that the
form of each agent’s local objective function can also be totally blind to others, e.g., whether it is a quadratic,
exponential, or other forms of convex functions is only known to an agent itself.
As indicated in Sec. 3.3, our approach in Algorithm 2 guarantees that state information is not leaked
to any neighbor in one iteration. However, would some information get leaked over time? More specifically, if
an honest-but-curious adversary observes carefully its communications with neighbors over several steps, can
it put together all the received information to infer its neighbor’s state?
We can rigorously prove that an honest-but-curious adversary cannot infer the exact states of its
neighbors even by collecting samples from multiple steps.
Theorem 4. Assume that all agents follow Algorithm 2. Then agent j’s exact state value xkj cannot be inferred
by an honest-but-curious agent i unless xki = x
k
j is true.
Proof: Suppose that an honest-but-curious agent i collects information from K iterations to infer
the information of a neighboring agent j. From the perspective of adversary agent i, the measurements
(corresponding to neighboring agent j) seen in each iteration k are yk = bkijb
k
ji(x
k
j −xki ) (k = 0, 1, ...,K),
i.e., adversary agent i can establish (K + 1)D equations based on received information:

y0 = b0ijb
0
ji(x
0
j − x0i ),
y1 = b1ijb
1
ji(x
1
j − x1i ),
...
yK−1 = bK−1ij b
K−1
ji (x
K−1
j − x
K−1
i ),
yK = bKijb
K
ji(x
K
j − xKi ).
(3.19)
To the adversary agent i, in the system of equations (3.19), yk, bkij ,x
k
i (k = 0, 1, 2, ...,K) are
known, but xkj , b
k
ji (k = 0, 1, 2, ...,K) are unknown. So the above system of (K + 1)D equations contains
(K + 1)D +K + 1 unknown variables. It is clear that adversary agent i cannot solve the system of equations
(3.19) to infer the exact values of unknowns xkj and b
k
ji (k = 0, 1, 2, ...,K) of agent j. It is worth noting that
23
if for some time index k, xkj = x
k
i happens to be true, then adversary agent i will be able to know that agent j
has the same state at this time index based on the fact that yk is 0. 
Using a similar way of reasoning, we can obtain that an honest-but-curious adversary agent i cannot
infer the exact gradient of objective function fj from a neighboring agent j at any point when agent j has
another legitimate neighbor other than the honest-but curious neighbor i.
Theorem 5. In Algorithm 2, the exact gradient of fj at any point cannot be inferred by an honest-but-curious
agent i if agent j has another legitimate neighbor.
Proof: Suppose that an honest-but-curious adversary agent i collects information from K iterations to
infer the gradient of function fj of a neighboring agent j. The adversary agent i can establish KD equations
corresponding to the gradient of fj by making use of the fact that the update rule (3.18) is publicly known, i.e.,

Ofj(x
1
j ) + (1 + γj)x
1
j + λ
0
j −
∑
m∈Nj
ρ0j,m(x
0
m − x0j )− (1 + γj)x0j = 0,
Ofj(x
2
j ) + (1 + γj)x
2
j + λ
1
j −
∑
m∈Nj
ρ1j,m(x
1
m − x1j )− (1 + γj)x1j = 0,
...
Ofj(x
K−1
j ) + (1 + γj)x
K−1
j + λ
K−2
j −
∑
m∈Nj
ρK−2j,m (x
K−2
m − xK−2j )− (1 + γj)x
K−2
j = 0,
Ofj(x
K
j ) + (1 + γj)x
K
j + λ
K−1
j −
∑
m∈Nj
ρK−1j,m (x
K−1
m − xK−1j )− (1 + γj)x
K−1
j = 0.
(3.20)
In the system of KD equations (3.20), Ofj(xkj ) (k = 1, 2, ...,K), γj , and x
k
j (k = 0, 1, 2, ...,K) are
unknown to adversary agent i. Parameters λkj and
∑
m∈Nj
ρkj,m(x
k
m−xkj ) (k = 0, 1, 2, ...,K − 1) are known to
adversary agent i only when agent j has agent i as the only neighbor. Otherwise, λkj and
∑
m∈Nj
ρkj,m(x
k
m−xkj )
(k = 0, 1, 2, ...,K−1) are unknown to adversary agent i. Noting that λk+1j = λkj −
∑
m∈Nj
ρk+1j,m (x
k+1
m −xk+1j )
and λ0j = −
∑
m∈Nj
ρ0j,m(x
0
m−x0j ), we can see that the above system of KD equations contains 3KD+D+1
unknowns when agent j has more than one neighbor. Therefore, adversary agent i cannot infer the exact values
of Ofj(xkj ) by solving (3.20).
It is worth noting that after the optimization converges, adversary agent i can have another piece of
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information according to the KKT conditions [26]:
Ofj(x
∗
j ) = −λ∗j (3.21)
where x∗j denotes the optimal solution and λ
∗
j denotes the optimal multiplier. However, since λ
∗
j is known to
adversary agent i only when agent j has agent i as the only neighbor, we have that adversary agent i cannot
infer the exact value of fj at any point when agent j has another legitimate neighbor besides an honest-but
curious neighbor i. 
Using a similar way of reasoning, we have the following corollary corresponding to the situation
where agent j has honest-but-curious agent i as the only neighbor.
Corollary 1. In Algorithm 2, the exact gradient of fj at the optimal solution can be inferred by an honest-but-
curious agent i if agent j has adversary agent i as the only neighbor. However, at any other point, the gradient
of fj is uninferrable by the adversary agent i.
Proof: Following a similar line of reasoning of Theorem 5, we can obtain the above Corollary. 
Based on Theorem 4, Theorem 5, and Corollary 1, we can obtain that agent i cannot infer agent j’s
local objective function fj .
Corollary 2. In Algorithm 2, agent j’s local objective function fj cannot be inferred by an honest-but-curious
agent i.
Proof: According to Theorem 4, Theorem 5, and Corollary 1, the intermediate states and correspond-
ing gradients of fj cannot be inferred by adversary i. Therefore, adversary i cannot infer agent j’s local
objective function fj as well. 
Furthermore, we have that an external eavesdropper cannot infer any private information of all agents.
Corollary 3. All agents’ intermediate states, gradients of objective functions, and objective functions cannot
be inferred by an external eavesdropper.
Proof: Since all exchanged messages are encrypted and that cracking the encryption is practically
infeasible [36], an external eavesdropper cannot learn anything by intercepting these messages. Therefore, it
cannot infer any agent’s intermediate states, gradients of objective functions, and objective functions. 
From the above analysis, it is obvious that agent j’s private information cannot be uniquely derived
by adversaries. However, an honest-but-curious neighbor i can still get some range information about the
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state xkj and this range information will become tighter as x
k
j converges to the optimal solution as k →∞ (cf.
the simulation results in Fig. 3.4). We argue that this is completely unavoidable for any privacy-preserving
approaches because all agents have to agree on the same final state, upon which the privacy of xkj will disappear.
In fact, this is also acknowledged in [54], which shows that the privacy of xkj will vanish as k →∞ and the
noise variance converges to zero at the state corresponding to the optimal solution. It is worth noting that
when the constraint is of a form different from consensus, it may be possible to protect the privacy of xkj when
k →∞. However, how to incorporate the proposed privacy mechanism in decentralized optimization under
non-consensus constraint is difficult and could be addressed in future work.
Remark 4. It is worth noting that an adversary agent i can combine systems of equations (3.19) and (3.20)
to infer the information of a neighboring agent j. However, this will not increase the ability of adversary agent
i because the combination will not change the fact that the number of unknowns is greater than the number of
establishable relevant equations. In addition, if all other agents collude to infer xkj of agent j, these agents
can be considered as one agent which amounts to having a network consisting of two agents.
Remark 5. From Theorem 4, we can see that in decentralized optimization, an agent’s information will not be
disclosed to other agents no matter how many neighbors it has. This is in distinct difference from the average
consensus problem in [80, 98] where privacy cannot be protected for an agent if it has an honest-but-curious
adversary as the only neighbor.
3.5 Implementation Details
In this section, we discuss several technical issues that have to be addressed in the implementation of
Algorithm 2.
1. In modern communication, a real number is represented by a floating point number, while encryption
techniques only work for unsigned integers. To deal with this problem, we uniformly multiplied each
element of the vector message xti ∈ RD (in floating point representation) by a sufficiently large number
Nmax and round off the fractional part during the encryption to convert it to an integer. After decryption,
the result is divided by Nmax. This process is conducted in each iteration and this quantization brings
an error upper-bounded by 1Nmax . In implementation, Nmax can be chosen according to the used data
structure.
2. As indicated in 1, encryption techniques only work for unsigned integers. In our implementation all
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integer values are stored in fix-length integers (i.e., long int in C) and negative values are left in 2’s
complement format. Encryption and intermediate computations are carried out as if the underlying data
were unsigned. When the final message is decrypted, the overflown bits (bits outside the fixed length)
are discarded and the remaining binary number is treated as a signed integer which is later converted
back to a real value.
3.6 Numerical Simulations
In this section, we first illustrate the efficiency of the proposed approach using C/C++ implementations.
Then we compare our approach with the algorithm in [54] and the algorithm in [71]. The open-source C
implementation of the Paillier cryptosystem [12] is used in our simulations. We conducted numerical
experiments on the following global objective function
f(x̃) =
N∑
i=1
1
pi
‖ Hix̃− θi ‖2, (3.22)
which makes the optimization problem (3.1) become
min
x̃
N∑
i=1
1
pi
‖ Hix̃− θi ‖2 (3.23)
with θi ∈ RD, Hi = hiID (hi ∈ R), and pi > 0 (pi ∈ R). Hence, each agent i deals with a private local
objective function
fi(xi) =
1
pi
‖ Hixi − θi ‖2,∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. (3.24)
We used the above function (3.22) because it is easy to verify whether the obtained solution is the minimal
value of the original optimization problem, which should be
∑N
i=1
2hi
pi
θi∑N
i=1
2h2
i
pi
. Furthermore, (3.22) makes it easy to
compare with [54], whose verification is also based on (3.22).
In the implementation, the parameters are set as follows: Nmax was set to 106 to convert each element
in xi to a 64-bit integer during intermediate computations. btij was also scaled up in the same way and
represented by a 64-bit integer. The encryption and decryption keys were chosen as 256-bit long.
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3.6.1 Evaluation of Our Approach
We implemented Algorithm 2 on different network topologies, all of which gave the right optimal
solution. Simulation results confirmed that our approach always converged to the optimal solution of (3.23).
Fig. 3.2 visualizes the evolution of xi (i = 1, 2, ..., 6) in one specific run where the network deployment
is illustrated in Fig. 3.1. In Fig. 3.2, xij (i = 1, 2, ..., 6, j = 1, 2) denotes the jth element of xi. All
xi (i = 1, 2, ..., 6) converged to the optimal solution [38.5; 4076 ]. In this run, b̄ was set to 0.65 and γis
were set to 3. Fig. 3.3 visualizes the encrypted weighted differences (in ciphertext) E1(bt21(xt21 − xt11)),
agent communication 
link
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agent 2
agent 3
agent 4
agent 5
agent 6
Figure 3.1: A network of six agents (N = 6).
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Figure 3.2: The evolution of xi (i = 1, 2, ..., 6) in Algorithm 2.
28
E1(bt41(xt41 − xt11)), and E1(bt61(xt61 − xt11)). It is worth noting that although the states of all agents have
converged after about 40 iterations, the encrypted weighted differences (in ciphertext) still appeared random to
an outside eavesdropper.
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Figure 3.3: The evolution of the encrypted weighted differences (in ciphertext) E1(bt21(xt21 − xt11)),
E1(bt41(xt41 − xt11)), and E1(bt61(xt61 − xt11)) in Algorithm 2.
We also simulated an honest-but-curious adversary who tries to estimate its neighbors’ intermediate
states and gradients in order to estimate the objective function. We considered the worse case of two agents
(A and B) where agent B is the honest-but-curious adversary and intends to estimate the objective function
fA of agent A. The individual local objective functions are the same as (3.24) with θi ∈ R. Because agent
B knows the constraints on agent A’s generation of btAB and γA (cf. Theorem 3), it generates estimates of
btAB and γA in the same random way. Then it obtained a series of estimated x
t
A and OfA(x
t
A) according to
(3.20). Finally, agent B used the estimated xtA and OfA(x
t
A) to estimate fA.
Fig. 3.4 and Fig. 3.5 show the estimated xA and fA in 2,000 trials when agent B used simple linear
regression to estimate OfA(x). Fig. 3.5 suggests that agent B cannot get a good estimate of fA. Moreover,
it is worth noting that all these estimated functions give the same optimal solution as fA to the optimization
problem (3.23).
In addition, the encryption/decryption computation took about 1ms for each agent to communicate
with one neighbor at each iteration on a 3.6 GHz CPU, which is manageable in small or medium sized real-time
optimization problems such as the power system monitoring problem [117] addressed in our prior work. For
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Figure 3.4: Estimated states of xA in 2,000 trials.
Figure 3.5: Estimated functions of fA in 2,000 trials.
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large sized optimization problems like machine learning with extremely large dimensions, the approach may
be computationally too heavy due to the underlying Paillier encryption scheme.
3.6.2 Comparison with the algorithm in [54]
We then compared our approach with the differential-privacy based privacy-preserving optimization
algorithm in [54]. Under the communication topology in Fig. 3.1, we simulated the algorithm in [54] under
seven different privacy levels: ε = 0.2, 1, 10, 20, 30, 50, 100. The global function we used for comparison was
(3.22) with pi (i = 1, 2, .., 6) fixed to 2, hi (i = 1, 2, .., 6) fixed to 1, and θi = [0.1 × (i − 1) + 0.1; 0.1 ×
(i − 1) + 0.2]. The domain of optimization was set to X = {(x, y) ∈ R2|x2 + y2 ≤ 1} for the algorithm
in [54]. Note that the optimal solution [0.35; 0.45] resided in X . Parameter settings for the algorithm in [54]
are detailed as follows: n = 2, c = 0.5, q = 0.8, p = 0.9, and
aij =

0.2 j ∈ Ni\i,
0 j /∈ Ni,
1−
∑
j∈Ni\i
aij i = j,
(3.25)
for i = 1, 2, ..., 6. Here Ni\i denotes all values except i in set Ni. Furthermore, we used the performance
index d in [54] to quantify the optimization error, which was computed as the average value of squared
distances with respect to the optimal solution over M runs [54], i.e.,
d =
6∑
i=1
M∑
k=1
‖ xki − [0.35; 0.45] ‖2
6M
with xki the obtained solution of agent i in the kth run.
Simulation results from 5,000 runs showed that our approach converged to [0.35; 0.45] with an error
d = 3.14 × 10−14, which is negligible compared with the simulation results under the algorithm in [54]
(cf. Fig. 3.6, where each differential privacy level was implemented for 5,000 times). The results confirm
the trade-off between privacy and accuracy for differential-privacy based approaches and demonstrate the
advantages of our approach in terms of optimization accuracy.
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Figure 3.6: The comparison of Algorithm 2 with the algorithm in [54] in terms of optimization error.
3.6.3 Comparison with the algorithm in [71]
We also compared our approach with the privacy-preserving optimization algorithm in [71]. The
network communication topology used for comparison is still the one in Fig. 3.1 and the global objective
function used is (3.22) with pi (i = 1, 2, .., 6) fixed to 2, hi (i = 1, 2, .., 6) fixed to 1, and θi ∈ R2. The
adjacency matrix of network graph is defined in (3.25) for the algorithm in [71]. Moreover, we let every agent
update at each iteration and ci = 1 (i = 1, ..., 6) for [71]. The initial states are set to the same values for both
algorithms.
Fig. 3.7 and Fig. 3.8 show the evolution of xi in our approach and the algorithm in [71] respectively.
It is clear that our approach converged faster than the algorithm in [71].
3.7 Implementation on Raspberry PI boards
We also implemented our privacy-preserving approach on twelve Raspberry Pi boards to confirm the
efficiency of the approach in real-world physical systems. Each board has 64-bit ARMv8 CPU and 1 GB RAM
(cf. Fig. 3.9). The optimization problem (3.23) was used in implementation with pi (i = 1, 2, .., 6) fixed to 2,
hi (i = 1, 2, .., 6) fixed to 1, and θi ∈ R. In the implementation, “libpaillier-0.8” library [3] was used to realize
the Paillier encryption and decryption process, “sys/socket.h” C library was used to conduct communication
through Wi-Fi, and “pthread” C library was used to generate multiple parallel threads to realize parallelism in
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Figure 3.7: The evolution of xi in Algorithm 2.
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Figure 3.8: The evolution of xi in the algorithm of [71].
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multi-agent networks. The encryption and decryption keys were chosen as 512-bit long.
Implementation results confirmed that our approach always converged to the optimal solution. Fig.
3.10 visualizes the evolution of xi (i = 1, 2, ..., 12) in one specific implementation where the network topology
used is a cycle graph. We can see that each xi converged to the optimal solution 188.417.
Figure 3.9: The twelve Raspberry Pi boards
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Figure 3.10: The evolution of xi of Algorithm 2 in the experimental verification using Raspberry Pi boards.
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3.8 Summaries
In this chapter, we presented a privacy-preserving decentralized optimization approach by proposing
a new ADMM and leveraging partially homomorphic cryptography. By incorporating Paillier cryptosystem
into the newly proposed decentralized ADMM, our approach provides guarantee for privacy preservation
without compromising the solution in the absence of any aggregator or third party. This is in sharp contrast
to differential-privacy based approaches which protect privacy through injecting noise and are subject to a
fundamental trade-off between privacy and accuracy. Different from the privacy-preserving optimization
approach in [71] which only protects the privacy of gradients, our approach preserves the privacy of both
intermediate states and gradients. In addition, [71] assumes that an adversary does not have access to the
adjacency matrix of the network graph while our approach does not need this assumption.Theoretical analysis
confirms that an honest-but-curious adversary cannot infer the information of neighboring agents even by
recording and analyzing the information exchanged in multiple iterations. The new ADMM allows time-
varying penalty matrices and have a theoretically guaranteed convergence rate of O(1/t), which makes it of
mathematical interest by itself. Numerical and experimental results are given to confirm the effectiveness and
efficiency of the proposed approach.
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Chapter 4
Privacy-preserving Decentralized
Optimization Based on Subgradient
Method
4.1 Introduction
This chapter considers a decentralized problem in which N agents cooperatively solve a constrained
optimization over a time-varying network topology. Such optimization problem have found applications in
domains as diverse as source localization in sensor networks [78], spectrum sensing in cognitive networks [128],
support vector machine in machine learning [23], cooperative control [87], data regression in statistics
[67, 77], and the monitoring of power systems [35, 83]. In this chapter, we propose an approach that enables
privacy-preservation in decentralized optimization through incorporating partially homomorphic cryptography
in subgradient method. We show that by employing the convergence property of subgradient method,
cryptographic techniques can be incorporated in a fully decentralized manner to enable privacy-preservation in
decentralized optimization in the absence of any third party or aggregator.
We also consider the two types of adversaries defined in 3.1 in this chapter, which are Honest-but-
curious adversaries who follow all protocol steps correctly but are curious and collect all intermediate and
input/output data in an attempt to learn some information about other participating agents [36,62] and External
eavesdroppers who steal information through wiretapping all communication channels and intercepting
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exchanged messages between agents. In addition, we define privacy as preserving the confidentiality of agents’
intermediate states and objective functions in this chapter.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Sec. 4.2 reviews the constrained decentralized
optimization problem. Based on the Paillier cryptosystem, a completely decentralized privacy-preserving
approach is proposed in Sec. 4.3. Rigorous analysis of the guaranteed privacy under the approach is addressed
in Sec. 4.4 and its implementation details are discussed in Sec. 4.5. Sec. 4.6 discusses its application to the
average consensus problem. Numerical simulation results are given in Sec. 4.7 to confirm the effectiveness
and computational efficiency of the proposed approach. In the end, we draw summaries in Sec. 4.8.
4.2 Preliminaries
4.2.1 Constrained Decentralized Optimization
4.2.1.1 Optimization Model
The problem of constrained decentralized optimization can be formulated in the following form:
min
x̃
N∑
i=1
fi(x̃)
subject to x̃ ∈ X ,
(4.1)
where X ⊆ RD is a closed convex set common to all agents, and function fi : RD → R is the local objective
function private to (only known to) agent i. Note that here fi is convex but not necessarily differentiable
everywhere.
Remark 6. In practical applications, the solutions to an unconstrained optimization problem should be finite.
Therefore, we can easily reformulate an unconstrained optimization problem as a constrained optimization
problem by setting a large enough constraint set X .
The constrained optimization problem has been widely used. Here we give some typical examples.
Example 1: In source localization, N sensors cooperatively localize the position of a source using
noisy range measurements with respect to the source from distributedly deployed sensors. When the source is
located in the convex hull of deployed sensors, a classical approach is to turn the localization problem into the
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problem of finding a point common to a set of closed convex sets Xi [78], which can be formulated as follows:
min
x
1
2
N∑
i=1
‖ x− PXi [x] ‖2
where i = 1, 2, ..., N is the index of deployed sensors and
Xi = {x ∈ RD| ‖ x− pi ‖2≤ r2i }.
Here, pi is the position of sensor i and ri is the range measurement of the source with respect to sensor i.
PXi [·] denotes the projection operation onto the set Xi, i.e., PXi [r] = argmin
y∈Xi
‖ y − r ‖.
Example 2: In cooperative control, a typical problem is to guarantee that a group of agents reach a
common decision or agreement formulated as follows [54, 87]:
min
x
N∑
i=1
1
2
‖ x− θi ‖2
subject to x ∈ X ,
(4.2)
where θi (i = 1, 2, ..., N) are known parameters, and x is the unknown vector.
Example 3: In statistical analysis, many problems have the constrained optimization formulation in
(4.1):
Simple linear regression
min
γ0,γ1
N∑
i=1
‖ yi − γ0 − γ1xi ‖2,
where yi and xi are known parameters, γ0 and γ1 are unknown variables.
Logistic regression [67]
min
x,c
1
N
N∑
i=1
log(1 + exp(−bi(xTai + c))) + τ ‖ x ‖1,
where bi, ai, and τ are known parameters, c and x are unknown variables.
Other examples can be found in power systems [83], compressive spectrum sensing [128], and
machine leaning [23, 123, 134].
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4.2.1.2 Decentralized Algorithm [87]
A decentralized solution to the constrained optimization problem (4.1) is the projected subgradient
algorithm in [87]. In the projected subgradient algorithm, each agent i updates its estimate by first fusing the
estimates from its neighbors, then taking a subgradient step, and finally projecting to the closed convex set X ,
i.e.,
vki =
N∑
j=1
akijx
k
j , (4.3)
xk+1i = PX [v
k
i − αkdki ]. (4.4)
Here, aij is a nonnegative weight assigned to xj by agent i, PX [·] denotes the projection operation onto the
set X , i.e., PX [r] = argmin
y∈X
‖ y − r ‖, αk > 0 is a stepsize, and dki is a subgradient of fi at x = vki .
4.2.1.3 Convergence Analysis
According to [87], the algorithm (4.3)-(4.4) is guaranteed to converge under the following three
assumptions when the stepsize αk satisfies
∑
k
αk =∞ and
∑
k
α2k <∞:
Assumption 3. There exists a scalar 0 < η < 1 such that for all k ≥ 0 and i = 1, 2, ..., N :
1. akii ≥ η.
2. akij ≥ η for all j ∈ N ki . Here N ki denotes the set of all neighboring agents of i at time instant k.
3. akij = 0 for all j /∈ N ki ∪ {i}.
4.
N∑
j=1
akij = 1.
5. akij = a
k
ji.
Note that the N agents may form a time-varying network, i.e., the neighbors of agent i may change
with time.
Assumption 4. The graph (V,E∞) is strongly connected, where
E∞ = {eij |eij ∈ Ek for infinitely many indices k}.
39
Here, Ek denotes the set of communication links (undirected edges) at time instant k, and eij ∈ Ek
denotes that agents i and j are neighbors (directly connected) at time instant k. Note that here we denote a
communication link as eij if i < j is true or as eji otherwise.
Assumption 5. There exists an integer B ≥ 1 such that for each eij ∈ E∞, agent j sends its estimate to
agent i at least once every B consecutive time slots.
A typical way to choose αk is αk = T1k+T2 , where 0 < T1 <∞ and 0 < T2 <∞.
4.3 Privacy-preserving Decentralized Optimization
In the algorithm (4.3)-(4.4) for the constrained optimization problem (4.1), to reach consensus on the
final optimal solution, agents exchange and disclose estimates (states) explicitly in each iteration to neighboring
agents, which leads to privacy breaches. Such information exchange is also vulnerable to eavesdropping
attacks which aim to steal information by intercepting exchanged messages. In this section, we introduce
a completely decentralized and third-party free approach to enable privacy-preservation in the constrained
decentralized optimization problem. More specifically, we will propose an interaction protocol which enables
an easy integration of partially homomorphic cryptography with the algorithm (4.3)-(4.4) to enable privacy-
preservation without the assistance of any aggregator or third party. The definition of privacy is given in
Definition 1.
To this end, we first rewrite (4.3) as follows
vki = x
k
i +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
akij(x
k
j − xki ). (4.5)
The key idea of our privacy-preserving mechanism is to construct akij , i 6= j, j ∈ N ki as the product
of two random positive numbers, i.e., akij = b
k
ij × bkji = akji, with bkij generated by and only known to
agent i, and bkji generated by and only known to agent j when agent i and agent j can communicate with
each other at time instant k. It is worth noting that if agent i and agent j cannot communicate with each other
at time instant k, akij and a
k
ji are set to 0 directly. Next we give in detail our privacy-preserving solution to the
constrained-decentralized-optimization problem in (4.1), which is described in Algorithm 3.
Several remarks are in order:
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Algorithm 3
Initial Setup: Each agent initializes x0i .
Input: xki
Output: xk+1i
1. Agent i encrypts −xki with its public key kpi:
xki → Ei(−xki ).
Here the subscript i denotes encryption using the public key of agent i.
2. Agent i sends Ei(−xki ) and its public key kpi to its neighboring agents.
3. Agent j ∈ N ki encrypts xkj with agent i’s public key kpi:
xkj → Ei(xkj ).
4. Agent j ∈ N ki computes the difference directly in ciphertext:
Ei(xkj − xki ) = Ei(xkj ) · Ei(−xki ).
5. Agent j ∈ N ki computes the bkji-weighted difference in ciphertext:
Ei(bkji(xkj − xki )) = (Ei(xkj − xki ))b
k
ji .
6. Agent j ∈ N ki sends Ei(bkji(xkj − xki )) back to agent i.
7. Agent i decrypts the message received from j with its private key ksi and multiples the result with bkij
to get akij(x
k
j − xki ).
8. Computing (4.5), agent i obtains vki .
9. Computing (4.4), agent i obtains xk+1i .
10. Each agent updates bkij to b
k+1
ij and sets k = k + 1.
1. Agent i’s state xki and its intermediate communication data b
k
ji(x
k
j − xki ) will not be revealed to
outside eavesdroppers, since they are encrypted.
2. The state of agent j ∈ N ki will not be revealed to agent i, because the decrypted message obtained by
agent i is bkji(x
k
j − xki ) with bkji only known to agent j and varying in each iteration.
3. We encrypt Ei(−xki ) because it is much easier to compute addition in ciphertext. The issue regarding
encryption of signed values using Paillier will be addressed in Sec. 4.5.
4. Paillier encryption cannot be performed on vectors directly. For vector messages xki ∈ RD, each
element of the vector has to be encrypted separately. For notational convenience, we still denote it in the
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same way as scalars, e.g., Ei(−xki ).
5. Paillier cryptosystem only works for integers, so additional steps have to be taken to convert real values
in optimization to integers. This may lead to quantization errors. A common workaround is to scale a
real value before quantization, as discussed in detail in Sec. 4.5.
6. The proposed approach requires agents to update synchronously and it may fail to converge if applied to
asynchronous networks directly.
In Algorithm 3, steps 1 to 7 constitute the core of our approach to incorporating Paillier cryptosystem
in privacy-preserving optimization in a fully decentralized manner. In fact, it can also be seen that the only
net effect of our privacy-preserving mechanism is random and time-varying coefficients akij in (4.5). Next we
show that the privacy-preserving mechanism does not affect the convergence of the algorithm to its optimal
solution.
Theorem 6. The convergence of the privacy-preserving Algorithm 3 is guaranteed if Assumptions 4 and
5 hold, all bkij are randomly chosen from [
√
η,
√
1−η
N−1 ] with 0 < η < 1/N , and the stepsize αk satisfies∑
k
αk =∞ and
∑
k
α2k <∞.
Proof: We show that Assumption 3 will be met if all bkij are randomly chosen from [
√
η,
√
1−η
N−1 ]
with 0 < η < 1/N . First, since akij and a
k
ji are set to 0 directly when j /∈ N ki , and to akij = bkijbkji =
bkjib
k
ij = a
k
ji when j ∈ N ki , it is clear that conditions 3) and 5) in Assumption 3 are satisfied. (Note that
bkij and b
k
ji are unknown to agents j and i respectively, so a
k
ij and a
k
ji are equal but unknown to both agent i
and agent j.) Next, rewriting (4.5) as
vki = (1−
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
akij)x
k
i +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
akijx
k
j
we have that akii = 1 −
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
akij is always true under the update rule and hence the condition 4) of
Assumption 3 is satisfied. When j ∈ N ki , bkij and bkji are chosen from the interval [
√
η,
√
1−η
N−1 ], so we
have η ≤ akij = bkijbkji ≤
1−η
N−1 and further a
k
ii = 1−
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
akij ≥ 1− (N − 1)×
√
1−η
N−1 ×
√
1−η
N−1 = η,
i.e., akij ≥ η and akii ≥ η for 0 < η < 1/N . Therefore, the conditions 1) and 2) in Assumption 3 are also
satisfied. So we have Theorem 6. 
Remark 7. It is worth noting that in Algorithm 3, if the state of agent i and agent j, i.e., xki and xkj happen to
be equal to each other, then agent i will be able to know this based on the fact that the obtained akij(x
k
j − xki )
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in step 7 is zero. This fact that agent i and agent j being equal is inferable from zero akij(x
k
j − xki ) can be
covered by allowing bkij and b
k
ji to be set to zero randomly. In this case, agents i and j’s mutual link is
intentionally abandoned and they are not neighbors any more at this specific time instant. Because they are
not neighbors at this time instant, having akij = 0 in this case is still consistent with the conditions 2 and 3 in
Assumption 3. Therefore, following a similar derivation as Theorem 6, we can easily get that the network will
converge to the optimal solution as long as there exists an integer B ≥ 1 such that for each eij ∈ E∞, bkij
and bkji are both nonzero for at least once every B consecutive time slots.
Remark 8. According to [87], when the weights akij are identical and time-invariant, i.e., all equal to 1/N ,
the convergence rate of algorithm (4.3)-(4.4) is geometric, i.e., there exists a λ ∈ (0, 1) and some positive
constant C such that ‖ xk − x∗ ‖≤ Cλk holds for all k [88]. When akij are time-varying, according
to [87], the convergence rate is mainly determined by the rate at which the transition matrix Φ(k, s) =
A(s)A(s + 1)...A(k − 1)Ak converges to 1N 1
T1, where 1 represents a column vector of all ones and the
(i, j)th entry of Ak is equal to akij . So next we analyze the influence of the privacy-preserving mechanism
on convergence rate by analyzing the influence of random akij on the convergence of Φ(k, s). Note that the
convergence of the transition matrix Φ(k, s) is established in [87]:
|[Φ(k, s)]ji −
1
N
| ≤ 21 + η
−B0
1− ηB0
(1− ηB0)(k−s)/B0 ,
where B0 = (N − 1)B with B defined in Assumption 5 and N the total number of agents. It is clear that
a greater η leads to a higher convergence speed. However, from Theorem 6 we know that all akij should be
randomly chosen in [η, 1−ηN−1 ], and hence to provide stronger privacy protection, η should be set smaller to
ensure that weights akij can randomly vary in a larger range. Therefore, there is a trade-off in choosing η: a
smaller η leads to stronger privacy protection but a lower convergence speed.
4.4 Privacy Analysis
In this section, we rigorously prove that each agent’s private information, e.g., immediate estimate
(state) xkj and private local objective function fj , cannot be inferred by honest-but-curious adversaries and
external eavesdroppers, which are commonly-used attack models in privacy studies [36,62] (cf. definitions
in Sec. 4.1). It is worth noting that the form of each agent’s local objective function fj can also be totally
inaccessible to others, i.e., whether it is a quadratic, exponential, or other forms of convex functions is only
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known to an agent itself. In addition, the distribution of bji is private to agent j itself.
As indicated in Sec. 4.3, our approach in Algorithm 3 guarantees that state information is not leaked to
any neighbors in one iteration. However, would some information get leaked to an honest-but-curious adversary
over time? More specifically, if an honest-but-curious adversary observes carefully its communications with
neighbors over several steps, can it put together all the received information to infer its neighbor’s state?
We can rigorously prove that an honest-but-curious adversary cannot infer the states of its neighbors
even by collecting samples from multiple steps.
Theorem 7. In Algorithm 3, an agent j’s state xkj cannot be inferred by an honest-but-curious neighboring
agent i.
Proof: Suppose that an honest-but-curious agent i collects information from K iterations to infer
the information of a neighboring agent j. From the perspective of the adversary agent i, the measurement
(corresponding to neighboring agent j) seen in each iteration k is yk = bkijb
k
ji(x
k
j−xki ) (k = 0, 1, 2, ...,K),
i.e., based on received information, the adversary agent i can establish (K + 1)D equations with respect to the
state of agent j:

y0 = b0ijb
0
ji(x
0
j − x0i ),
y1 = b1ijb
1
ji(x
1
j − x1i ),
...
yK = bKijb
K
ji(x
K
j − xKi ).
(4.6)
To the adversary agent i, in the system of equations (4.6), yk, bkij , x
k
i (k = 0, 1, 2, ...,K) are
known, but xkj , b
k
ji (k = 0, 1, 2, ...,K) are unknown. So the above system of (K + 1)D equations contains
(K + 1)D + K + 1 unknown variables. It is clear that the adversary agent i cannot solve the system of
equations to infer the unknowns xkj or b
k
ji (k = 0, 1, 2, ...,K) of agent j. 
Based on a similar line of reasoning, we can obtain that an honest-but-curious agent i cannot infer
the private information of function fj from a neighboring agent j either.
Corollary 4. In Algorithm 3, agent j’s private local function fj will not be revealed to an honest-but-curious
agent i.
Proof: Suppose that an honest-but-curious agent i collects information from K iterations to infer the
function fj of a neighboring agent j. The adversary agent i can establish KD equations with respect to fj by
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making use of the fact that the update rule (4.4) is publicly known, i.e.,

x1j = PX [v
0
j − α0d0j ],
x2j = PX [v
1
j − α1d1j ],
...
xKj = PX [v
K−1
j − αK−1d
K−1
j ].
(4.7)
We discuss (4.7) under two cases. Case 1): When agent j has more than one neighbor, the values of vkj , d
k
j
(k = 0, 1, 2, ...,K − 1), and xkj (k = 1, 2, ...,K) are unknown to adversary agent i. So the above system of
KD equations contains 3KD unknown variables; Case 2): When agent j has agent i as its only neighbor,
then another set of equations vkj = x
k
j − yk (k = 1, 2, ...,K − 1) are accessible to agent i, and hence in
combination with the equations in (4.7), agent i has access to (2K − 1)D equations with 3KD unknowns. In
neither case can adversary agent i infer fj . 
Similarly, we have that an external eavesdropper cannot infer any private information of an agent.
Corollary 5. Every agent’s intermediate states and objective functions cannot be inferred by an external
eavesdropper.
Proof: Since all exchanged messages are encrypted and that cracking the encryption is practically
infeasible [36], an external eavesdropper cannot learn anything by intercepting exchanged messages. Therefore,
it cannot infer any agents’ intermediate states or objective functions. 
From the above analysis, it is obvious that agent j’s private information cannot be uniquely derived
by adversaries. However, an honest-but-curious neighbor i can still get some range information about the
state xkj and this estimated range will become tighter as x
k
j converges to the optimal value as k → ∞ (cf.
the simulation results in Fig. 4.8). We argue that this is completely unavoidable for any privacy-preserving
approaches where all agents have to agree on the same final state, upon which the privacy of xkj disappears. In
fact, this is also acknowledged in [54], which shows that the privacy of xkj will vanish as k →∞.
Remark 9. It is worth noting that an adversary agent i can combine systems of equations (4.6) and (4.7) to
infer the information of a neighboring agent j. However, this will not enhance the ability of adversary agent i
because the combination will not change the fact that the number of unknowns is greater than the number of
establishable relevant equations.
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Remark 10. From Theorem 7, we can see that in decentralized optimization, an agent’s information will
not be disclosed to other agents no matter how many neighbors it has. This is in distinct difference from
the average consensus problem in [75, 80, 98] where privacy cannot be protected for an agent if it has the
honest-but-curious adversary as the only neighbor. This shows the disparate difference between decentralized
optimization and the linear consensus problem.
4.5 Implementation Details
In this section, we recapitulate several technical issues that have to be addressed in the implementation
of Algorithm 3, which are same to the implementation of Algorithm 2.
1. In modern communication, a real number is represented by a floating point number, while encryption
techniques only work for unsigned integers. To deal with this problem, we uniformly multiplied each
element of the vector message xki ∈ RD (in floating point representation) by a sufficiently large number
Nmax and round off the fractional part during the encryption to convert it to an integer. After decryption,
the result is divided by Nmax. This process is conducted in each iteration and this quantization brings
an error upper-bounded by 1Nmax .
2. As indicated in 1, encryption techniques only work for unsigned integers. In our implementation all
integer values are stored in fix-length integers (i.e., long int in C) and negative values are left in 2’s
complement format. Encryption and intermediate computations are carried out as if the underlying data
were unsigned. When the final message is decrypted, the overflown bits (bits outside the fixed length)
are discarded and the remaining binary number is treated as a signed integer which is later converted
back to a real value.
4.6 Application to Average Consensus
Average consensus addresses the distributed computation of the mathematical mean of participating
agents’ states. In recent years, it has found applications in domains as diverse as automatic control, social
sciences, signal processing, robotics, and optimization [93]. In this section, we show that the average
consensus problem can be formulated as a constrained optimization problem, which, in turn, can be solved
using Algorithm 3 with privacy guarantee for participating agents.
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Assume that participating agents have scalar states βi for i = 1, 2, ..., N . Then the problem of reach-
ing average consensus, i.e., β̄ = 1N
N∑
i=1
βi, on every agent, can be formulated as the following decentralized
optimization problem:
min
x
N∑
i=1
1
2
(x− βi)2
subject to x ∈ X .
(4.8)
Here X is assumed to be large enough to contain the average consensus value β̄.
Theorem 8. A network of N agents with individual states βi (i = 1, 2, ..., N) can distributedly compute the
average β̄ by solving (4.8) using Algorithm 3 if Assumptions 4 and 5 hold, all bkij are randomly chosen from
[
√
η,
√
1−η
N−1 ] with 0 < η < 1/N , and the stepsize αk satisfies
∑
k
αk =∞ and
∑
k
α2k <∞.
Proof: The proof can be obtained following a similar line of reasoning of Theorem 6 and hence is
omitted here. 
In addition, we have that an honest-but-curious agent i cannot infer the state of any other agents.
Theorem 9. Agent j’s private state βj cannot be inferred by an honest-but-curious neighboring agent i if the
network is composed of more than two agents, i.e., N > 2, and the stepsize αk satisfies αk 6= 1 for all k ≥ 0.
Proof: The proof can be obtained following a similar line of reasoning of Theorem 7 and hence is
omitted here. 
Remark 11. The condition αk 6= 1 for all k ≥ 0 is easy to satisfy. For example, the commonly used form of
αk =
T1
k+T2
(0 < T1 < T2 <∞) in [17, 84] naturally satisfies this condition.
Remark 12. It is worth noting that in average consensus, the update rule of dkj , i.e., dkj = vkj − βj , can
be known to every participating agent. This is different from the general constrained optimization problem
(4.1), where fj and the update rule of dkj are completely private to agent j. Therefore, average consensus
requires a stronger condition for privacy-preservation, i.e., N > 2 and αk 6= 1 for all k ≥ 0. However, the
condition N > 2 is still less restrictive than the condition of requiring at least two neighbors in existing
data-obfuscation based privacy-preserving average consensus results [75, 80]. In addition, as all exchanged
messages are encrypted, our approach is also resilient to outside eavesdroppers, which will fail existing
approaches in [75, 80].
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4.7 Numerical Simulations
In this section, we first illustrate the efficiency of the proposed privacy-preserving approach using
C/C++ implementations. Then we compare our privacy-preserving average consensus approach with existing
results in [80] and [75]. We used the open-source C implementation of the Paillier cryptosystem [12] in our
simulations.
In the implementation, Nmax was set to 106 to convert each element in xi to a 64-bit integer during
intermediate computations. bkij and b
k
ji were also scaled up in the same way and represented by 64-bit
integers. The encryption and decryption keys were chosen as 256-bit long.
4.7.1 Evaluation of Algorithm 3
We evaluated the effectiveness of Algorithm 3 using the source localization problem (cf. Example
1), agreement problem (cf. Example 2), and a least square problem (cf. Example 3), which are typical and
important applications of the decentralized optimization problem (4.1).
4.7.1.1 Source Localization
We implemented Algorithm 3 under different source localization setups with sensors randomly
distributed in the plane [0, 100] × [0, 100] and a source located at [50; 45]. Simulation results confirmed
that Algorithm 3 always converged to the source position when the source was located in the convex hull
of all sensors. Fig. 4.2 visualizes the evolution of xi (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) in one specific run where the network
deployment is illustrated in Fig. 4.1. In Fig. 4.2, xij (i = 1, 2, 3, 4, j = 1, 2) denotes the jth element of xi.
All xi (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) converged to the source position [50; 45]. Fig. 4.3 visualizes the encrypted weighted
differences (in ciphertext) E1(bk21(xk21 −xk11)), E1(bk31(xk31 −xk11)), and E1(bk41(xk41 −xk11)). It is worth
noting that although the estimates of all agents have converged after about 30 iterations, the encrypted weighted
differences (in ciphertext) still appeared random to an outside eavesdropper. For Paillier cryptosystem, if the
encryption/decryption key-length is n-bit, the size of ciphertexts will be 2n [20]. Since we use 256-bit key, the
ciphertext is 512-bit, i.e. as large as 2512.
4.7.1.2 Agreement Problem
We next implemented Algorithm 3 under different network topologies to solve the agreement problem
in Example 2. Simulation results confirmed that Algorithm 3 always converged to the optimal solution
N∑
i=1
θi
N .
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Figure 4.1: Source localization setup used in one simulation run.
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Figure 4.2: The evolution of xi (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) in Algorithm 3.
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Figure 4.3: The evolution of the encrypted wighted differences (in ciphertext) E1(bk21(xk21 − xk11)),
E1(bk31(xk31 − xk11)), and E1(bk41(xk41 − xk11)).
Fig. 4.5 visualizes the evolution of xi (i = 1, 2, ..., 6) in one specific run where the network communication
topology is given in Fig. 4.4 and αk was set to αk = 1k+2 . In Fig. 4.5, xij (i = 1, 2, ..., 6, j = 1, 2) denotes
the jth element of xi. All xi (i = 1, 2, ..., 6) converged to the optimal value [48.5; 3736 ].
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Figure 4.4: A network of six agents (N = 6).
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Figure 4.5: The evolution of xi (i = 1, 2, ..., 6) in Algorithm 3.
4.7.1.3 Least Squares Problem
We also implemented Algorithm 3 to solve the simple linear regression problem in Example 3.
Simulation results confirmed that Algorithm 3 always converged to the optimal solution. However, the
convergence speed was lower than the source localization problem and the agreement problem. Simulation
results also suggested that the convergence rate was sensitive to the stepsize αk. Fig. 4.6 visualizes the
evolution of γi0 and γ
i
1 (i = 1, 2, ..., 6) in one specific run where the network communication topology is given
in Fig. 4.4, αk was set to αk = 10k+20 , xi was set to xi = i, yi was set to yi = 2× i− 16, and the constrained
set was set to γ20 + γ
2
1 ≤ 5002. γi0 and γi1 (i = 1, 2, ..., 6) denote the intermediate states γ0 and γ1 of agent i,
respectively. All γi0 and γ
i
1 (i = 1, 2, ..., 6) converged to their respective optimal values, i.e., 2 and −16.
4.7.1.4 The Effect of Encryption and Decryption Key-length and Network Size
We also considered the influence of encryption and decryption key-length and network size on
Algorithm 3 (based on the agreement problem). We simulated two all-to-all networks with 6 and 51 agents,
respectively. Both 256-bit and 2048-bit keys are evaluated. Table 4.1 gives the average computation time of
encryption and decryption for each agent to communicate with all its neighbors in each iteration on a 3.6 GHz
CPU with 15.6 GB RAM. Fig. 4.7 visualizes the evolution of xi (i = 1, 2, ..., 51) in the all-to-all network
with 51 agents using 2048-bit keys. We can see that the average computation time increased with increased
key-length and network size.
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Figure 4.6: The evolution of γi0 and γ
i
1 (i = 1, 2, ..., 6) in Algorithm 3.
Table 4.1: Average encryption and decryption computation time
network size key-length (bit) average time (s)
6 256 0.0052048 0.193
51 256 0.0422048 1.763
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Figure 4.7: The evolution of xi (i = 1, 2, ..., 51) in Algorithm 3.
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4.7.1.5 The Trade-off between Convergence Speed and Privacy
In this part, we first simulated an honest-but-curious adversary who tried to estimate its neighbors’
intermediate states under different η values to illustrate the strengths of enabled privacy under different values
of η. Then we simulated the convergence speed of Algorithm 3 under different η values. All simulation results
were obtained based on the agreement problem.
Assume that agent 2 in Fig. 4.4 is an honest-but-curious adversary who intends to estimate the
intermediate states of agent 1. The individual local objective functions are the same as in (4.2) with θi ∈ R.
Because agent 2 knows the constraints on agent 1’s generation of b12, i.e., b12 is randomly chosen from
[
√
η,
√
1−η
N−1 ] with 0 < η < 1/N (cf. Theorem 6), it generated estimates of b12 by using a guessed stochastic
distribution of b12. We conservatively assume that agent 2 knows the probability distribution of b12, which
gives it an edge in estimating b12. Then agent 2 obtained a series of estimated xk1 according to (4.6). For
example, after agent 2 obtained yk = bk21b
k
12(x
k
1 − xk2) at iteration k, it generated an estimate of bk12
(denoted as b̄k12), and then it estimated x
k
1 as x
k
1 = x
k
2 +
yk
b̄k12b
k
21
.
Fig. 4.8 shows the estimated x1 in 500 trials under different η values when b12 follows uniform
distribution. It can be seen that a smaller η leads to less accurate estimation and hence better privacy protection,
confirming the statement in Remark 8. In addition, it can be seen that agent 2 cannot accurately estimate x1
initially. However, as x1 converges to the optimal value, agent 2 will be able to estimate the value that every
agent agrees on, confirming the statement right above Remark 9.
We use the root mean square error (RMSE) to quantify the error between intermediate states and the
optimal value, which is denoted as ERRRMSE:
ERRRMSE =
√√√√√ L∑j=1 N∑i=1 ‖ xij − x∗ ‖2
LN
,
where L is the number of Monte Carlo trials, N is the number of agents, xij is the intermediate state of agent
i in the jth Monte Carlo trial, and x∗ is the optimal value. Fig. 4.9(a) visualizes the evolution of ERRRMSE
under different η values when the network topology is given in Fig. 4.4 (L = 500) and Fig. 4.9(b) visualizes
the evolution of ERRRMSE under different η values in an all-to-all network with 51 agents (L = 500). It can
be seen that to reach the same ERRRMSE, a smaller η incurs more iterations for convergence, confirming
the statement in Remark 8. Because our approach requires a small η to enable strong privacy protection, it
sacrifices the convergence speed in this sense.
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(a) η = 0.05 (b) η = 0.01
(c) η = 0.005 (d) η = 0.001
Figure 4.8: An adversary’s estimation of the intermediate state of agent 1. The green line is the actual
intermediate state x1 of agent 1, the blue “+” are estimated states of x1 by agent 2 in 500 trials.
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(a) The evolution of ERRRMSE under different η values
when the network topology is given in Fig. 4.4.
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Figure 4.9: The evolution of ERRRMSE under different η values in Algorithm 3.
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4.7.2 Privacy-preserving average consensus
Using the network communication topology in Fig. 4.4, we compared our privacy-preserving
average consensus approach with the algorithms in [80] and [75]. We set the states βi of the six agents to
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} respectively. The weights were set as follows:
aij =

0.2 j ∈ Ni,
0 j /∈ Ni ∪ {i},
1−
∑
j∈Ni
aij i = j,
(4.9)
The internal state and the exchanged state are denoted as xki and x
+k
i for the algorithms in [80] and [75].
Fig. 4.10 visualizes the evolution of xi (i = 1, 2, ..., 6) under the proposed approach in one specific
run where αk was set to αk = 1k+2 . It can be see than all xi converged to the exact average value 3.5,
confirming the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
It is worth noting that the convergence speed of the privacy-preserving average consensus approach
can be increased by judiciously designing the stepsize αk. For example, simulation results suggested that
using the αk below, convergence to the average can be made much faster (cf. the evolution of xi in Fig. 4.11).
αk =

10
k + 20
k < 30,
1
k + 1000
k ≥ 30.
(4.10)
Since our approach encrypts all exchanged messages, an outside eavesdropper cannot learn anything
by intercepting these messages. In contrast, the algorithms in [80] and [75] cannot protect the privacy of
participating agents against an external eavesdropper that can intercept all exchanged messages, as confirmed
by our numerical simulation results below. Without loss of generality, we assume that an outside eavesdropper
is interested in learning the state β1 of agent 1 and builds the following observer to estimate β1:
zk+1 = zk + x
+(k+1)
1 − (a11x
+k
1 +
∑
j∈N1
a1jx
+k
j ) (4.11)
with the initial value of z set to z0 = x+01 . As mentioned earlier, in (4.11) x1 and x
+
1 denote the internal
and exchanged states, respectively. Fig. 4.12 visualizes the evolution of xi (i = 1, 2, ..., 6) as well as the
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Figure 4.10: The evolution of xi (i = 1, 2, ..., 6) under the proposed privacy-preserving average consensus
approach when αk was set to αk = 1k+2 in Algorithm 3.
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Figure 4.11: The evolution of xi (i = 1, 2, ..., 6) under the proposed privacy-preserving average consensus
approach when αk was set according to (4.10) in Algorithm 3.
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eavesdropper’s observer state zk under the approach in [80]. It can be seen that the eavesdropper can accurately
estimate the internal state x1. The same conclusion can be drawn for the approach in [75], which is confirmed
vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks (cf. Fig. 4.13).
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Figure 4.12: The evolution of xi (i = 1, 2, ..., 6) and zk under the algorithm in [80].
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Figure 4.13: The evolution of xi (i = 1, 2, ..., 6) and zk under the algorithm in [75].
57
4.8 Summaries
In this chapter, we proposed a novel approach to enabling privacy-preservation in decentralized
optimization based on the integration of partially homomorphic cryptography with subgradient method. By
leveraging Paillier cryptosystem and the convergence properties of subgradient method, i.e., robustness to
random coupling weights, our approach provides privacy guarantee without compromising the optimality of
optimization in the absence of an aggregator or third party. Theoretical analysis confirms that an honest-but-
curious adversary cannot infer the information of neighboring agents even by recording and analyzing the
information exchanged in multiple iterations. The approach is also applicable to average consensus which has
found extensive applications in fields as diverse as distributed computing, robotic networks, and power grids.
Numerical simulation results confirmed the effectiveness and low computational complexity of the proposed
approach.
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Chapter 5
Privacy-preserving Decentralized
Optimization using Function
Decomposition
This chapter proposes a function-decomposition based privacy-preserving approach for the decen-
tralized optimization problem (3.1) using Jacobian ADMM. Compared with encryption-based approaches
which suffer from heavy computational and communication burden, the proposed approach incurs little extra
computational and communication overhead. We also prove that when the global objective function is strongly
convex, proximal Jacobian ADMM can achieve Q-linear convergence rate1 even when local individual ob-
jective functions are only convex, which generalizes existing results on proximal Jacobian ADMM requiring
strongly convex local objective functions to achieve Q-linear convergence rate.
In this chapter, we also consider the two types of adversaries defined in 3.1, which are Honest-but-
curious adversaries [36, 62] and External eavesdroppers. In addition, we define privacy as preserving the
confidentiality of agents’ objective functions in this chapter.
The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows: Sec. 5.1 presents the proximal Jacobian ADMM
solution to (3.1). Then a completely decentralized privacy-preserving approach to problem (3.1) is proposed
in Sec. 5.2. Rigorous analysis of the guaranteed privacy and convergence is addressed in Sec. 5.3 and Sec.
1For a sequence {xk} converging to x∗ in some norm, Q-linear convergence rate is achieved if there exists a λ ∈ (0, 1) such that
‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖≤ λ ‖ xk − x∗ ‖ holds for all k [85].
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5.4, respectively. Numerical simulation results are provided in Sec. 5.5 to confirm the effectiveness of the
proposed approach. In the end, we draw summaries in Sec. 5.6.
5.1 Background
The decentralized problem (3.1) can be formulated as follows: each fi in (3.1) is private and only
known to agent i, and all N agents form a bidirectional connected network, which is denoted by a graph
G = (V,E). V denotes the set of agents, E denotes the set of communication links (undirected edges)
between agents, and |E| denotes the number of communication links (undirected edges) in E. If there exists
a communication link between agents i and j, we say that agent i and agent j are neighbors and the link is
denoted as ei,j ∈ E if i < j is true or ej,i ∈ E otherwise. Moreover, the set of all neighboring agents of i is
denoted as Ni and the number of agents in Ni is denoted as Ni. Then problem (3.1) can be rewritten as
min
xi∈RD, i∈{1,2,...,N}
N∑
i=1
fi(xi)
subject to xi = xj , ∀ei,j ∈ E,
(5.1)
where xi is a copy of x̃ belonging to agent i.
In the conventional proximal Jacobian ADMM [26], each agent uses the following update to coopera-
tively find the optimal solution to (3.1):

xk+1i = argmin
xi
fi(xi) +
γiρ
2
‖ xi − xki ‖2 +
∑
j∈Ni
(λkTi,j (xi − xkj ) +
ρ
2
‖ xi − xkj ‖2) (5.2)
λk+1i,j = λ
k
i,j + ρτ(x
k+1
i − x
k+1
j ), ∀j ∈ Ni (5.3)
Here, k is the iteration index, γi > 0 (i = 1, 2, . . . , N) are proximal coefficients, τ > 0 is a damping
parameter, ρ is the penalty parameter, which is a positive constant scalar. λi,j and λj,i are Lagrange multipliers
corresponding to the constraint xi = xj , ei,j ∈ E. Here, both λi,j and λj,i are introduced for the constraint
xi = xj , ei,j ∈ E in (5.2)-(5.3) to unify the algorithm description. By setting λ0i,j = ρ(x0i − x0j ) at t = 0,
we have λki,j = −λkj,i for all i = 1, 2, · · · , N, j ∈ Ni. In this way, we unify the update rule of agent i without
separating i > j and i < j for j ∈ Ni, as is clear in (5.2).
The conventional proximal Jacobian ADMM is effective in solving (3.1). However, it cannot protect
the privacy of participating agents’ gradients as states xki are exchanged and disclosed explicitly among
neighboring agents. Adversaries can easily derive Ofi(xki ) using the update rules in (5.2) and (5.3) by
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Figure 5.1: Function-decomposition based privacy-preserving decentralized optimization. (a) Before function
decomposition. (b) After function decomposition.
leveraging the knowledge of γi.
5.2 Privacy-preserving Decentralized Optimization
The key idea of our approach to enabling privacy-preservation is to randomly decompose each fi into
two parts fαki and f
βk
i under the constraint fi = f
αk
i + f
βk
i . The index k of functions f
αk
i and f
βk
i indicates
that functions fαki and f
βk
i can be time-varying. However, it should be noticed that the sum of f
αk
i and f
βk
i is
time invariant and always equals to fi. We let the function fαki succeed the role of the original function fi in
inter-agent interactions while the other function fβki involves only by interacting with f
αk
i , as shown in Fig.
5.1.
After the function decomposition, problem (3.1) can be rewritten as
min
xαi ,x
β
i ∈RD, i∈{1,2,...,N}
N∑
i=1
(fαki (x
α
i ) + f
βk
i (x
β
i ))
subject to xαi = x
α
j , ∀ei,j ∈ E,
xαi = x
β
i , ∀i ∈ V,
(5.4)
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and the associated augmented Lagrangian function is:
Lkρ(x,λ) =
N∑
i=1
(fαki (x
α
i ) + f
βk
i (x
β
i )) +
∑
ei,j∈E
(λαTi,j (x
α
i − xαj ) +
ρ
2
‖ xαi − xαj ‖2)
+
∑
i∈V
(λαβTi,i (x
α
i − x
β
i ) +
ρ
2
‖ xαi − x
β
i ‖
2),
(5.5)
where x = [xαT1 ,x
βT
1 ,x
αT
2 ,x
βT
2 , . . . ,x
αT
N ,x
βT
N ]
T ∈ R2DN is the augmented state. λαi,j is the Lagrange
multiplier corresponding to the constraint xαi = x
α
j , λ
αβ
i,i is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the
constraint xαi = x
β
i , and all λ
α
i,j and λ
αβ
i,i are stacked into λ. ρ is the penalty parameter, which is a positive
constant scalar. It is worth noting that agent i does not need to know the associated augmented Lagrangian
function (i.e., other agents’ objective functions) to update its states xαi and x
β
i , as shown below in (5.6) and
(5.7).
Based on Jacobian update, we can solve (5.4) by applying the following iterations for i = 1, 2, . . . , N :

x
α(k+1)
i = argmin
xαi
γαi ρ
2
‖ xαi − xαki ‖2 +Lk+1ρ (xαk1 ,x
βk
1 , . . . ,x
α
i ,x
βk
i , . . . ,x
αk
N ,x
βk
N ,λ
k)
= argmin
xαi
f
α(k+1)
i (x
α
i ) +
γαi ρ
2
‖ xαi − xαki ‖2 +
∑
j∈Ni
(λαkTi,j (x
α
i − xαkj ) +
ρ
2
‖ xαi − xαkj ‖2)
+λαβkTi,i (x
α
i − x
βk
i ) +
ρ
2
‖ xαi − x
βk
i ‖
2, (5.6)
x
β(k+1)
i = argmin
xβi
γβi ρ
2
‖ xβi − x
βk
i ‖
2 +Lk+1ρ (xαk1 ,x
βk
1 , . . . ,x
αk
i ,x
β
i , . . . ,x
αk
N ,x
βk
N ,λ
k)
= argmin
xβi
f
β(k+1)
i (x
β
i ) +
γβi ρ
2
‖ xβi − x
βk
i ‖
2 +λβαkTi,i (x
β
i − x
αk
i ) +
ρ
2
‖ xβi − x
αk
i ‖2, (5.7)
λ
α(k+1)
i,j = λ
αk
i,j + τρ(x
α(k+1)
i − x
α(k+1)
j ), ∀j ∈ Ni (5.8)
λ
αβ(k+1)
i,i = λ
αβk
i,i + τρ(x
α(k+1)
i − x
β(k+1)
i ), (5.9)
λ
βα(k+1)
i,i = λ
βαk
i,i + τρ(x
β(k+1)
i − x
α(k+1)
i ). (5.10)
Here τ ∈ (0, 1) is a damping parameter, and both λαi,j and λαj,i are introduced for the constraint
xαi = x
α
j , ei,j ∈ E in (5.6)-(5.10) to unify the algorithm description. Similarly, both λ
αβ
i,i and λ
βα
i,i are
introduced for the constraint xαi = x
β
i in (5.6)-(5.10) to unify the algorithm description. Our privacy-
preserving function-decomposition based algorithm is given in Algorithm 4.
Remark 13. Different from [65] which also considers dynamic decentralized optimization, our dynamics are
added purposely to enable privacy-preservation. In addition, we use Jacobian update instead of introducing
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Algorithm 4
Initial Setup: For all i = 1, 2, . . . , N , agent i initializes xα0i and x
β0
i , and exchanges x
α0
i with neighboring
agents. Then agent i sets λα0i,j = x
α0
i − xα0j , λ
αβ0
i,i = x
α0
i − x
β0
i , and λ
βα0
i,i = x
β0
i − xα0i .
Input: xαki , λαki,j , λ
αβk
i,i , x
βk
i , λ
βαk
i,i .
Output: xα(k+1)i , λ
α(k+1)
i,j , λ
αβ(k+1)
i,i , x
β(k+1)
i , λ
βα(k+1)
i,i .
1. For all i = 1, 2, . . . , N , agent i constructs fα(k+1)i and f
β(k+1)
i under the constraint fi = f
α(k+1)
i +
f
β(k+1)
i ;
2. For all i = 1, 2, . . . , N , agent i updates xα(k+1)i and x
β(k+1)
i according to the update rules in (5.6) and
(5.7), respectively;
3. For all i = 1, 2, . . . , N , agent i sends xα(k+1)i to neighboring agents;
4. For all i = 1, 2, . . . , N , agent i computes λα(k+1)i,j , λ
αβ(k+1)
i,i and λ
βα(k+1)
i,i according to (5.8)-(5.10);
5. Set k to k + 1, and go to 1.
splitting variables which increases the number of variables and constraints of the problem.
5.3 Privacy Analysis
In this section, we rigorously prove that each agent’s gradient of local objective function Ofj cannot
be inferred by honest-but-curious adversaries and external eavesdroppers.
Theorem 10. In Algorithm 4, agent j’s gradient of local objective function Ofj at any point except the optimal
solution will not be revealed to an honest-but-curious agent i.
Proof. Suppose that an honest-but-curious adversary agent i collects information from K iterations to infer
the gradient Ofj of a neighboring agent j. The adversary agent i can establish 2DK equations relevant to Ofj
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by making use of the fact that the update rules of (5.6) and (5.7) are publicly known, i.e.,

Ofα1j (x
α1
j ) + (γ
α
j +Nj + 1)ρx
α1
j − γαj ρxα0j +
∑
m∈Nj
(λα0j,m − ρxα0m ) + λ
αβ0
j,j − ρx
β0
j = 0
Ofβ1j (x
β1
j ) + (γ
β
j + 1)ρx
β1
j − γ
β
j ρx
β0
j + λ
βα0
j,j − ρx
α0
j = 0
...
OfαKj (x
αK
j ) + (γ
α
j +Nj + 1)ρx
αK
j − γαj ρx
α(K−1)
j
+
∑
m∈Nj
(λ
α(K−1)
j,m − ρx
α(K−1)
m ) + λ
αβ(K−1)
j,j − ρx
β(K−1)
j = 0
OfβKj (x
βK
j ) + (γ
β
j + 1)ρx
βK
j − γ
β
j ρx
β(K−1)
j + λ
βα(K−1)
j,j − ρx
α(K−1)
j = 0
(5.11)
In the system of 2DK equations (5.11), Ofαkj (x
αk
j ) (k = 1, 2, . . . ,K), Of
βk
j (x
βk
j ) (k = 1, 2, . . . ,K), γ
α
j ,
γβj , and x
βk
j (k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,K) are unknown to adversary agent i. Parameters x
αk
m ,m 6= j and λαkj,m,m 6= j
are known to adversary agent i only when agent m and agent i are neighbors. So the above system of 2DK
equations contains at least 3DK +D + 2 unknown variables, and adversary agent i cannot infer the gradient
of local objective function Ofj by solving (5.11). Following the same line of argument, we can also obtain that
an adversary agent i cannot solve a subset of equations in (5.11) to determine the gradient information either.
It is worth noting that after the optimization algorithm converges, adversary agent i can have another
piece of information according to the KKT conditions [26]:
Ofj(x
∗
j ) = −
∑
m∈Nj
λα∗j,m. (5.12)
If agent j’s neighbors are also neighbors to the honest-but-curious agent i, the exact gradient of fj at the
optimal solution can be inferred by agent i. Therefore, agent j’s gradient of local objective function Ofj will
not be revealed to an honest-but-curious agent i at any point except the optimal solution.
Corollary 6. In Algorithm 4, agent j’s gradient of local objective function Ofj at any point except the optimal
solution will not be revealed to external eavesdroppers.
Proof. The proof can be obtained following a similar line of reasoning of Theorem 10. External eavesdroppers
can also establish the system of 2DK equations (5.11) to infer agent j’s gradient Ofj . However, in this case,
the number of unknowns, i.e., Ofαkj (x
αk
j ) (k = 1, 2, . . . ,K), Of
βk
j (x
βk
j ) (k = 1, 2, . . . ,K), γ
α
j , γ
β
j , and
xβkj (k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,K), adds up to 3DK+D+2, making the system of equations undetermined. Therefore,
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following the argument in the proof of Theorem 10, we can obtain that external eavesdroppers cannot infer the
gradient of local objective function Ofj at any point except the optimal solution.
Remark 14. It is worth noting that if multiple adversary agents cooperate to infer the information of agent j,
they can only establish a system of 2DK equations containing at least 3DK + D + 2 unknown variables
as well. Therefore, our algorithm can protect the privacy of agents against multiple honest-but-curious
adversaries and external eavesdroppers.
5.4 Convergence Analysis
In this section, we rigorously prove the convergence of Algorithm 4 under the following assumptions.
Assumption 6. Function f̄(x̃) =
∑N
i=1 fi(x̃) : RD → R is strongly convex and continuously differentiable,
i.e.,
(Of̄(x̃)− Of̄(ỹ))T (x̃− ỹ) ≥ mf̄ ‖ x̃− ỹ ‖2 .
Assumption 7. Each local function fi : RD → R is convex and continuously differentiable.
Assumption 8. Each local function fi : RD → R has Lipschitz continuous gradients, i.e.,
‖ Ofi(x̃)− Ofi(ỹ) ‖≤ Li ‖ x̃− ỹ ‖ .
Assumption 9. fαki is chosen under the following constraints:
1) fαki is convex and differentiable.
2) fβki = fi − fαki is convex and differentiable.
3) fαki has Lipschitz continuous gradients, i.e. there exists an L < +∞ such that
‖ Ofαki (x̃)− Ofαki (ỹ) ‖≤ L ‖ x̃− ỹ ‖ .
4) fβki = fi − fαki has Lipschitz continuous gradients, i.e. there exists an L < +∞ such that
‖ Ofβki (x̃)− Of
βk
i (ỹ) ‖≤ L ‖ x̃− ỹ ‖ .
5) lim
k→∞
fαki → fα∗i and fαki (x̃) is bounded when x̃ is bounded.
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Figure 5.2: Function-decomposition based privacy-preserving decentralized optimization equals to converting
the original network into a virtual network G′ = (V ′, E′) of 2N agents.
It is worth noting that under Assumption 7 and Assumption 8, fαki can be easily designed to
meet Assumption 9. A quick example is fαki (x̃) = b
kT
i x̃ where b
k
i ∈ RD is time-varying, and satisfies
lim
k→∞
bki → b∗i and −∞ <‖ bki ‖<∞.
Because the function decomposition process amounts to converting the original network to a virtual
network G′ = (V ′, E′) of 2N agents, as shown in Fig. 5.2, we analyze the convergence of our algorithm
based on the virtual network G′ = (V ′, E′). To simplify and unify the notations, we relabel the local objective
functions fαki and f
βk
i for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N as h
k
1 , h
k
2 , . . . , h
k
2N . We relabel the associated states x
αk
i
and xβki for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N as x
k
1 ,x
k
2 , . . . ,x
k
2N . In addition, we relabel parameters γ
α
i and γ
β
i for all
i = 1, 2, . . . , N accordingly as γ1, γ2, . . . , γ2N . Then problem (5.4) can be rewritten as
min
xi∈RD, i∈{1,2,...,2N}
2N∑
i=1
hki (xi)
subject to Ax = 0
(5.13)
where x = [xT1 ,x
T
2 , . . . ,x
T
2N ]
T ∈ R2DN and A = [am,l]⊗ ID ∈ RD|E
′|×2DN is the edge-node incidence
matrix of graph G′ as defined in [118]. More specifically, am,l is determined as
am,l =

1 if the mth edge originates from agent l,
−1 if the mth edge terminates at agent l,
0 otherwise.
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We define each edge ei,j originating from i and terminating at j and denote an edge as ei,j ∈ E′ if i < j is
true or as ej,i ∈ E′ otherwise.
Denote the iterating results in the kth step in Algorithm 4 as follows:
xk = [xkT1 ,x
kT
2 , . . . ,x
kT
2N ]
T ∈ R2DN ,
λk = [λki,j ]ij,ei,j∈E′ ∈ RD|E
′|,
yk = [xkT ,λkT ]T ∈ R(|E
′|+2N)D
Further augment the coefficients γi (i = 1, 2, . . . , 2N) into the matrix form
U = diag{γ1, γ2, . . . , γ2N} ⊗ ID ∈ R2DN×2DN ,
and Ni into the matrix form
D̄ = diag{N1, N2, . . . , N2N} ⊗ ID ∈ R2DN×2DN .
Then we are in position to give the main results for this section:
Definition 2. (Restricted strongly convex with respect to a point x̃∗ [76]) A convex and differential function
f(x̃) is restricted strongly convex with respect to a point x̃∗ if the following holds for all x̃
(Of(x̃)− Of(x̃∗))T (x̃− x̃∗) ≥ mf ‖ x̃− x̃∗ ‖2 (5.14)
where mf > 0 is a constant.
Lemma 1. Define rk(x) : R2DN → R as
rk(x) = hk(x) +
ρ(1− τ)
2
‖ Ax ‖2
for 0 < τ < 1 where hk(x) =
2N∑
i=1
hki (xi), and h̄
k(x̃) : RD → R is defined as
h̄k(x̃) =
2N∑
i=1
hki (x̃).
Let x∗ be the optimal solution to (5.13). If Assumptions 6, 7, 8, and 9 are satisfied, we have that rk(x) is
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restricted strongly convex with respect to the optimal solution x∗, i.e., the following holds for all x
(Or(x)− Or(x∗))T (x− x∗) ≥ mr ‖ x− x∗ ‖2 (5.15)
where
mr ≥ {
mf̄
2N
− 2Lυ, Aminρ(1− τ)
1 + 1υ2
}, (5.16)
for any υ ∈ (0, mf̄4NL ) with Amin the smallest nonzero eigenvalue of A
TA, mf̄ given in Assumption 6, and L
given in Assumption 9.
Proof. Because h̄k(x̃) =
2N∑
i=1
hki (x̃) =
N∑
i=1
fi(x̃) = f̄(x̃) is strongly convex, and the matrixA here is the same
as the matrix Eo in [76], according to Lemma 1 in [76] and Appendix 1 in [102], we have the Lemma.
Lemma 2. Let x∗ be the optimal solution to (5.13), λk∗ be the optimal multiplier to (5.13) at iteration k, and
yk∗ be the augmented vector [x∗T ,λk∗T ]T . Further define Q = U + D̄ − ATA, H = diag{ρQ, 1ρID|E′|},
Amax and Amin as the respective maximal and minimal nonzero eigenvalues of ATA. Then we have
‖ yk+1 − yk+1∗ ‖H≤
‖ yk − yk+1∗ ‖H√
1 + δ
(5.17)
if U + D̄ − ATA is positive semi-definite and Assumptions 6, 7, 8, and 9 are satisfied. In (5.17), ‖ x̃ ‖H=
√
x̃THx̃ and
δ = min{ (u− 1)τAmin
2uQmax
,
2mrρτ(u− 1)Amin
φ
} (5.18)
where u > 1 is an arbitrary constant, Qmax is the largest eigenvalue of Q, mr, L are given in Assumptions 6
and 9, respectively, and
φ = u(u− 1)L2 + ρ2τAminQmax(u− 1) + 2ρ2(1− τ)2uA2max.
Proof. The results can be obtained following a similar line of reasoning in [65]. The detailed proof is given in
the Appendix B.
Lemma 3. Let x∗ be the optimal solution to (5.13), λk∗ be the optimal multiplier to (5.13) at iteration k, and
yk∗ be the augmented vector [x∗T ,λk∗T ]T . Further defineQ = U + D̄−ATA andH = diag{ρQ, 1ρID|E′|}.
Then we have
‖ yk − yk+1∗ ‖H≤‖ yk − yk∗ ‖H +p(k) (5.19)
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if U + D̄ −ATA is positive semi-definite and Assumptions 6, 7, 8, and 9 are satisfied. In (5.19),
p(k) =
1√
ρτAmin
‖ Ohk+1(x∗)− Ohk(x∗) ‖ (5.20)
where hk(x) =
2N∑
i=1
hki (xi).
Proof. The results can be obtained following a similar line of reasoning in [65]. The detailed proof is given in
the Appendix B.
Lemma 4. Let x∗ be the optimal solution to (5.13), λk∗ be the optimal multiplier to (5.13) at iteration k, and
yk∗ be the augmented vector [x∗T ,λk∗T ]T . Further defineQ = U + D̄−ATA andH = diag{ρQ, 1ρID|E′|}.
Then we have
‖ yk+1 − yk+1∗ ‖H≤
‖ yk − yk∗ ‖H√
1 + δ
+
p(k)√
1 + δ
(5.21)
if U + D̄ −ATA is positive semi-definite and Assumptions 6, 7, 8, and 9 are satisfied.
Proof. Combining (5.17) and (5.19), we obtain the result directly.
Lemma 4 indicates that ‖ yk+1 − yk+1∗ ‖H converges linearly to a neighborhood of 0. When the
local objective function is not dynamically changing, i.e. p(k) = 0, we have that the proximal Jacobian
ADMM has a Q-linear convergence rate without requiring all local objective functions to be strongly convex,
which gives us the following theorem.
Theorem 11. Algorithm 4 is guaranteed to converge to the optimal solution to (5.13) with a Q-linear
convergence rate if U + D̄ −ATA is positive semi-definite, Assumptions 6, 7, 8, and 9 are satisfied, and fαki
is time-invariant.
Proof. When fαki is time-invariant, we have p(k) = 0. Then from Lemma 4, we have the theorem.
Remark 15. [76] also achieves Q-linear convergence rate for ADMM under dummy variables. However, the
introduced dummy variables increase the requirement on computational and memory resources. Furthermore,
different from [52] which establishes R-linear2 convergence rate under a sufficiently small dual step-size, our
approach achieves a faster Q-linear convergence rate without such a constraint.
When fαki is time-variant, we have the following theorem.
2For a sequence {xk} converging to x∗ in some norm, R-linear convergence rate is achieved if there exists a λ ∈ (0, 1) and some
positive constant C such that ‖ xk − x∗ ‖≤ Cλk holds for all k [85].
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Theorem 12. Algorithm 4 is guaranteed to converge to the optimal solution to (5.13) if U + D̄ − ATA is
positive semi-definite and Assumptions 6, 7, 8, and 9 are satisfied.
Proof. The proof is provided in the Appendix B.
5.5 Numerical Simulations
In this section, we first illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach. Then we compare our
approach with the differential-privacy based algorithm in [54] and the encryption based algorithm in Chapter
3. We conducted numerical experiments on the following global objective function
f̃(x̃) =
N∑
i=1
1
2
‖ Hix̃− yi ‖2, (5.22)
which makes the optimization problem (3.1) become
min
x̃
N∑
i=1
1
2
‖ Hix̃− yi ‖2 (5.23)
with yi ∈ RD and Hi ∈ RD×D a diagonal matrix. Hence, each agent i deals with a private local objective
function
fi(xi) =
1
2
‖ Hixi − yi ‖2,∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. (5.24)
We used the above function (5.22) because it is easy to verify whether the obtained solution is the minimal
value of the original optimization problem, which is (
∑N
i=1H
T
i Hi)
−1(
∑N
i=1Hiyi). Furthermore, (5.22)
makes it easy to compare with [54], whose verification is also based on (5.22).
5.5.1 Evaluation of Our Approach
To solve the optimization problem (5.22), fαki (x̃) was set to f
αk
i (x̃) = (b
k
i )
T x̃ in all simulations,
where bki was set to b
k
i =
1
k+1ci + di with ci ∈ R
D and di ∈ RD being constants private to agent i. Fig.
5.4 visualizes the evolution of xαi1 and x
β
i1 (i = 1, 2, ..., 6) in one specific run where D = 2 and the network
deployment is illustrated in Fig. 5.3. Fig. 5.5 visualizes the evolution of xαi2 and x
β
i2 (i = 1, 2, ..., 6). Here,
xαij denotes the jth element of x
α
i and x
β
ij denotes the jth element of x
β
i . All x
α
i and x
β
i (i = 1, 2, ..., 6)
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converged to the optimal solution.
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Figure 5.3: A network of six agents (N = 6).
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Figure 5.4: The evolution of xαi1 and x
β
i1 (i = 1, 2, ..., 6) in one specific run.
5.5.2 Comparison with the algorithm in [54]
Under the network deployment in Fig. 5.3, we compared our privacy-preserving approach with the
differential-privacy based algorithm in [54]. We simulated the algorithm in [54] under seven different privacy
levels:
ε = 0.2, 1, 10, 20, 30, 50, 100.
In the objective function (5.22),Hi was set to the identity matrix and yi was set to yi = [0.1×(i−1)+0.1; 0.1×
(i−1)+0.2]. The domain of optimization for the algorithm in [54] was set to X = {(x, y) ∈ R2|x2 +y2 ≤ 1}.
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Note that the optimal solution [0.35; 0.45] resided in X . Detailed parameter settings for the algorithm in [54]
were given as n = 2, c = 0.5, q = 0.8, p = 0.9, and
aij =

0.2 j ∈ Ni,
0 j /∈ Ni, j 6= i,
1−
∑
j∈Ni
aij i = j,
(5.25)
for i = 1, 2, ..., 6. In addition, the performance index d in [54] was used to quantify the optimization error
here, which was computed as the average value of squared distances with respect to the optimal solution over
M runs [54], i.e.,
d =
6∑
i=1
M∑
l=1
‖ xli − [0.35; 0.45] ‖2
6M
.
Here xli is the obtained solution of agent i in the lth run. For our approach, x
l
i was calculated as the average of
xαli and x
βl
i .
Simulation results from 5,000 runs showed that our approach converged to [0.35; 0.45] with an error
d = 6.5× 10−6, which is negligible compared with the simulation results under the algorithm in [54] (cf. Fig.
5.6, where each differential privacy level was implemented for 5,000 times). The results confirm the trade-off
between privacy and accuracy in differential-privacy based approaches.
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Figure 5.6: The comparison of our approach with the algorithm in [54] in terms of optimization error.
5.5.3 Comparison with the algorithm in Chapter 3
We also compared our approach with the privacy-preserving optimization algorithm in Chapter 3,
which is based on ADMM and partially homomorphic encryption. The network communication topology
used for comparison is a ring network of 30 agents and the global objective function used is (5.22) with Hi
(i = 1, 2, .., 6) set to identity matrix and yi ∈ R2. The initial states were set to the same values for both
algorithms (xα0i = x
β0
i = x
0
i ). Fig. 5.7 visualizes the evolution of x
α
i and x
β
i in our approach whereas Fig.
5.8 visualizes the evolution of xi of the algorithm in Chapter 3 when b̄ in Chapter 3 was set to 1.5. It can
be seen that our encryption-free approach has comparable convergence rate with the partially homomorphic
encryption based algorithm in Chapter 3.
5.6 Summaries
In this chapter, we proposed a novel approach to enabling privacy-preservation in decentralized
optimization based on function decomposition, which neither compromises the optimality of optimization
nor relies on an aggregator or third party. Theoretical analysis confirms that an honest-but-curious adversary
cannot infer the information of neighboring agents even by recording and analyzing the information exchanged
in multiple iterations. In addition, our approach can also avoid an external eavesdropper from inferring
the information of participating agents. Compared with encryption-based approaches which suffer from
heavy computational and communication burden, the proposed approach incurs little extra computational
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Figure 5.8: The evolution of xi of the algorithm in Chapter 3.
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and communication overhead. Furthermore, we prove that when the global objective function is strongly
convex, proximal Jacobian ADMM can achieve Q-linear convergence rate even when local individual objective
functions are only convex, which generalizes existing proximal Jacobian ADMM results requiring local
objective functions to be strongly convex to achieve Q-linear convergence rate. Numerical simulation results
confirmed the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
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Chapter 6
Decentralized Non-convex Event
Localization via ADMM
Event localization plays a fundamental role in many wireless sensor network applications such as
environmental monitoring, homeland security, medical treatment, and health care, and it is essentially a
non-convex and non-smooth problem. In this chapter, we address such a problem in a completely decentralized
way based on augmented Lagrangian methods and alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM). The
main contributions of this chapter are as follows:
1. An algorithm is applied to directly solve the general non-smooth and non-convex event localization
problem without using convex relaxation. The avoidance of convex relaxation is significant in that convex
relaxation based methods generally suffer from high computational complexity. It is worth noting that
recently results have emerged for ADMM in non-convex optimization [53, 72]. However, [53] requires
objective functions to have Lipschitz continuous derivatives and [72] requires objective functions to
be continuously differentiable and have bounded gradient, neither of which can be satisfied by the
non-smooth event localization problem considered in this chapter. Furthermore, the non-convex and
non-smooth optimization approach in [116] is not applicable to our problem either because it requires
some parts of the objective function to be restricted prox-regular1, which is not the case here;
1Restricted prox-regularity is defined in Definition 2 of [116]: For a lower semi-continuous function f , let M ∈ R+, f : RD →
R ∪ {∞}, and define the exclusion set SM := {x ∈ dom(f) :‖ d ‖> M, ∀d ∈ ∂f(x)}. f is called restricted prox-regular if, for any
M > 0 and bounded set T ⊆ domf , there exists γ > 0 such that f(y) + γ
2
‖ x − y ‖2≥ f(x) + 〈d,y − x〉, ∀x ∈ T\SM ,y ∈
T,d ∈ ∂f(x), ‖ d ‖≤M.
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2. The proposed algorithm takes full advantages of alternating direction method of multipliers which
decomposes a general optimization problem into multiple local optimization subproblems with each
subproblem solved by an individual sensor. Through cooperations in the computation process among
neighboring sensors, a consistent estimate of the event position across the entire network can be achieved.
Therefore, compared with centralized approach in which a processing center performs the whole heavy
computation, the algorithm is highly scalable, flexible, robust to network topology changes, and thus is
more favorable in practical implement;
3. Numerical simulations show that the proposed algorithm achieves better localization accuracy than
existing distributed projection-based approaches when the target is within the convex hull of localization
sensors. When the target is outside the convex hull, numerical simulations show that the proposed
approach has a higher probability to converge to the target event location than existing projection-based
approaches.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Sec. 6.1 states the formulation of the problem.
To solve the problem, a decentralized algorithm is proposed in Sec. 6.2 and its convergence properties are
analyzed in Sec. 6.3. Sec. 6.4 gives numerical simulation results of the algorithm and its comparison with
existing results. In the end, a conclusion is made in Sec. 6.5.
6.1 Problem Statement
We suppose that the sensor network for event localization is composed of N sensors and the position
of sensor i is denoted as ai ∈ RD, where D (D ∈ {1, 2, 3}) is the dimension. If there exists a communication
link between sensors i and j, we say that sensors i and j can communicate and exchange information. We
further denote the unknown position of the target event as x ∈ RD. Then the noisy range ri between sensor i
and the target event is denoted as:
ri = di + vi,
where di =‖ x − ai ‖ denotes the real distance between sensor i and the target event, and vi denotes the
measurement noise.
Suppose that both ai and ri are available to sensor i and are private (i.e., ai and ri are only known to
sensor i). Furthermore, we assume that the sensor network is connected, i.e., there exists a (multi-hop) path
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between every pair of sensors in the network. The event localization problem addressed in this chapter is to
estimate the unknown event position x from available sensor positions ai and noisy range measurements ri
(i = 1, 2, . . . , N ) with respect to the target event.
Remark 16. The setting of not exchanging sensors’ positions makes great sense in practical applications.
For example, on the battlefield where soldiers wear sensor devices to locate gunfire, exchanging soldiers’
positions takes great risks of being intercepted to opponents or compromised teammate, which will put soldiers
in danger [6].
Assume that v = (v1, v2, ..., vN )T follows a standard Gaussian distribution and its covariance matrix
is a diagonal matrix with equal diagonal elements, then the position estimate of the target event x is the
solution to the following maximum likelihood problem [11]:
min
x
N∑
i=1
fi(x), (6.1)
where
fi(x) =
N∑
i=1
(‖ x− ai ‖ −ri)2. (6.2)
fi(x) in (6.2) is non-convex, non-smooth and does not satisfy the restricted prox-regular condition,
which invalidates the application of existing results [53,72,116]. In this chapter, we will show that by designing
the penalty parameter, we can address this non-convex and non-smooth problem (6.1) via ADMM directly
without using convex relaxation. We first propose the algorithm in the following section and then analyze its
convergence in Sec. 6.3.
6.2 Proposed Decentralized Algorithm
6.2.1 Problem Reformulation
To address problem (6.1) in a decentralized way via ADMM, first we denote the communication
pattern of the sensor network as an undirected graph G = {V,E} [14], where V is the set of N sensors and
E is the set of undirected edges (communication links) among the sensors. We assume that the undirected
network is connected. Let |E| be the total number of undirected edges. Then if there is an edge between
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sensors i and j, we denote it as ei,j ∈ E and say that sensor j is a neighboring sensor of i (sensor i is a
neighboring sensor of j as well). Note that here both ei,j and ej,i denote the same edge, so we only use the
expression of ei,j (if i < j) or ej,i (if j < i) to avoid repetition. We denoteNi as the neighboring set of sensor
i and Ni as the number of neighboring sensors in Ni. Assume that each sensor has an estimate of the target
event position x, denoted as xi. Then each sensor is associated with a local cost function fi(xi) and all local
cost functions are combined into the general problem in (6.1). We also suppose that the local cost function
fi is only known to sensor i since ai and ri are private and only available to sensor i. Therefore, to reach
consistency on the estimated target event position across the entire network, we need to impose the constraints
xi = zi,j and xj = zi,j if there exists an edge ei,j between sensors i and j. Here, zi,j(i < j) is an auxiliary
item. We use the constraint xi = zi,j instead of xi = z in [16] because the constraint xi = z requires a
central node to collect all xi for i = 1, 2, ..., N to update z whereas under constraint xi = zi,j individual
nodes can update zi,j in a decentralized way.
Now problem (6.1) can be reformulated as a distributed ADMM described as follows:
min
xi, i∈{1,2,...,N},zi,j
N∑
i=1
fi(xi)
subject to xi = zi,j , xj = zi,j , ∀ei,j ∈ E,
(6.3)
or in a more compact form:
min
x,z
f(x) + g(z)
subject to Cx+ Fz = 0,
(6.4)
where x = [xT1 ,x
T
2 , ...,x
T
N ]
T , g(z) = 0 is the identical zero function, z = [zi,j ]ij,ei,j∈E , matrices C
and F are defined similarly to [103], which we recapitulate here: C = [C1;C2]; both C1 ∈ R|E|D×ND
and C2 ∈ R|E|D×ND consist of |E| × N blocks of D × D matrices. If there exists an edge ei,j between
sensors i and j, and zi,j is the qth block in z, then the (q, i)th block in C1 and (q, j)th block in C2 are
identity matrices ID for all q, i, and j. The other blocks in C1 and C2 are identical zero matrices OD. Matrix
F = [−I|E|D;−I|E|D] with I|E|D being an |E|D×|E|D identity matrix. It is worth noting that the constraints
xi = zi,j and xj = zi,j for all ei,j ∈ E imply that the feasible set of (6.4) is X = {x ∈ RD|Ax = 0},
where A = [am,n]⊗ ID ∈ R|E|D×ND is the edge-node incidence matrix of graph G as defined in [118]. The
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symbol ⊗ denotes Kronecker product. The am,n element is defined as
am,n =

1 if the mth edge originates from agent n,
−1 if the mth edge terminates at agent n,
0 otherwise.
Here we define that each edge ei,j originates from agent i and terminates at agent j.
In this reformulation, the imposed constraints xi = zi,j ,xj = zi,j ,∀ei,j ∈ E in (6.3) require neigh-
boring sensors to exchange copies of local estimated event positions. Through an exchange of intermediate
computational results, it is guaranteed that a consistency of individual local estimates of event positions xi
across the entire network can be achieved. Now we are in place to solve (6.3).
6.2.2 Proposed Algorithm
Let λii,j be the Lagrange multiplier relevant to the constraint xi = zi,j and λ
j
i,j be the Lagrange
multiplier relevant to the constraint xj = zi,j . Parameter ρi is the penalty parameter associated with sensor i
and ρi > 0. Then we can denote the regularized augmented Lagrangian function of problem (6.3) as
Lρ(x, z,λ) =
N∑
i=1
fi(xi) +
∑
ei,j∈E
(λiTi,j(xi − zi,j) + λ
jT
i,j (xj − zi,j))
+
∑
ei,j∈E
(
ρi
2
‖ xi − zi,j ‖2 +
ρj
2
‖ xj − zi,j ‖2),
(6.5)
where λ is the shorthand notion for λii,j and λ
j
i,j , ρ = diag{ρi1DNi}i={1,2,...,N}, 1DNi is a column vector of
length DNi and all its entries are one. Applying ADMM, we can get the following three recursions:
xt+1 ∈ argminxLρt(x, zt,λt), (6.6)
zt+1 = argminzLρt(xt+1, z,λt), (6.7)
λt+1 = λt + ρt(Cxt+1 + Fzt+1). (6.8)
The function Lρt(x, zt,λt) in (6.6) may have more than one local minimum, so we use xt+1 ∈
argminxLρt(x, zt,λt) instead of xt+1 = argminxLρt(x, zt,λt). Here “argmin” is used to indicate finding
local minima. The above recursions from (6.6) to (6.8) can be realized in a decentralized way, which is
described in Algorithm 5.
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Algorithm 5
Initial Setup: Each sensor initializes x0i , λi0i,j , λ
j0
i,j , ρ
0
i , and exchanges x
0
i with neighboring sensors. Then it
sets z0i,j =
x0i+x
0
j
2 .
Input: xti, zti,j , λiti,j , λ
jt
i,j , ρ
t
i
Output: xt+1i , z
t+1
i,j , λ
i(t+1)
i,j , λ
j(t+1)
i,j , ρ
t+1
i
1. Each sensor updates its local vector xt+1i :
xt+1i ∈ argminxifi(xi) +
∑
j∈Ni,i<j
(λitTi,j xi +
ρti
2
‖ xi − zti,j ‖2)
+
∑
j∈Ni,i>j
(λitTj,i xi +
ρti
2
‖ xi − ztj,i ‖2).
To simplify and unify the above expression, we introduce three notions: we use λii,j to represent λ
i
j,i,
λji,j to represent λ
j
j,i, and zi,j to represent zj,i in each sensor i. Then the above equation can be
rewritten as follows:
xt+1i ∈ argminxifi(xi) +
∑
j∈Ni
(λitTi,j xi +
ρti
2
‖ xi − zti,j ‖2). (6.9)
2. Each sensor sends its local vector xt+1i and ρ
t
i to neighboring sensors;
3. Each sensor computes zt+1i,j for j ∈ Ni:
zt+1i,j = argminzi,j − (λ
itT
i,j + λ
jtT
i,j )zi,j + (
ρti
2
‖ xt+1i − zi,j ‖
2 +
ρtj
2
‖ xt+1j − zi,j ‖
2). (6.10)
Note that here the values of zt+1i,j computed by sensors i and j are the same. This problem is easy to
solve, whose approximate solution is:
zt+1i,j =
1
ρti + ρ
t
j
(ρtix
t+1
i + ρ
t
jx
t+1
j + λ
it
i,j + λ
jt
i,j); (6.11)
4. Each sensor computes for j ∈ Ni:
λ
i(t+1)
i,j = λ
it
i,j + ρ
t
i(x
t+1
i − z
t+1
i,j ), (6.12)
λ
j(t+1)
i,j = λ
jt
i,j + ρ
t
j(x
t+1
j − z
t+1
i,j ). (6.13)
Note that here the values of λi(t+1)i,j and λ
j(t+1)
i,j computed by sensors i and j are the same;
5. Each sensor updates ρti → ρ
t+1
i . Detailed updating rules are given in Sec. 6.3;
6. Set t = t+ 1, and go to 1.
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Now our focus is to find a closed-form solution to subproblem (6.9). First, let us introduce a Lemma:
Lemma 5. Let A = {a1, ...,aN} be the set of N sensors’ positions and
Li(xi) = fi(xi) +
∑
j∈Ni
(λitTi,j xi +
ρti
2
‖ xi − zti,j ‖2). (6.14)
Then for any i = 1, 2, ..., N , the following statements are true:
Statement (1): Every ā ∈ A is not a local minimum of problem (6.1);
Statement (2): ai is not a local minimum of Li(xi) (i.e., ai will not be the solution to (6.9)) when ρti
is finite.
Proof: Statement (1) follows from Lemma 2.5 in [11] directly. The proof of Statement (2) can also be
obtained following the proof of Lemma 2.5 in [11]. First let us denote
∑
j∈Ni
(λitTi,j xi +
ρti
2 ‖ xi − z
t
i,j ‖2) by
gi(xi). Then (6.14) can be written as
Li(xi) = fi(xi) + gi(xi), (6.15)
Note that Li(xi) is not differentiable at ai. Nonetheless, the directional derivative of Li at every point xi in
the direction v ∈ RD exists and is given as follows [11]:
L′i(x̄i;v) =

OLi(x̄i)Tv, x̄i 6= ai,
Ogi(ai)Tv − 2ri ‖ v ‖, x̄i = ai.
(6.16)
Noting that gi is differentiable at ai, if Ogi(ai) 6= 0, using (6.16) we have
L′i(x̄i;−Ogi(ai)) = − ‖ Ogi(ai) ‖2 −2ri ‖ Ogi(ai) ‖< 0.
If Ogi(ai) = 0, then for every v 6= 0 we have
L′i(x̄i;v) = −2ri ‖ v ‖< 0.
So there always exists a descent direction at ai. Therefore, ai is not a local minimum of Li(xi). This
concludes the proof of statement (2). 
Next, we derive a closed-form solution (local minimum) to (6.9) by applying the zero-gradient
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condition [97] and the positive definite property of Hessian. First, let us find a solution to the zero-gradient
condition:
Ofi(x
t+1
i ) +
∑
j∈Ni
(λti,j + ρ
t
i(x
t+1
i − z
t
i,j)) = 0, (6.17)
where
Ofi(xi) = 2(xi − ai)−
2ri(xi − ai)
‖ xi − ai ‖
, xi 6= ai.
It is worth noting that here our purpose is to find one solution (not all) that satisfies both the
zero-gradient condition [97] and the positive definite property of Hessian, i.e., one local minimum to (6.9).
Rewrite (6.17) as
∑
j∈Ni
ρti(x
t+1
i − z
t
i,j +
λti,j
ρti
) = 2(ai − xt+1i )(1−
ri
‖ xt+1i − ai ‖
). (6.18)
Now, we provide a solution to (6.18) under two situations.
S1: when
∑
j∈Ni
(zti,j −
λti,j
ρti
) − Niai 6= 0 holds, let us set xt+1i = ai + ζµ with scalar ζ > 0 and
vector ‖ µ ‖= 1, then it is clear that (6.18) can be rewritten as [97]
∑
j∈Ni
ρti(z
t
i,j −
λti,j
ρti
− ai) = µ[ζ(2 +Niρti)− 2ri]
if ζ and µ are selected as follows
ζ =
2ri+ ‖
∑
j∈Ni
ρti(z
t
i,j −
λti,j
ρti
− ai) ‖
2 +Niρti
,
µ =
∑
j∈Ni
ρti(z
t
i,j −
λti,j
ρti
− ai)
‖
∑
j∈Ni
ρti(z
t
i,j −
λti,j
ρti
− ai) ‖
.
So we have that
xt+1i = ai +
2ri+ ‖
∑
j∈Ni
ρti(z
t
i,j −
λti,j
ρti
− ai) ‖
2 +Niρti
·
∑
j∈Ni
ρti(z
t
i,j −
λti,j
ρti
− ai)
‖
∑
j∈Ni
ρti(z
t
i,j −
λti,j
ρti
− ai) ‖
(6.19)
is a solution to (6.18), i.e., a stationary point of Li.
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S2: when
∑
j∈Ni
(zti,j −
λti,j
ρti
)−Niai = 0 holds and ρti is a finite value, (6.18) is equal to
Niρ
t
i(x
t+1
i − ai) = 2(ai − x
t+1
i )(1−
ri
‖ xt+1i − ai ‖
). (6.20)
It is easy to obtain that
xt+1i ∈ {ai +
2ri
2 +Niρti
ε}, ‖ ε ‖= 1 (6.21)
is a solution to (6.18), i.e., a stationary point of Li.
A commonly used way to choose xt+1i in this situation is to set x
t+1
i = ai +
2ri
2+Niρti
xti−ai
‖xti−ai‖
.
Lemma 6. The stationary points provided in (6.19) and (6.21) are also local minima of Li, i.e., solutions to
(6.9) (under situation S1 and situation S2, respectively).
Proof: First, we prove that the point in (6.19) is a local minimum. Consider the Hessian of Li
(denoted by O2Li), i.e.,
(2 +Niρ
t
i)ID −
2ri
‖ xi − ai ‖
ID +
2ri(xi − ai)(xi − ai)T
‖ xi − ai ‖3
,
at xt+1i in (6.19), we have
O2Li(x
t+1
i ) =
2ri(x
t+1
i − ai)(x
t+1
i − ai)T
‖ xt+1i − ai ‖3
+ (2 +Niρ
t
i)ID −
2ri(2 +Niρ
t
i)
2ri+ ‖
∑
j∈Ni
ρti(z
t
i,j −
λti,j
ρti
− ai) ‖
ID.
(6.22)
Since
∑
j∈Ni
(zti,j −
λti,j
ρti
)−Niai 6= 0, we have that
(2 +Niρ
t
i)ID −
2ri(2 +Niρ
t
i)
2ri+ ‖
∑
j∈Ni
ρti(z
t
i,j −
λti,j
ρti
− ai) ‖
ID (6.23)
is positive definite. In addition, because the matrix yyT is positive semidefinite, we have
2ri(x
t+1
i − ai)(x
t+1
i − ai)T
‖ xt+1i − ai ‖3
(6.24)
is positive semidefinite. A positive definite matrix plus a positive semidefinite matrix is positive definite. So
O2Li(x
t+1
i ) is positive definite and therefore x
t+1
i in (6.19) is a local minimum of Li.
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For situation S2, first note that (6.14) can be rewritten as
L̄i(xi) = fi(xi) +
ρtiNi
2
‖ xi − bti ‖2 +cti, (6.25)
where bti =
∑
j∈Ni
(zti,j−
λti,j
ρt
i
)
Ni
and cti = −
ρtiNi
2 ‖ b
t
i ‖2 +
∑
j∈Ni
‖ zti,j ‖2. When bti = ai (situation S2), (6.25)
can be rewritten as
L̄i(xi) =
2 + ρtiNi
2
‖ xi − ai ‖2 −2ri ‖ xi − ai ‖ +r2i + cti. (6.26)
Function (6.26) is a simple quadratic function and it is clear that the minimum is reached at points that satisfy
‖ xi − ai ‖= 2ri2+ρtiNi . Since x
t+1
i in (6.21) satisfies ‖ x
t+1
i − ai ‖=
2ri
2+ρtiNi
, it is a local minimum of L̄i,
i.e., a local minimum of Li. 
In Algorithm 5, after each sensor obtains its local estimated event position xti in each iteration, it
sends a copy of xti to its neighboring sensors in Ni. This guarantees the consistency of individual estimates
across the entire network. In general, Algorithm 5 is highly scalable and flexible. However, if we consider
the required storage space in each sensor, we can find that each sensor i has to store the following values:
xi,xj , zi,j , ρ
t
i, ρ
t
j ,λ
i
i,j ,λ
j
i,j , Ni, which require a storage space of 4DNi +D +Ni + 2 if we simply assume
that any real number is stored by one storage cell. Note that these values are updated with iteration and hence
can be demanding in terms of required storage space. In the following, we simplify the algorithm to save
storage space in each sensor.
By substituting (6.12) and (6.13) into (6.11) [106], we get
zt+1i,j =
1
ρti + ρ
t
j
(ρtix
t+1
i + ρ
t
jx
t+1
j + λ
i(t−1)
i,j + λ
j(t−1)
i,j + ρ
t−1
i (x
t
i − zti,j) + ρt−1j (x
t
j − zti,j)). (6.27)
Then by substituting (6.11) into zti,j again, we get
zt+1i,j =
1
ρti + ρ
t
j
(ρtix
t+1
i + ρ
t
jx
t+1
j ), (6.28)
λ
i(t+1)
i,j + λ
j(t+1)
i,j = 0. (6.29)
From (6.28) and (6.29), we can simplify our algorithm by omitting the computation of zi,j and
λji,j ,∀j ∈ Ni in sensor i. First, we introduce a vector λi =
∑
j∈Ni
λii,j , which leads to (6.30) from the
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relationship in (6.12)
λt+1i = λ
t
i +
∑
j∈Ni
ρtiρ
t
j
ρti + ρ
t
j
(xt+1i − x
t+1
j ). (6.30)
Then by substituting zti,j in (6.19) with (6.28) and substituting
∑
j∈Ni
λii,j in (6.19) with λi, we have
xt+1i = ai +
2ri+ ‖
∑
j∈Ni
(
ρti
ρt−1i +ρ
t−1
j
(ρt−1i x
t
i + ρ
t−1
j x
t
j)−
λti
Ni
− ρtiai) ‖
2 +Niρti
·
∑
j∈Ni
(
ρti
ρt−1i +ρ
t−1
j
(ρt−1i x
t
i + ρ
t−1
j x
t
j)−
λti
Ni
− ρtiai)
‖
∑
j∈Ni
(
ρti
ρt−1i +ρ
t−1
j
(ρt−1i x
t
i + ρ
t−1
j x
t
j)−
λti
Ni
− ρtiai) ‖
(6.31)
under situation S1, i.e., when
∑
j∈Ni
(
ρti
ρt−1i +ρ
t−1
j
(ρt−1i x
t
i + ρ
t−1
j x
t
j)−
λti
Ni
− ρtiai) 6= 0 holds.
The simplified algorithm is described in Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6
Initial Setup: Each sensor initializes x0i , λ0i , ρ0i , and exchanges x0i with neighboring sensors.
Input: xti, λti, ρti, ρ
t−1
i
Output: xt+1i , λ
t+1
i , ρ
t+1
i
1. Each sensor updates its local vector xt+1i in parallel according to the update rule in (6.31) or (6.21);
2. Each sensor sends its local vector xt+1i and ρ
t
i to neighboring sensors in Ni;
3. Each sensor computes λt+1i according to (6.30);
4. Each sensor updates ρti → ρ
t+1
i . Detailed updating rules are given in Sec. 6.3;
5. Set t = t+ 1, and go to 1.
From Algorithm 6, we can see that each sensor has to store the following values: xi, xj , ρti, ρ
t
j , ρ
t−1
i ,
ρt−1j , λi, Ni, which require a storage space of DNi + 2Ni + 2D+ 3 that is less than Algorithm 5. We remark
that Algorithm 6 is a simplified version for Algorithm 5 in terms of the required storage space, and it differs
from Algorithm 5 only by streamlining the steps in the conventional ADMM algorithm.
In addition, if we set ρt+1i = ρ
t
i = ρ̄, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, i.e., keep ρi as a constant, (6.30) and (6.31)
can be simplified as:
λt+1i = λ
t
i +
ρ̄
2
(Nix
t+1
i −
∑
j∈Ni
xt+1j ),
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xt+1i = ai +
2ri+ ‖
∑
j∈Ni
(
ρ̄(xti+x
t
j)
2 −
λti
Ni
− ρ̄ai) ‖
2 +Niρ̄
·
∑
j∈Ni
(
ρ̄(xti+x
t
j)
2 −
λti
Ni
− ρ̄ai)
‖
∑
j∈Ni
(
ρ̄(xti+x
t
j)
2 −
λti
Ni
− ρ̄ai) ‖
which require a even smaller storage space of DNi + 2D + 2 in Algorithm 6. Furthermore, neighboring
sensors only need to exchange local estimates of event position, which reduces the communication overhead.
The convergence performance of the algorithm under a constant penalty parameter ρ̄ is evaluated numerically
in Sec. 6.4. Theoretical convergence analysis is detailed in the following section.
6.3 Convergence Analysis
Since fi in the objective function is non-convex and non-continuously differentiable, no proof is
currently available for the convergence of Algorithm 5 if ρti is kept constant (the same case for Algorithm 6),
although simulation results show that the algorithm converges well under a constant ρti in Sec. 6.4. Inspired by
the results in [7,8,28], we propose to update ρti in a time-varying way. Here, by time-varying we mean that the
penalty parameter is updated at every iteration. We update the penalty parameter ρti according to the following
rule:
If the following relationship holds in Algorithm 5
‖
∑
j∈Ni
(xt+1i − z
t+1
i,j ) ‖∞≤ ε ‖
∑
j∈Ni
(xti − zti,j) ‖∞, (6.32)
or accordingly the following relationship holds in Algorithm 6
‖
∑
j∈Ni
ρtj
ρti + ρ
t
j
(xt+1i − x
t+1
j ) ‖∞≤ ε ‖
∑
j∈Ni
ρt−1j
ρt−1i + ρ
t−1
j
(xti − xtj) ‖∞, (6.33)
then we update ρt+1i as
ρt+1i = max{ρ
t
j , j ∈ Ni ∪ {i}}, (6.34)
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otherwise, we update ρt+1i as
ρt+1i = η(max{ρ
t
j , j ∈ Ni ∪ {i}}), (6.35)
where ε resides in the interval [0, 1), η is larger than but close to 1. Here, ‖
∑
j∈Ni
(xt+1i −z
t+1
i,j ) ‖∞ is a measure
of the local primary gap. In the condition based update rule, (6.34) is used to keep the penalty parameter ρi as
consistent throughout the network as possible when the local primary gap decreases sufficiently, i.e., when
(6.32) holds, whereas (6.35) is used to reinforce the constraint xi = zi,j in the next update of xi if the local
primary gap does not decrease sufficiently enough. According to (6.9), we can see that a larger ρ implies a
stronger influence of the constraint xi = zi,j when updating xi.
In addition, the Lagrange multipliers and the search domain for xt+1i are required to be bounded
[7, 8, 28]. Therefore, we substitute the update rule for Lagrange multipliers in (6.30) with the following form:
λt+1i = PΩ[λ
t
i +
∑
j∈Ni
ρtiρ
t
j
ρti + ρ
t
j
(xt+1i − x
t+1
j )], (6.36)
where PΩ denotes the projection on the interval Ω = [λmin,λmax], i.e.,
PΩ[λ]j =

[λmin]j , if [λ]j ≤ [λmin]j ;
[λmax]j , if [λ]j ≥ [λmax]j ;
[λ]j , otherwise,
and [λ]j is the jth element of vector λ. To prevent unwanted clippings, λmax should be large enough (λmin
should be small enough).
For the update rule in (6.17), we add a constraint set
Xi = {xi|fi(xi) ≤ f(x̄)},
where x̄ is some initial estimate such that f(x̄) ≤ ∞ is true. Therefore, (6.17) can be substituted by
PXi [xk+1i −Gi(x
k+1
i )]− x
k+1
i = 0, (6.37)
where Gi(xk+1i ) denotes the left side function of (6.17). Then we need to modify the update rule of x
t+1
i for
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situation S1. Denote the solutions in (6.19) and (6.31) as ẋt+1i , we have
xt+1i =

ai +
(ri+
√
f(x̄))(ẋt+1i −ai)
‖ẋt+1i −ai‖
, ẋt+1i /∈ Xi;
ẋt+1i , ẋ
t+1
i ∈ Xi.
(6.38)
We first introduce two conclusions in [7] and [8], which help to conclude our theorem. (Note that
Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6 using the rules in (6.32)-(6.38) are designed following the idea of Algorithm 3.1
in [7] and Algorithm 2 in [8].)
Lemma 7. (Theorem 3.2 in [8]) Let {xt} be a sequence generated by Algorithm 5 or Algorithm 6. Then at
least one of the following possibilities hold when Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6 are updated following the
rules in (6.32)-(6.38): 1. The sequence admits a feasible limit point; 2. The sequence admits an infeasible
degenerate limit point.
Lemma 8. (Theorem 4.1 in [7]) Let {xt} be a sequence generated by Algorithm 5 or Algorithm 6 using
the rules in (6.32)-(6.38). Let x∗ be a limit point of {xt}. If the sequence of penalty parameter ρti,∀i ∈
{1, 2, ..., N} in (6.35) is bounded, the limit point {xt} is feasible.
Now we can conclude the convergence properties of our algorithms.
Theorem 13. If the Lagrange multipliers and penalty parameters in Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6 are
updated following the rules in (6.32)-(6.38), Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6 are guaranteed to admit a limit
point x∗ for any parameter choice, provided that they are chosen in the required range, i.e., ρ0i > 0,
η > 1, 0 ≤ ε < 1, λmax > 0, and λmin < 0. In addition, the limit point is admissible provided that
lim
t→∞
ρti = ρ̂ < ∞,∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} is true, i.e., all ρti are bounded, and the Lagrange multipliers are not
clipped.
Proof: The proof of Theorem 13 follows from conclusions in [7, 8]. First, note that Algorithm 5
and Algorithm 6 using the rules in (6.32)-(6.38) are designed following the idea of Algorithm 3.1 in [7] and
Algorithm 2 in [8], where x belongs to the set {X1×, ...,×XN}. Then according to Theorem 3.2 in [8], we
can get that Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6 admit a limit point x∗. It is worth noting that in [8], the derivative
of the objective function (denoted by F (x) in [8]) should be continuous, while in our case, fi(xi) is non-
differentiable at xi = ai. However, this will not be a problem in our case, as explained as follows. From the
proof of Theorem 3.2 in [8], we can see that the continuity condition is used to guarantee ‖ lim
t→∞
F (xt)
‖ρt‖∞ ‖= 0,
when ‖ ρt ‖∞ tends to∞ as t→∞. Recalling Lemma 5, it is clear that the only possible situation that we
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will have xt+1i tending to ai is when
∑
j∈Ni
(zti,j −
λti,j
ρti
) − Niai = 0 holds and ρti tends to∞. And in this
situation, we have ‖ lim
xti→ai
Ofi(xti) ‖= 2ri, which still guarantees ‖ limt→∞
F (xt)
‖ρt‖∞ ‖= 0. So Theorem 3.2 in [8]
holds for Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6. When all ρti are bounded, and the Lagrange multipliers are not clipped,
according to Theorem 4.1 in [7], x∗ is a feasible limit point. This concludes the proof of Theorem 13. 
In general, ρ0i should be set to a small value no more than 1 and η should be set slightly larger than
but close to 1, since a large ρti will slow down the convergence rate. The parameter ε resides in the interval
[0, 1), but it is suggested to be chosen slightly smaller than but close to 1 [97]. To prevent unwanted clippings,
λmax should be large enough and λmin should be small enough.
Remark 17. An important contribution of our algorithm with respect to the centralized optimization ap-
proaches in [7] and [8] is that our algorithm can be implemented in a completely decentralized manner. In
addition, [7] and [8] address smooth (continuously differentiable) objective functions whereas this chapter
extends the results to address the non-smooth event localization problem where the objective function is not
always differentiable.
Remark 18. It is worth noting that the target event localization problem considered here is different from the
self-cooperative localization problem in [28, 59, 106] where sensors with unknown positions are embedded
with computation capability to estimate their own positions by themselves. The differences are evident from the
following example. Suppose that there is only one target to localize. In the case of [28, 59, 106], the target will
be a sensor with unknown position and it estimates its own position alone in a centralized way based on all
information gathered from adjacent sensors, including their positions and corresponding range measurements.
Whereas in our case, the target is an event without any communication or computation capability and the
event position estimation process is conducted cooperatively in a decentralized way among the sensors.
6.4 Numerical Simulations
In this section, we first illustrated the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm under both time-varying
and constant penalty parameters. Then we compared our Algorithm 6 with existing results including the
PONLM algorithm [101], the PPM algorithm [56], and the DAPA algorithm [135]. It is worth noting that as
indicated in Sec. 6.2, Algorithm 6 differs from Algorithm 5 only by streamlining the steps in the conventional
ADMM algorithm. Therefore, Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6 have the same performance. The Matlab code for
all simulations in this section can be found in [1].
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The following two performance indices ERRRMSE and INCRMSE are defined below for the conve-
nience of performance comparison:
Localization Error: we use the root mean square error (RMSE) to quantify the error between estimated
and true positions of the target event for every sensor, which is denoted as ERRRMSE:
ERRRMSE =
√√√√√ L∑j=1 ‖ xj − x∗ ‖2
L
,
where L is the number of Monte Carlo trials, xj is the estimated position in the jth Monte Carlo trial in a
certain sensor, and x∗ is the true position of the target event.
Localization Inconsistency: We also use the root mean square error (RMSE) to quantify the lo-
calization inconsistency (difference) in estimated event positions between N sensors, which is denoted as
INCRMSE:
INCRMSE =
√√√√√ L∑
k=1
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
‖ xi,k − xj,k ‖2
L
,
where L is the number of Monte Carlo trials, xi,k is the estimated position obtained from the ith sensor in the
kth Monte Carlo trial. Parameter N is the number of sensors.
6.4.1 Evaluation of the Proposed Algorithm with Respect to Penalty Parameters
A. The Convergence of Time-varying ρ: As indicated in [121], the number of sensors required
to achieve unique source identification is between 4 and 6, so we simulated Algorithm 6 under an event
localization setup with five sensors and a target event located at [7.5; 7.5]. We set the initial values of time-
varying penalty parameters as ρ0i = 1,∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, and other parameters as ε = 0.99, η = 1.0001,
respectively. In addition, when ‖
∑
j∈Ni
ρtj
ρti+ρ
t
j
(xt+1i − x
t+1
j ) ‖∞≤ 10−12 holds, ρ stops iterating. We ran the
simulation for 1000 times with the sensors positions randomly chosen from [−15, 15]× [−15, 15]. Simulation
results showed that in all runs ρi converged to some finite value, no matter whether the target event was in or
outside the convex hull of the five sensors. Fig. 6.2 visualizes the evolution of ρi in one specific run where the
sensor positions are illustrated in Fig. 6.1 (we used the noise-free range measurements in this part).
B. Time-varying vs Constant Penalty Parameters: Because a constant penalty parameter can reduce
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Figure 6.1: Event localization setup used in one of the simulation runs. The values in [•] denote positions (x, y
coordinates) of sensors.
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Figure 6.2: The evolution of ρi.
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communication overhead and the storage space in each sensor, we simulated Algorithm 6 under a constant
penalty parameter ρ̄ = 1. Fig. 6.3 visualizes the distribution of estimated event positions from 1000 Monte
Carlo trials under a constant penalty parameter ρ̄ = 1 (Fig. 6.3b) and a time-varying ρ (Fig. 6.3a) with sensor
positions given in Fig. 6.1. The Gaussian standard noise deviation (measurement noise) was set to σi = 0.5.
The initial estimate x0i was randomly chosen in [−100, 100]× [−100, 100] in each Monte Carlo trial. It can
be seen that performances are similar in the two cases.
5 6 7 8 9 10 11
X
6
7
8
9
10
Y
sensor 1
sensor 2
sensor 3
sensor 4
sensor 5
actual position
(a) Time-varying ρ (b) Constant ρ̄
Figure 6.3: Estimated event positions distribution for 1000 Monte Carlo trials under the measurement noise
σi = 0.5.
We also evaluated the influence of the noise level on localization inconsistency of Algorithm 6 under
time-varying and constant penalty parameters. The results are summarized in Table 6.1 where each data
point is an average of 1000 Monte Carlo trials. They confirm that the proposed algorithm can achieve a good
consistency across the entire sensor network even under large measurement noises.
Table 6.1: INCRMSE of Algorithm 6 under different levels of measurement noise
σi Time-varying ρ Constant ρ̄
0.01 6.80× 10−15 2.42× 10−15
0.2 6.62× 10−15 2.46× 10−15
0.5 6.64× 10−15 2.50× 10−15
1 6.66× 10−15 2.61× 10−15
1.5 0.3858 0.3042
2 0.9778 0.8785
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6.4.2 Comparison with Projection-based Algorithms
In this subsection, we compared the proposed Algorithm 6 with the PONLM algorithm [101], the
DAPA algorithm [135], and the PPM algorithm [56]. For our algorithm, we set the initial values of parameters
as ρ0i = 1,∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, ε = 0.99, and η = 1.0001 respectively. For DAPA, we set the same parameters
as in [135]: αi = 1t+2 , βi =
1
t+1 , bi = 1, ξi = 3,∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. For PONLM, since it is sequential,
we set its updating order as 1 → 2 → ... → N . In addition, we made an equivalent transform from
energy measurements to range measurements for DAPA and PONLM in our simulations. Note that PPM is a
centralized algorithm and it requires a central node to collect and average local estimates from all sensors.
Therefore, in fact, PPM is not applicable to our event localization, but we still list its results here so that the
performance of our algorithm can be evaluated in context.
A. Convergence Performance: We used the event localization setup in Fig. 6.1 to compare the
convergence performance. Fig. 6.4 visualizes the evolution of the localization error with iteration time t. The
measurement noise was set to σi = 0.01, and each data point in Fig. 6.4 was an average of 1000 Monte Carlo
trials. The settings for initial estimates, iteration times, and random noisy range measurements were identical
for all algorithms in each Monte Carlo trial. From Fig. 6.4, we can see that Algorithm 6 has a comparable
performance with the centralized method PPM in terms of localization accuracy and convergence rate. It is
worth noting that although PONLM has the highest convergence rate, it requires sensors to update their local
estimates sequentially according to a globally predefined order. Therefore, it requires a much longer absolute
updating time than all the other three algorithms, especially when the number of sensors is large.
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Figure 6.4: The evolution of localization error under the event localization setup in Fig. 6.1.
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We also compared the convergence performance of our algorithm, PONLM, DAPA, and PPM in
a network of 50 sensors randomly placed in the field [−25, 25] × [−25, 25]. The sensors are assumed to
communicate only with two neighbors to form a ring network. Fig. 6.5 visualizes the evolution of the
localization error with iteration time t. The measurement noise was set to σi = 0.5, and each data point in
Fig. 6.5 was an average of 500 Monte Carlo trials. We can see that our Algorithm 6 still has a comparable
accuracy with the centralized version PPM while having a much faster convergence speed than DAPA. It
is worth noting that although PONLM has a high convergence rate, it requires sensors to update their local
estimates sequentially according to a globally predefined order. Therefore, it requires a much longer absolute
updating time than all the other three algorithms.
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Figure 6.5: The evolution of localization error in a ring network of 50 sensors
.
B. The Influence of Measurement Noise on Localization Error: We also varied the level of measure-
ment noise to check their influence on the localization error under the event localization setup in Fig. 6.1. The
iteration time was set to 1000. Fig. 6.6 summarizes the ERRRMSE of these algorithms under different σi with
each data point being an average of 1000 Monte Carlo trials. It can be seen that Algorithm 6 has a comparable
performance on the localization accuracy with the centralized method PPM. Furthermore, compared with
PONLM and DAPA, our proposed algorithm showed consistently better performance under different levels
of measurement noise. Moreover, when we used noise-free range measurements, the localization error of
Algorithm 6 is on the level of 10−15, which indicates that the algorithm can converge to the true target event
position.
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Figure 6.6: The influence of measurement noise on localization error.
C. The Influence of Initialization Settings: We randomly set different initial estimates to check its
influence to the four algorithms. We considered two situations: when the target event is in the convex hull of
sensors as illustrated in Fig. 6.1 and when the target event is outside the convex hull of sensors as illustrated in
Fig. 6.7. The event localization setup in Fig. 6.7 is inspired by the practical acoustic event localization system
in [18, 90].
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Figure 6.7: Event localization setup used in simulations. The values in [•] denote positions (x, y coordinates)
of sensors.
When the target event is in the convex hull of sensors, all algorithms converged to the true target
event position irrespective of the initial estimate x0i . However, when the target event is outside the convex hull
of sensors, DAPA did not converge to the true target event position in our simulations even if we set the initial
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Table 6.2: Algorithm 6 vs PPM under random initial estimates
Initial
Estimates
Algorithm 6 PPM
V1 V2
Correct
V1 V2
Correct
Hits Hits
Y3 9826 174 98.26% 8423 1577 84.23%
Y2 9941 59 99.41% 8766 1234 87.66%
Y1 9991 9 99.91% 9397 603 93.97%
estimates close to the true target event position. For example, it converged to [−15; 200] after 105 iterations
when x0i = [−20; 180],∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 9}, while Algorithm 6 and PPM converged to [−5; 200] after 200
iterations. The failure of DAPA is understandable given that it always pursues the intersections of sensing rings,
which do not necessarily coincide with the true target event location. Table 6.2 gives the number of times that
Algorithm 6 and PPM converged to the true target event position [−5; 200] (denoted as V1) and another local
minimum [−4.9;−200] (denoted as V2) when the initial estimates of the nine sensors were randomly chosen
in the following three ranges in 10000 Monte Carlo trials, respectively: Y1 := {x ∈ R2| ‖ x− [−5; 200] ‖≤
300}, Y2 := {x ∈ R2| ‖ x− [−5; 200] ‖≤ 400}, and Y3 := {x ∈ R2| ‖ x− [−5; 200] ‖≤ 500}. It can be
seen that our proposed algorithm is more likely to converge to the true target event position. PONLM is not
applicable to the event localization setup in Fig. 6.7, since there exists no path that connects all nine sensors in
succession.
D. The Influence of Topology Changes: We simulated the influence of topology changes to Algorithm
6, the PONLM algorithm [101], and the DAPA algorithm [135] under the event localization setup in Fig. 6.1.
We supposed that each communication link in Fig. 6.1 has a fixed probability of packet loss in each iteration,
denoted as P . For Algorithm 6 and DAPA, if the packet on a communication link between two senors is
lost, then these two sensors can not exchange local estimates in this iteration. Specifically for Algorithm 6,
if a sensor does not receive any local estimates from its neighbors in some iteration time, it updates its local
estimate as xt+1i = x
t
i. For PONLM, if there exists one packet lose in the multi-hop path 1→ 2→ ...→ 5,
the update process is failed in this iteration. Therefore, the topology might change from iteration to iteration.
Fig. 6.8 visualizes the evolution of localization error of the three algorithms under the packet loss probability
of P = 5%. The measurement noise was set to σi = 0.01, and each data point was an average of 1000
Monte Carlo trials. We can see that Algorithm 6 has the smallest localization error in the presence of topology
changes caused by link failures. Fig. 6.9 visualizes the evolution of localization error of Algorithm 6 under
packet loss probabilities of P = 0%, P = 5%, P = 10%, P = 15%, P = 30%, and P = 50%, respectively.
It can be seen that Algorithm 6 reached high localization accuracy even under a high probability of packet loss,
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which indicates that Algorithm 6 is robust to network topology changes.
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Figure 6.8: The evolution of localization error of our algorithm, PONLM, and DAPA under a packet loss
probability of P = 5%.
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Figure 6.9: The evolution of localization error of Algorithm 6 under different packet loss probabilities.
Remark 19. In Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6, the update of xti (local target event position estimate) at sensor
i is influenced by the local estimates from its neighbors due to the constraint xi = zi,j . The constraints
xi = zi,j and xj = zi,j drive the consistency of local estimates among neighboring sensors once they can
communicate. So the consistency among local estimates of all sensors can still be guaranteed whenever
neighboring sensors can exchange information under a connected communication pattern. This is in some
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Table 6.3: Complexity comparison among Algorithm 6, PONLM, and DAPA
Algorithm 6 PONLM DAPATime-varying ρ Constant ρ̄
Communication Load
N∑
i=1
(D + 1)Ni
N∑
i=1
DNi ND
N∑
i=1
DNi
Local Storage Space DNi + 2Ni + 2D + 3 DNi + 2D + 2 2D DNi + 3D +Ni + 2
Execution Time (every 1000 iterations) 0.02s 0.0066s 0.002s 0.008s
sense similar to the asynchronous ADMM, whose convergence is guaranteed for convex function [119]. Our
simulation results suggest a potential application of asynchronous ADMM in some non-convex and non-smooth
functions.
E. Complexity Comparison: Table 6.3 provides a comparison on the overall network communication
load per iteration, the required local storage space in each sensor, and the average computation complexity
per sensor per iteration of Algorithm 6, the PONLM algorithm [101], and the DAPA algorithm [135]. We
simply assume that any real number is stored by one storage cell. For computation complexity comparison,
we used the average execution time that each sensor spends for 1000 iterations. From Table 6.3, we can see
that Algorithm 6 with constant ρ̄ has comparable performance with DAPA. In addition, although algorithm
PONLM has the smallest communication overhead and local storage requirement, it requires sensors to update
their local estimates sequentially according to a globally predefined order and is not amendable to parallelism.
F. The influence of the number of sensors: In this part, we simulated the influence of the number of
sensors on our algorithm’s convergence rate and localization error. We considered 50 sensors randomly placed
in the field [−25, 25]× [−25, 25]. We formed a ring network by randomly choosing 5, 10, 25, and 50 sensors,
respectively. Fig. 6.10 visualizes the evolution of localization error of Algorithm 6 under these ring networks.
The measurement noise was set to σi = 0.5, and each data point in Fig. 6.10 was an average of 500 Monte
Carlo trials. Fig. 6.10 shows that with an increase in the number of sensors, the localization error decreases
monotonically while the convergent speed is only moderately affected in a non-monotonic way. Therefore, if
accuracy is of concern, then more sensors should be deployed. In addition, simulation results showed that
the probability of acquiring the true target event position was always 100% for the three cases of 10 sensors,
25 sensors, and 50 sensors, respectively (cf. Table 6.4), which is higher than the case with 5 sensors. This
is intuitive as the target event is more likely to be within the convex hull of all sensors when the number of
sensors increases.
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Figure 6.10: The evolution of localization error of Algorithm 6 under different numbers of sensors.
Table 6.4: Correct hits of Algorithm 6 under a ring topology composed of different numbers of sensors.
Number of Sensors Correct Hits Total Trials Percentage
5 973 1000 97.3%
10 1000 1000 100%
25 1000 1000 100%
50 1000 1000 100%
6.5 Summaries
In this chapter, we proposed a completely decentralized parallel algorithm which solves the non-
convex and non-smooth event localization problem directly without using convex relaxation. Simulation results
confirm that our algorithm has better localization accuracy compared with other projection-based algorithms
when the target event is in the convex hull of sensors. When the target event is outside the convex hull of
sensors, our algorithm has a higher probability to converge to the right target event position than existing
results. In addition, numerical simulations show that our algorithm has higher localization accuracy than
existing approaches even in the presence of topology changes.
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Chapter 7
Distributed Event Localization via
ADMM
This chapter is motivated by acoustic event localization which is crucial on battlefields [25]. In
such applications, the target event has no communication or computation capability, which differentiates the
problem from sensor localization problems in which the locations of sensors are estimated [106]. Furthermore,
in such applications, the target events lie outside the convex hull of deployed sensors, which renders existing
projection-based algorithms inappropriate. SDP relaxation based algorithms can avoid the convex hull problem
and are traditionally employed to solve the event localization problem [30,91,92,113,114,124,126]. However,
as far as we known, existing SDP relaxation based algorithms for event localization are all centralized, with a
central node collecting and processing all data, which makes them susceptible to processing center failure
and traffic bottleneck. In this chapter, we propose two distributed event localization approaches based on a
clustered architecture motivated by mobile acoustic localization applications such as the PinPointTM system
from BioMimetics Systems Inc. The PinPointTM mobile localization sensor network can be deployed as a
mobile infrastructure for impulsive threat event detection and localization [18, 25]. Each PinPointTM sensor is
a small omnidirectional microphone array which localizes impulsive acoustic events by correlating the ToA
measurements among its microphone cells. In fact, since each sensor has an integrated microphone array,
individual sensors are able to identify and localize a target event without assistance or cooperation with other
sensors. However, due to close distances between the microphone cells, the accuracy of individual sensors
is very limited and unsatisfactory, and collaboration among the sensors is necessary to improve localization
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accuracy [18, 25].
The above application motivated us to assume a localization architecture in which an entire network
is divided into several clusters. A cluster head (which can be a regular sensor) collects and fuses measurements
(e.g., noisy ranges) obtained from all members in its cluster. Two cluster heads in different clusters can
exchange information (the local estimates of target events) if a communication link is available between them;
otherwise they don’t have access to each other’s information. Based on the alternating direction method of
multipliers (ADMM), we propose two scalable distributed algorithms named GS-ADMM and J-ADMM which
do not require the target event to be within the convex hull of the deployed sensors. Our developed algorithms
can also be applied in some other applications where a cluster-based architecture is employed. A typical
example is the wide-area monitoring and control in large-scale power systems [83], [35]. To estimate the
electro-mechanical oscillation modes, a large number of phasor measurement units (PMU) have to be deployed
across a power network to conduct measurements. The measurements from PMUs have to be fused to diagnose
the inter-area oscillation modes. However, wide-area communication between PMUs is very expensive [43].
To fuse information across the PMUs without imposing heavy communication overhead, a similar structure as
ours is adopted in [83], [35]. Other examples on cluster-based architecture can be found in [55, 95, 109, 133].
The main contribution of this chapter is two ADMM-based distributed event localization algorithms,
i.e., GS-ADMM and J-ADMM. Compared with existing centralized SDP relaxation based algorithms for
event localization, the two algorithms divide the computation on a central node to different clusters to avoid
possible center failure and traffic bottleneck, and in the mean time, guarantee consistency of the estimates
across all clusters among which only limited communications are available. Furthermore, the two algorithms
take advantages of SDP relaxation to avoid the convex hull problem compared with existing projection-based
algorithms. Moreover, the algorithms are proven to converge with a convergence rate of O(1/t) where t is the
iteration time.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Sec. 7.1 states the formulation of the problem. To
solve the problem, a convex relaxation is required and the method proposed by [106] is recapitulated in Sec.
7.2. In Sec. 7.3 , two algorithms named GS-ADMM and J-ADMM are proposed based on ADMM, with
their convergence properties analyzed in Sec. 7.4. Sec. 7.5 gives numerical simulation results. In the end, a
summary is made in Section 7.6.
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Figure 7.1: Cluster based event localization architecture (N = 4)
7.1 Problem Statement
Motivated by mobile acoustic event localization applications such as the PinPointTM event localization
sensor network [18, 25], we consider a localization sensor network divided into N clusters (cf. Fig. 7.1 for
the case N = 4). Denote the number of constituent sensors of cluster i as Ci (i = 1, 2, . . . , N ). We consider
localization in D (D ∈ {1, 2, 3}) dimensional Euclidean space and suppose that the position of the target
event is denoted as x ∈ RD. Denote the position of the kth sensor in the ith cluster as ai,k ∈ RD. The kth
sensor in the ith cluster can obtain a noisy range measurement ri,k of its distance with respect to a target event:
ri,k = di,k + vi,k
where di,k =‖ x− ai,k ‖ denotes the actual distance between the event position and the kth sensor of the ith
cluster, and vi,k is the Gaussian noise term.
Then the event localization problem amounts to estimating the unknown event location x using known
sensor positions ai,k and noisy range measurements ri,k (i = 1, 2, . . . , N, k = 1, 2, . . . , Ci). Still motivated
by acoustic event localization applications (e.g., the PinPointTM event localization sensor network [18,25]), we
assume that a cluster head exists in each cluster i, which can gather range measurements ri,k from all sensors
within the cluster. In addition, a cluster head can communicate and exchange information with the cluster head
of a neighboring cluster if there is a communication link between them (cf. Fig. 7.1). In this case, we also
say that these two clusters can communicate. We assume that the communication pattern forms a connected
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network, i.e., there is a (multi-hop) path (composed of multiple communication links connected in succession)
between any pair of cluster heads. For example, in Fig. 7.1, cluster 1 is able to exchange information with
clusters 2 and 3 (via cluster heads); cluster 2 can exchange information with clusters 1, 3, and 4 (via cluster
heads), etc. DenoteNi as the set of all neighboring clusters of cluster i, N̂i as the union of setNi and cluster i
itself, and Ni as the number of clusters in Ni.
As in most existing results, we use the maximum likelihood method for event localization [30, 91].
Let pi,k(di,k(x,ai,k)|ri,k) denote the measuring probability density function (PDF) for sensor k in cluster i
and assume that it is a log-concave function of unknown distance di,k [106], we can write this problem using
the maximum likelihood method (which is costly but efficient [11]):
x∗ML = argmaxx∈RD
N∑
i=1
Ci∑
k=1
lnpi,k(di,k(x,ai,k)|ri,k). (7.1)
7.2 Convex Relaxation
Problem (7.1) is non-convex and it is generally infeasible to find a global optimal solution [106]. So
a convex relaxation is needed to convert problem (7.1) into a convex optimization problem. Following the
idea of [106], we use an SDP based relaxation approach. However, it is worth noting that there are inherent
differences between the problem considered here and the sensor-position estimation problem in [106] where
each sensor with unknown position estimates its own position using embedded computation capability. The
differences are evident from the following example. Suppose that there is only one target to localize. In the
case of [106], the target will be a sensor with unknown position and it estimates its own position alone using
a centralized SDP based on all information gathered from adjacent sensors, including their positions and
corresponding range measurements. Whereas in our case, the target is an event without any communication or
computation capability and the event position estimation process is conducted cooperatively in a distributed
way among the clusters.
To facilitate the relaxation, we first define the following new variables: y = xTx, εi,k = d2i,k. Then
we stack εi,k, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., Ci} into εi and further stack εi, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} into ε , [εT1 , εT2 , ..., εTN ]T . In
the same way we stack di,k into di and d , [dT1 ,d
T
2 , ...,d
T
N ]
T . Then the cost function can be written as
f(d) = −
N∑
i=1
Ci∑
k=1
lnpi,k(di,k|ri,k).
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Consider the case of white zero-mean Gaussian noise, i.e., vi,k ∼ N (0, σ2i,k), then the above problem
can be rewritten as
f(d) =
N∑
i=1
Ci∑
k=1
σ−2i,k (d
2
i,k − 2di,kri,k + r2i,k) (7.2)
Without loss of generality, we can set the standard deviation σi,k in (7.2) to one. Now, problem (7.1)
can be relaxed into the following constrained optimization problem:
min
x,ε,d,y
f(d)
subject to y − 2xTai,k+ ‖ ai,k ‖2= εi,k, y = xTx,
εi,k = d
2
i,k, di,k ≥ 0,
∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., Ci}.
(7.3)
However, in this case, the constraints of (7.3) still define a non-convex set [106]. Using Schur
complements [94], the following convex relaxation can be obtained:
min
x,ε,d,y
f(d)
subject to y − 2xTai,k+ ‖ ai,k ‖2= εi,k, εi,k ≥ 0, 1 di,k
di,k εi,k
  0, di,k ≥ 0,
∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., Ci},ID x
xT y
  0, y ≥ 0.
(7.4)
Problem (7.4) is a convex problem with inequality constraints [16]. We can rewrite the cost function
as
f(d, ε) =
N∑
i=1
Ci∑
k=1
σ−2i,k (εi,k − 2di,kri,k + r
2
i,k) (7.5)
by enforcing a change of variables εi,k = d2i,k to further relax it to a semidefinite programming (SDP)
problem [106]. Now, we can propose ADMM based solutions for problem (7.4).
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7.3 Proposed Distributed Algorithms
7.3.1 Problem Reformulation
In distributed algorithms, neighboring nodes have to generate and exchange copies of local estimates
to ensure a consistent global estimation across all nodes. In our event localization architecture, a cluster is
treated as a normal node which solves a common event localization problem based on measurements obtained
by sensors within the cluster. And neighboring clusters exchange intermediate computational results (through
cluster heads) to guarantee that all clusters reach the same estimation value.
To better interpret our algorithms, we define a local vector
pi , (ε
T
i ,d
T
i , yi,x
T
i )
T ∈ R2Ci+D+1, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N},
which is owned by cluster i.
We let p denote the stacked vector of pi and define a convex set
Pi , {pi|pi verifies (7.4)}.
Then problem (7.4) can be rewritten as
min
p
f(p)
subject to pi ∈ Pi, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N},
(7.6)
where, in our situation, f(p) is given as follows:
f(p) = −
N∑
i=1
Ci∑
k=1
ln pi,k(di,k|ri,k) =
N∑
i=1
fi(pi). (7.7)
7.3.2 ADMM based problem formulation
From the architecture in (7.7), it is easy to see that problem (7.6) can be divided into N subproblems,
which can be solved in a distributed way using ADMM by adding some constraints on pi. Next we present the
basic idea based on a graph-based formulation of the communication pattern.
Using graph theory [14], the communication pattern of cluster heads can be represented by G =
{V,E}, where the set V denotes the set of cluster heads, and E denotes the set of undirected edges (communi-
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cation links) between clusters. We use ei,j ∈ E, i < j to denote the link (if there is) between cluster heads i
and j. We use |E| to represent the total number of undirected edges. In our problem formulation, each cluster
is associated with a local cost function fi(pi), and all clusters work together to solve the problem in (7.6).
Assume that the local cost function fi is only known to cluster i, then to reach consistency (consensus) of
estimated position values among all clusters, we impose a constraint xi = xj if there exists an edge ei,j ∈ E
between clusters i and j. Introduce a matrix Ji = [0D×(2Ci+1), ID] ∈ RD×(2Ci+D+1), where ID denotes the
D dimensional identity matrix, then xi can be represented as xi = Jipi. So the constraint xi = xj can be
represented as Jipi = Jjpj .
Now we are able to rewrite problem (7.6) into a distributed ADMM form as follows:
min
pi, i∈{1,2,...,N}
N∑
i=1
fi(pi)
subject to Jipi = Jjpj , ∀ei,j ∈ E,
pi ∈ Pi, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N},
(7.8)
or in a more compact way:
min
p
f(p)
subject to AJp = 0, pi ∈ Pi, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N},
(7.9)
where p = [pT1 ,p
T
2 , ...,p
T
N ]
T , J = diag{J1, J2, . . . , JN} ∈ R
ND×(
N∑
i=1
2Ci+D+1)
, and A = [am,n] ⊗ ID ∈
R|E|D×ND is the edge-node incidence matrix of graphG as defined in [118], with its |E|D rows corresponding
to the |E| communication links and the ND columns corresponding to the N agents. The symbol ⊗ denotes
Kronecker product. The am,n element is defined as
am,n =

1 if the mth edge originates from agent n,
−1 if the mth edge terminates at agent n,
0 otherwise.
(7.10)
Here we define that each edge ei,j originates from agent i and terminates at agent j.
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It can be easily verified that the incidence matrix A for Fig. 7.1 is
A =

ID −ID 0D 0D
0D ID −ID 0D
ID 0D −ID 0D
0D ID 0D −ID

. (7.11)
In this formulation, after each cluster obtains its local estimate pi, it sends the value Jipi (estimated
event position xi) to neighboring clusters. By adding the constraint Jipi = Jjpj ,∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, j ∈ Ni
as shown in (7.8), the consistency of individual event position Jipi (xi) estimated across the clusters is
guaranteed. Now we are in place to present our detailed algorithms to solve (7.8).
Remark 20. Note that although a normal way to apply ADMM to consensus problems is to create auxiliary
local variables (cf. [106]), we just put the constraint Jipi = Jjpj directly here. The reason that we omit the
auxiliary local variables is to save storage space at each cluster, since auxiliary local variables take additional
storage space. Furthermore, by adding the constraint Jipi = Jjpj , we can have both a sequential and a
parallel realization with convergence guaranteed, which will be detailed in the following subsection. This kind
of constraint and its induced ADMM algorithm is called extended ADMM, which is discussed and applied in
many recent work, e.g., [26, 82, 83, 118, 127].
7.3.3 Proposed Algorithms
Let λi,j be the Lagrange multiplier relevant to the constraint Jipi = Jjpj . Then the regularized
augmented Lagrangian function of problem (7.8) can be reformulated as
Lρ(p,λ) =
N∑
i=1
fi(pi) +
∑
ei,j∈E
(λTi,j(Jipi − Jjpj) +
ρ
2
‖ Jipi − Jjpj ‖2), (7.12)
where λi,j are stacked into λi for all j ∈ Ni and λi are stacked into λ for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}.
Applying ADMM, we can get the following two updating recursions:
pt+1 = argminpi∈PiLρ(p,λ
t), (7.13)
λt+1i,j = λ
t
i,j + ρ(Jip
t+1
i − Jjp
t+1
j ). (7.14)
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Here, we can update p in two different ways. One way is based on the Gauss-Seidel update [37] in which
clusters update in a sequential order. The other way is the Jacobian scheme in which all clusters update in
parallel [99].
Gauss-Seidel update (GS-ADMM): We first consider an algorithm based on the Gauss-Seidel
update. Gauss-Seidel update for distributed ADMM has been explored theoretically and proven able to
converge in most cases for convex objective functions (see, e.g., [46, 52, 108]). GS-ADMM based solution for
distributed event localization can be described as follows:
Algorithm 7 GS-ADMM
Each cluster initializes p0i , λ
0
i,j .
Input: pti, λti,j
Output: pt+1i , λ
t+1
i,j
1. All clusters update their local vectors in a sequential order and send their local vectors Jipt+1i to
neighboring clusters in Ni immediately, where
pt+1i = argminpi∈P(fi(pi) +
∑
j∈N̂i,j≥i
(λtTi,j(Jipi − Jjptj) +
ρ
2
‖ Jipi − Jjptj ‖2)
+
∑
j∈N̂i,j<i
(λtTi,j(Jipi − Jjpt+1j ) +
ρ
2
‖ Jipi − Jjpt+1j ‖
2)).
(7.15)
Here we also consider the effect of Jipti when updating p
t+1
i by adding a term
ρ
2 ‖ Jipi − Jip
t
i ‖2.
Problem (7.15) with fi given in (7.5) is an SDP problem that can be solved by common convex toolboxes
such as Yalmip [70, 106], which is used in our simulations.
2. Each cluster computes
λt+1i,j = λ
t
i,j + ρ(Jip
t+1
i − Jjp
t+1
j ). (7.16)
3. Set t = t+ 1, and go to 1.
In GS-ADMM, all clusters update their local estimated position values in a sequential way just as
some projection-based algorithms. Sequential update can be used in small-size networks. For large-scale
networks, a parallel method is more appropriate. So we also propose another algorithm based on Jacobian
scheme which is amendable for parallelization.
Jacobian based ADMM (J-ADMM): Algorithm J-ADMM is motivated by the work in [26], which
proposed the Proximal Jacobian ADMM by adding some proximal terms when updating pi. We adopt the
same idea here and prove that if the proximal terms meet some additional requirements, convergence of this
algorithm can be guaranteed. The detailed procedure of J-ADMM is given as follows, with the convergence
analysis detailed in the following section.
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Algorithm 8 J-ADMM
Each cluster initializes p0i , λ
0
i,j .
Input: pti, λti,j
Output: pt+1i , λ
t+1
i,j
1. Each cluster updates its local vector in parallel:
pt+1i = argminpi∈Pfi(pi) +
∑
j∈N̂i
(λtTi,j(Jipi − Jjptj) +
ρ
2
‖ Jipi − Jjptj ‖2) +
ργi
2
‖ Jipi − Jipti ‖2
(7.17)
The last term of the above equality, i.e., ργi2 ‖ Jipi − Jip
t
i ‖2, is the proximal term we added where
γi ≥ 0 is a scalar. Problem (7.17) with fi given in (7.5) is an SDP problem that can be solved by
common convex toolboxes such as Yalmip [70, 106], which is used in our simulations.
2. Each cluster sends its local vector Jipt+1i to neighboring clusters in Ni.
3. Each cluster computes
λt+1i,j = λ
t
i,j + ρ(Jip
t+1
i − Jjp
t+1
j ). (7.18)
4. Set t = t+ 1, and go to 1.
Remark 21. A distinct difference between GS-ADMM and J-ADMM is the way they update pi. In GS-ADMM,
each cluster updates its local estimated position value in a sequential way, which requires a globally predefined
order. Whereas in J-ADMM, all clusters update their local estimated position values simultaneously. We
remark that GS-ADMM is appropriate for small-scale sensor networks. But for large-scale networks, updating
in a sequential way may be quite time-consuming and parallel methods like J-ADMM are more appropriate. So
different updating methods should be chosen according to the size of networks and other practical concerns.
In fact, if we disregard the PinPointTM motivated application scenario, the proposed two algorithms
can be completely distributed to each sensor by allowing sensors to have access to neighboring sensors’
positions and range measurements with respect to the target event. However, we argue that this, in fact,
may cost more energy since each sensor has to solve an SDP problem. In addition, the required storage
overhead is larger since each sensor has to store neighboring sensors’ positions and range measurements.
Furthermore, consider a situation where two sensors can communicate with each other and have the same
neighbors. Then the position estimation process conducted at these two sensors are the same, which leads to
redundant processing of the same data. While in our clustered architecture, only cluster heads need to conduct
position estimation and in fact, each sensor in the cluster can take turns to be the cluster head, which is helpful
to average energy consumption. Compared with the iterative schemes, e.g., projection-based algorithms, where
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each sensor only has access to its own position and range measurement, our algorithms are insensitive to the
convex hull problem. And compared with centralized SDP-based algorithms, our clustered architecture is
robust to processing center failure or traffic bottleneck problems. In addition, the convex relaxation methods
used at each cluster can be further improved by using recent works such as [30, 91, 92, 113, 114, 124, 126].
7.4 Convergence Analysis
In this section, we analyze the convergence properties of GS-ADMM and J-ADMM. As our algorithms
are applications of distributed ADMM, the analysis benefits from many existing results on general distributed
ADMM [40, 82, 118].
7.4.1 Convergence Analysis of GS-ADMM
Let pk = [pkT1 ,p
kT
2 , ...,p
kT
N ]
T and λk = [λki,j ]ij,ei,j∈E be the iterates generated by algorithm
GS-ADMM following (7.15) and (7.16). Assume that the initial problem (7.8) admits a solution (p∗,λ∗), i.e.,
the Lagrangian function L(p,λ) = f(p) + λTAJp has a saddle point (note: not the augmented Lagrangian
function), then the following theorem holds:
Theorem 14. Let p̄t+1 = 1t+1
t∑
k=0
pk+1 be the average of pk up to iteration time t+ 1, then the followings
hold for all t:
(1)
0 ≤ L(p̄t+1,λ∗)− L(p∗,λ∗) ≤ c0
t+ 1
, (7.19)
(2) The sequence (pk1 ,p
k
2 , ...,p
k
N ) deduced by GS-ADMM converges to (p
∗
1,p
∗
2, ...,p
∗
N ), i.e., lim
k→∞
‖
pk − p∗ ‖= 0. In addition, we have J1p∗1 = J2p∗2 = ... = JNp∗N .
Here
c0 =
1
2ρ
‖ λ0 − λ∗ ‖2 +ρ
2
(‖ HJ(p0 − p∗) ‖2 + ‖ Jp0 − Jp∗ ‖2), (7.20)
and H = min{0, A} (Hi,j = min{0, Ai,j}).
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Proof: (7.19) can be obtained following a way similar to Theorem 4.4 in [118]. A detailed proof is
given in Appendix C.1. To prove the second statement, recall that the objective function is
f(d) =
N∑
i=1
Ci∑
k=1
σ−2i,k (d
2
i,k − 2di,kri,k + r2i,k).
Setting hi,k = σ−2i,k (d
2
i,k − 2di,kri,k + r2i,k), we have f(d) =
N∑
i=1
Ci∑
k=1
hi,k. Note that hi,k is a quadratic
function and is strongly convex. Since the sum of strongly convex functions is still strongly convex, our
objective function f(d) is strongly convex. Further note that f(p) is equal to f(d) and the set Pi is convex
and closed. Therefore, our problem satisfies the requirements of both strongly convex objective function and
convex-and-closed constraint set in [40]. Now we proceed to prove the second statement. First, rewriting
AJp = 0 in the form of
N∑
i=1
[A]iJipi = 0, where [A]i denotes the columns of A associated with cluster i, we
can form a variational inequality MV I(Q,U) similar to (5)-(6) in [40]:
〈u− u∗,Q(u∗)〉 ≥ 0, ∀u ∈ U ,
where
u∗ :=

p∗1
p∗2
· · ·
p∗N
λ∗

, Q(u∗) :=

ξ∗1 + J
T
1 [A]
T
1 λ
∗
ξ∗2 + J
T
2 [A]
T
2 λ
∗
· · ·
ξ∗N + J
T
N [A]
T
Nλ
∗
AJp

,
U :=
N∏
i=1
Pi × R|E|D.
Then following the proof of Lemma 4.1 in [40], we can get that (pk+11 , ...,p
k+1
N ,λ
k+1) is a solution to
MV I(Q,U) if AJp = 0 and [A]iJipki = [A]iJip
k+1
i hold. Secondly, following the proof of Lemma 4.2
in [40], we can get the following inequality:
〈λ∗ − λk, AJp〉 ≥
N∑
i=1
ωi ‖ pk+1i − p
∗
i ‖2 +ρ ‖ AJpk+1 ‖2
+ρ
N∑
i=1
〈[A]iJipk+1i − [A]iJip
∗
i ,
N∑
j=i+1
([A]jJjp
k
j − [A]jJjpk+1j )〉
−ρ
N∑
i=1
〈[A]iJipk+1i − [A]iJip
∗
i ,
1
Ni
([A]iJip
k+1
i − [A]iJip
k
i )〉,
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where fi(pi) is strongly convex with modulus ωi. Thirdly, define an auxiliary block-diagonal matrix W :
W =

ρNJT1 [A]
T
1 [A]1J1 . . . 0 0
· · ·
. . . · · · · · ·
0 . . . ρNJTN [A]
T
N [A]NJN 0
0 . . . 0 ρ−1I

.
Then by following the idea of the proof of Lemma 4.3 in [40], the following inequality can be obtained:
‖ uk+1 − u∗ ‖2W≤‖ uk − u∗ ‖2W −2
N∑
i=1
ωi ‖ pk+1i − p
∗
i ‖2 −ρ ‖ AJpk+1 ‖2
+3Nρ
N∑
i=1
‖ [A]iJipk+1i − [A]iJip
∗
i ‖2,
where
‖ u ‖2W :=‖ λ ‖2ρ−1 +ρN(‖ [A]1J1p1 ‖
2 + ‖ [A]2J2p2 ‖2 +...+ ‖ [A]NJNpN ‖2).
Finally, when 0 < ρ < min
1≤i≤N
{ 2ωi3N‖[A]iJi‖2 } holds, we can get the second statement following the proof of
Theorem 4.1 in [40]. 
Remark 22. Recall λk+1 = λk + ρAJpk+1, we can get
λk+1 = λk + ρAJpk+1 = λk−1 + ρAJ(pk+1 + pk) = ... = λ0 + ρAJ
k+1∑
i=1
pi.
When k →∞, we have λk+1 → λ∗. In other words, λ∗ = λ0 + ρAJ
∞∑
i=1
pi. So c0 can be represented as:
c0 =
ρ
2
‖ AJ
∞∑
i=1
pi ‖2 +ρ
2
(‖ HJ(p0 − p∗) ‖2 + ‖ Jp0 − Jp∗ ‖2).
It is clear that c0 will increase with an increase in ρ, so if the iteration time t is fixed, L(p̄t+1,λ∗)−
L(p∗,λ∗) will also increase with an increase in ρ. That is to say, with ρ increasing, the iteration time to
reach convergence will increase, namely convergence rate will be slower. Although with an increase in ρ,
the convergence rate will decrease, ρ cannot be too small. This is because if ρ is too small, the constraint
Jipi = Jjpj is weak, which makes reaching consistency across clusters difficult. More detailed discussions
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on selecting ρ can be found in [52].
Directly following the statements in Theorem 14, we can obtain the following result on the conver-
gence speed:
Theorem 15. The convergence rate of GS-ADMM is O(1/t), where t is the iteration time.
Proof: The result can be obtained directly from the proof of Theorem 14 and is omitted. 
7.4.2 Convergence Analysis of J-ADMM
To analyze the convergence of J-ADMM, we first define several terms: Let pk = [pkT1 ,p
kT
2 , ...,p
kT
N ]
T
and λk = [λki,j ]ij,ei,j∈E be the results for (7.17) and (7.18) for iteration k. Augment the coefficients γi of
proximal terms into a matrix QP = diag{γ1ID, γ2ID, ..., γNID} and introduce a positive definite diagonal
matrix QC = diag{N1ID, N2ID, ..., NNID}, where Ni is the number of clusters in Ni. Since QC and QP
are both diagonal matrices, we can define a new diagonal matrix Q̄ according to Q̄T Q̄ = QC + I +QP where
I is the identity matrix. It can be easily verified that Q̄ has the following form:
Q̄ = diag{γ′1ID, γ′2ID, ..., γ′NID}, (7.21)
with γ′i > 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Assuming that the original problem (7.8) admits a solution (p
∗,λ∗), then we
have the following theorem:
Theorem 16. Let p̄t+1 = 1t+1
t∑
k=0
pk+1 be the average of pk up to iteration time t + 1 and denote the
eigenvalues of ATA as αi. If γ′i ≥
√
αmax is true with αmax = max{αi}, then the following holds for all t:
(1)
0 ≤ L(p̄t+1,λ∗)− L(p∗,λ∗) ≤ c1
t+ 1
, (7.22)
where L(p,λ) = f(p) + λTAJp is the Lagrangian function, and
c1 =
1
2ρ
‖ λ0 − λ∗ ‖2 +ρ
2
(‖ Q̄J(p0 − p∗) ‖2 . (7.23)
(2) The sequence (pk1 ,p
k
2 , ...,p
k
N ) deduced by J-ADMM converges to (p
∗
1,p
∗
2, ...,p
∗
N ), i.e., lim
k→∞
‖
pk − p∗ ‖= 0. In addition, we have J1p∗1 = J2p∗2 = ... = JNp∗N .
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Figure 7.2: Event localization architecture used in simulations. The values in [•] denote positions (x, y
coordinates) of sensors.
Proof: See Appendix C.2. 
From Theorem 16, we can easily obtain the following results on the convergence speed:
Theorem 17. The convergence rate of J-ADMM is O(1/t), where t is the iteration time.
Proof: The result can be obtained directly from the proof of Theorem 16 and is omitted. 
Since c0 and c1 are of the same form, Remark 22 for GS-ADMM also applies to the J-ADMM case.
Next, we use numerical results to evaluate the performance of GS-ADMM and J-ADMM.
7.5 Numerical Simulations
In this section, we illustrate effectiveness of the proposed approaches using comparison with existing
results. A typical type of distributed algorithms for event localization is the projection-based algorithms.
However, some projection-based algorithms, e.g., the DAPA algorithm in [135], is found in our simulations
not appropriate for the considered case where the target event lies outside the convex hull of sensors. More
specifically, we set the sensor localization architecture similar as in [18, 90], which considers a practical
acoustic event localization system (see Fig. 7.2 for the detailed spatial distribution of all sensor nodes). The
target event occurs at x = [−5; 200], which is far away from the nine sensors. Simulation results suggested
that DAPA did not work well in this architecture, even if we set the initial values close to the target event
and used the range measurements without noise, although it did work very well if the target event was set
in the convex hull of sensors. In the simulation, we used the same parameters for DAPA as in [135], i.e.,
α1 = ... = α9 =
1
t+2 , β1 = ... = β9 =
1
t+1 , b1 = ... = b9 = 1, and ξ1 = ... = ξ9 = 3.
Then we compared the localization performance of the proposed algorithms GS-ADMM and J-
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ADMM with two other projection-based algorithms: the PPM algorithm proposed in [56] and the PONLM
algorithm proposed in [101], which gave reasonable performance in the simulations. PPM is a parallel
projection method which requires a central node to average the local event location estimates obtained from
all sensors in every iteration. PONLM is a sequential projection-based algorithm which solves the event
localization problem by finding a point at the intersection of sensing circles. In fact, both PPM and PONLM
cannot be applied to the sensor network structure in Fig. 7.2, since there exists no central node or path that
connects all nine sensors in succession. We list their results here so that the performance of our algorithm
can be evaluated in context. Both localization error (differences between estimated and actual target event
positions) and localization consistency (differences in estimated positions between clusters) are compared
under different noise standard deviations σi,k. The convergence performance is evaluated by exploring the
evolution of the localization error with iteration time t.
To facilitate comparison, we first define two performance indices:
Localization Error: we use the root mean square error (RMSE) to quantify the error between estimated
and true positions for every cluster or sensor, which is denoted as ERRRMSE:
ERRRMSE =
√√√√√ L∑j=1 ‖ xj − x∗ ‖2
L
,
where L is the number of Monte Carlo trials, xj is the estimated position in the jth Monte Carlo trial in a
certain cluster or sensor, and x∗ is the true position of the target event.
Localization Inconsistency: We also use the root mean square error (RMSE) to quantify the lo-
calization inconsistency (difference) in estimated event positions between N clusters, which is denoted as
INCRMSE:
INCRMSE =
√√√√√ L∑
k=1
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
‖ xi,k − xj,k ‖2
L
,
where L is the number of Monte Carlo trials, xi,k is the estimated position obtained from the ith cluster in the
kth Monte Carlo trial. N is the number of clusters.
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7.5.1 Convergence performance
We compared the convergence performance of our sequential GS-ADMM algorithm, parallel J-
ADMM algorithm, the sequential PONLM algorithm in [101], and the parallel PPM algorithm in [56]. For
GS-ADMM and J-ADMM, we set ρ = 10−3. For PPM and PONLM, we set the initial point at [−50; 100]
(PPM and PONLM are sensitive to initialization settings, which will be shown later). We used the range
measurements without noise in this part. The simulation results are given in Fig. 7.3.
From Fig. 7.3, we can see that both GS-ADMM and J-ADMM reached an accuracy of 100 after
about 10 iterations, while PONLM took 25 iterations and PPM took about 150 iterations. Note that sensors
and clusters have to exchange local estimates in each iteration, so the required communication overhead is
heavier with an increase in iteration times. The same conclusion can be drawn for energy consumption. It is
worth noting that both PPM and PONLM can reach very high accuracies. However, in practical applications
like gunfire localization, the accuracy of 100 is sufficient [18].
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Figure 7.3: The evolution of localization error
Remark 23. In our simulations, we used the Sedumi solver in Yalmip, whose limited precision may lead to
approximate minima when solving subproblems (7.15) and (7.17). This may also lead to a low convergence
speed or even fluctuations after a certain number of iterations. In addition, SeDuMi may sometimes return the
message “Run into numerical problems”, which implies that it has terminated before it finds an approximate
optimal solution [110]. In this situation, we can transform semi-definite inequality constraints into definite
inequality constraints by introducing a constant positive definite term (e.g., 10−6) as indicated in [60].
However, such a transformation may bring fluctuations to the convergence process.
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7.5.2 The influence of noise level on ERRRMSE
In this section, we simulated the event localization algorithms under different levels of Guassian
noise standard deviation σi,k. For GS-ADMM and J-ADMM, we set ρ = 10−3. For PPM and PONLM, we
ran simulations under two cases: setting fixed initial values at [−50; 100] (denote as Fix in Table 7.1) and
setting random initial values in the area of 10000m × 10000m (denote as Ran in Table 7.1). The number of
iterations is fixed to 50 for GS-ADMM, J-ADMM, PONLM, and 200 for PPM. All simulation results are
summarized in Table 7.1 and Fig. 7.4. Each data point in Table 7.1 is an average of 100 Monte Carlo trials.
Table 7.1: ERRRMSE of GS-ADMM, J-ADMM, PPM, and PONLM under different measurement noise
σi,k GS-ADMM J-ADMM PPM PONLM
CL1 CL2 CL3 CL1 CL2 CL3 Fix Ran Fix Ran
0.00 0.3693 0.4848 0.5128 0.1146 0.2223 0.2964 0.2100 273.19 0.0338 304.52
0.01 0.5417 0.5443 0.5753 0.3546 0.3911 0.4385 0.2106 285.65 0.0498 269.86
0.02 0.5453 0.5862 0.5992 0.2766 0.3266 0.3779 0.2145 282.83 0.0865 307.95
0.05 0.6055 0.6723 0.7188 0.4987 0.5261 0.5724 0.2265 268.31 0.1895 278.84
0.10 1.0564 1.0942 1.1440 1.0562 1.0589 1.1017 0.2832 288.41 0.4019 243.67
From Table 7.1, we can see that both PPM and PONLM reached high localization accuracies under
fixed initial values. However, their performance deteriorated significantly when random initial values were
used. Therefore PPM and PONLM are sensitive to initial value settings. If the target event lies outside the
convex hull of sensors, the convergent values of PPM and PONLM may be far away from the true event
position. GS-ADMM and J-ADMM can avoid the convex hull problem, so every estimate lay close to the true
event position.
Fig. 7.4 visualizes the estimated event locations. Fig. 7.4 (a) and (b) show the localization results of
the proposed algorithms GS-ADMM and J-ADMM respectively from 100 Monte Carlo trials with ρ = 10−3.
Fig. 7.4 (c) and (d) show the results of PPM and PONLM respectively where the initial positions are chosen
randomly. It is clear that both GS-ADMM and J-ADMM performed better than PPM and PONLM when the
initial values are randomly chosen.
7.5.3 The influence of noise level on INCRMSE
Setting ρ = 10−3, we also evaluated the influence of noise level on INCRMSE of our proposed
algorithms. The results are summarized in Fig. 7.5.
Fig. 7.5 indicates that the proposed GS-ADMM and J-ADMM have small localization inconsistency
(INCRMSE) under different noise strength. In other words, our proposed algorithms GS-ADMM and J-ADMM
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Figure 7.4: The distribution of estimated event location, σ = 0.05. (a) GS-ADMM; (b) J-ADMM; (c) PONLM;
(d) PPM.
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Figure 7.5: The influence of measurement noise on localization inconsistency
can achieve good consistency across clusters even under large noise standard deviations. As indicated before,
consistency is of crucial importance in many applications.
7.6 Summaries
We proposed two ADMM based distributed event localization algorithms GS-ADMM and J-ADMM
that do not require the target event to be within the convex hull of the deployed sensors. Convergence properties
of the algorithms are analyzed theoretically. Numerical simulations showed that the proposed algorithms are
robust to measurement noises and insensitive to convex hull problem compared with existing projection-based
algorithms.
In addition, we would like to thank Dr. Andrea Simonetto for providing Matlab codes for his
paper [106].
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
In this dissertation, we addressed decentralized optimization and its application to the event localiza-
tion problem. We first presented a privacy-preserving decentralized optimization approach by proposing a
new ADMM and leveraging partially homomorphic cryptography. By incorporating Paillier cryptosystem
into the newly proposed decentralized ADMM, our approach provides guarantee for privacy preservation
without compromising the solution in the absence of any aggregator or third party. We then presented another
privacy-preserving decentralized optimization algorithm based on the integration of partially homomorphic
cryptography with subgradient method. Given that encryption-based algorithms unavoidably suffer from
significant computational and communication overhead, we also presented a privacy-preserving solution to
decentralized optimization using function decomposition. Theoretical analysis confirms that an honest-but-
curious adversary cannot infer the information of neighboring agents even by recording and analyzing the
information exchanged in multiple iterations. In sharp contrast to differential-privacy based approaches which
protect privacy through injecting noise and are subject to a fundamental trade-off between privacy and accuracy,
all algorithms can preserve privacy without sacrificing accuracy. Numerical and experimental results are given
to confirm the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed algorithms.
We also addressed the application of decentralized optimization to the event localization problem.
We first proposed a completely decentralized parallel algorithm which solves the non-convex and non-smooth
event localization problem directly without using convex relaxation. Simulation results confirm that this
algorithm has better localization accuracy compared with other projection based algorithms when the target
event is in the convex hull of sensors. When the target event is outside the convex hull of sensors, this algorithm
has a higher probability to converge to the right target event position than existing results. We then proposed
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another two ADMM based distributed event localization algorithms GS-ADMM and J-ADMM that do not
require the target event to be within the convex hull of the deployed sensors. Convergence properties of
the algorithms are analyzed theoretically. Numerical simulations showed that the proposed algorithms are
robust to measurement noises and insensitive to convex hull problem compared with existing projection-based
algorithms.
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Appendix A Proofs of Theorems in Chapter 3
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The key idea to prove Theorem 1 is to show that Algorithm 1 converges to the saddle point of the
Lagrangian function L(x,λ) = f(x) + λTAx. To achieve this goal, we introduce a variational inequality
MV I(Q,U) first and prove that the solution ofMV I(Q,U) is also the saddle point of the Lagrangian function
L(x,λ) = f(x) + λTAx (which is formulated as Lemma 9). Then we introduce a sufficient condition for
solving MV I(Q,U) in Lemma 10. After the two steps, what is left is to prove that the iterates of Algorithm 1
satisfy the condition in Lemma 10 when k →∞, i.e., Algorithm 1 converges to the solution of MV I(Q,U)
(Theorem 18 and Theorem 19).
We form a variational inequality MV I(Q,U) similar to (5)-(6) in [40] first:
〈u− u∗,Q(u∗)〉 ≥ 0, ∀u, (1)
where
u∗ :=

x∗1
x∗2
...
x∗N
λ∗

, Q(u∗) :=

ξ∗1 + [A]
T
1 λ
∗
ξ∗2 + [A]
T
2 λ
∗
...
ξ∗N + [A]
T
Nλ
∗
Ax∗

,
ξ∗i ∈ ∂fi(x∗i ),∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}.
(2)
In (2), [A]i denotes the columns of matrix A that are associated with agent i. By recalling the first-order
necessary and sufficient condition for convex programming [40], it is easy to see that solving problem (3.6)
amounts to solving the above MV I(Q,U) [40]. Denote the solution set of MV I(Q,U) as U∗. Since fi is
convex, ∂fi(xi) is monotone, the MV I(Q,U) is solvable and U∗ is nonempty [40].
Next, we introduce several lemmas and theorems that contribute to the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 9. Each u∗ = (x∗,λ∗) in U∗ is also the saddle point of the Lagrangian function L(x,λ) =
f(x) + λTAx.
Proof: The results can be obtained from Part 2.1 in [47] directly. 
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Lemma 10. If Axk+1 = 0 and xk+1 = xk hold, then (xk+11 ,x
k+1
2 , ...,x
k+1
N ,λ
k+1) is a solution to
MV I(Q,U).
Proof: Using the definition of matrix A and the update rule of λk+1 in (3.11), we can see that the
assumption Axk+1 = 0 implies λk+1 = λk and xk+11 = x
k+1
2 = ... = x
k+1
N .
On the other hand, we know that xk+1i is the optimizer of (3.13). By using the first-order optimality
condition, we get
(xi − xk+1i )
T (ξk+1i +
∑
j∈Ni
(λki,j + ρ
k
i,j(x
k+1
i − x
k
j )) + γi(x
k+1
i − x
k
i )) ≥ 0. (3)
where ξk+1i ∈ ∂fi(x
k+1
i ). Then based on the assumption x
k+1 = xk, the fact λk+1 = λk, and the definition
of matrix A, we have (xi − xk+1i )T (ξ
k+1
i + [A]
T
i λ
k+1) ≥ 0. Therefore, (xk+11 ,x
k+1
2 , ...,x
k+1
N ,λ
k+1) is a
solution to MV I(Q,U). 
Lemma 10 provides a sufficient condition for solving MV I(Q,U). According to Lemma 9, we know
that the solution to MV I(Q,U) is also the saddle point of the Lagrangian function. Next, we prove that the
iterates in Algorithm 1 satisfy lim
k→∞
Axk+1 = 0 and lim
k→∞
xk+1 − xk = 0, i.e., Algorithm 1 converges to the
solution to MV I(Q,U). To achieve this goal, we first establish the relationship (4) about iterates k and k + 1
in Theorem 18, whose proof is mainly based on convex properties. Then based on the relationship, we further
prove lim
k→∞
Axk+1 = 0 and lim
k→∞
xk+1 − xk = 0 in Theorem 19.
Theorem 18. Let ρk satisfy Condition A, Q̄ , QP + QkC satisfy Condition B, and (x∗,λ∗) be the saddle
point of the Lagrangian function L(x,λ) = f(x) + λTAx, then we have
‖ λk+1 − λ∗ ‖2(ρk+1)−1 + ‖ x
k+1 − x∗ ‖2Q̄≤‖ λ
k − λ∗ ‖2(ρk)−1 + ‖ x
k − x∗ ‖2Q̄
− (‖ Axk+1 ‖2ρk + ‖ x
k+1 − xk ‖2−ATρkA+Q̄)+ ‖ Ax
k+1 ‖2ρk+1 − ‖ Ax
k ‖2ρk .
(4)
To prove Theorem 18, we first introduce two lemmas:
Lemma 11. Let xk = [xkT1 ,xkT2 , ...,xkTN ]T and λk = [λki,j ]ij,ei,j∈E be the intermediate results of iteration
k in Algorithm 1, then the following inequality holds for all k:
f(x)− f(xk+1) + (x− xk+1)TATλk + (x− xk+1)TATρkAxk + (x− xk+1)T Q̄(xk+1 − xk) ≥ 0,
(5)
where Q̄ , QP +QkC .
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Proof: The proof follows from [130]. For completeness, we sketch the proof here. Denote by gi the
function
gki (xi) =
∑
j∈Ni
(λkTi,j xi +
ρki,j
2
‖ xi − xkj ‖2) +
γi
2
‖ xi − xki ‖2 . (6)
Using ξk+1i ∈ ∂fi(x
k+1
i ), we can get ξ
k+1
i +Ogi(x
k+1
i ) = 0 and (xi−x
k+1
i )
T [ξk+1i +Ogi(x
k+1
i )] =
0 based on the fact that xk+1i is the optimizer of g
k
i + fi. On the other hand, as fi is convex, the following
relationship holds:
fi(xi) ≥ fi(xk+1i ) + (xi − x
k+1
i )
T ξk+1i .
Then we can get fi(xi)− fi(xk+1i ) + (xi − x
k+1
i )
TOgi(x
k+1
i ) ≥ 0.
Substituting Ogi(xk+1i ) with (6), we obtain
fi(xi)− fi(xk+1i ) + (xi − x
k+1
i )
T · (
∑
j∈Ni
(λki,j + ρ
k
i,j(x
k+1
i − x
k
j )) + γi(x
k+1
i − x
k
i )) ≥ 0.
Noting λi,i = 0 and λi,j = −λj,i, based on the definition of matrices A and ρ, we can rewrite the
above inequality as
fi(xi)− fi(xk+1i ) + (xi − x
k+1
i )
T · ([A]Ti λk +
∑
j∈Ni
ρki,j(x
k+1
i − x
k
j ) + γi(x
k+1
i − x
k
i )) ≥ 0. (7)
Summing both sides of (7) over i = 1, 2, . . . , N , and using
N∑
i=1
(xi − xk+1i )
T [A]Ti λ
k = (x− xk+1)TATλk,
N∑
i=1
(xi − xk+1i )
T
∑
j∈Ni
ρki,jx
k+1
i = (x− x
k+1)TQkCx
k+1,
N∑
i=1
(xi − xk+1i )
T
∑
j∈Ni
ρki,jx
k
j = (x− xk+1)T (−ATρkA+QkC)xk,
N∑
i=1
(xi − xk+1i )
T γi(x
k+1
i − x
k
i ) = (x− xk+1)TQP (xk+1 − xk),
we can get the lemma. 
Lemma 12. Let xk = [xkT1 ,xkT2 , ...,xkTN ]T and λk = [λki,j ]ij,ei,j∈E be the intermediate results of iteration
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k in Algorithm 1, then the following equality holds for all k:
− (xk+1)TAT (λk − λ∗)− (xk+1)TATρkAxk + (x∗ − xk+1)T Q̄(xk+1 − xk)
=
1
2
(‖ λk − λ∗ ‖2(ρk+1)−1 − ‖ λ
k+1 − λ∗ ‖2(ρk+1)−1) +
1
2
‖ λk+1 − λk ‖2(ρk+1)−1 −
1
2
‖ xk+1 − xk ‖2Q̄
− 1
2
‖ Axk+1 ‖2ρk −
1
2
‖ Axk ‖2ρk +
1
2
‖ A(xk+1 − xk) ‖2ρk −
1
2
(‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2Q̄ − ‖ x
k − x∗ ‖2Q̄).
(8)
Proof: For a scalar a, we have aT = a. Recall λk+1 = λk + ρk+1Axk+1 and notice that ρk+1 is a
positive definite diagonal matrix, we can get
(xk+1)TAT (λk − λ∗) = (λk+1 − λk)T (ρk+1)−1(λk − λ∗). (9)
On the other hand, since (x∗,λ∗) is the saddle point of the Lagrangian function (3.15), we can get
Ax∗ = 0 [118]. Moreover, the following equalities can be established by using algebraic manipulations:
(xk+1 − x∗)T Q̄(xk+1 − xk) = 1
2
‖ xk+1 − xk ‖2Q̄ +
1
2
(‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2Q̄ − ‖ x
k − x∗ ‖2Q̄), (10)
−x(k+1)TATρkAxk = 1
2
‖ A(xk+1 − xk) ‖2ρk −
1
2
‖ Axk+1 ‖2ρk −
1
2
‖ Axk ‖2ρk , (11)
(λk+1 − λk)T (ρk+1)−1(λk − λ∗) = 1
2
(‖ λk+1 − λ∗ ‖2(ρk+1)−1 − ‖ λ
k − λ∗ ‖2(ρk+1)−1)
− 1
2
‖ λk+1 − λk ‖2(ρk+1)−1 .
(12)
Then we can obtain (8) by plugging equalities (9)-(12) into the left hand side of (8). 
Now we can proceed to prove Theorem 18. By setting x = x∗ in (5), we can get
f(x∗)− f(xk+1) + (x∗ − xk+1)TATλk + (x∗ − xk+1)TATρkAxk + (x∗ − xk+1)T Q̄(xk+1 − xk) ≥ 0
Recalling Ax∗ = 0, the above inequality can be rewritten as
f(x∗)− f(xk+1)− x(k+1)TATλk − x(k+1)TATρkAxk + (x∗ − xk+1)T Q̄(xk+1 − xk) ≥ 0. (13)
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Now adding and subtracting the term λ∗TAxk+1 from the left hand side of (13) gives
f(x∗)− f(xk+1)− λ∗TAxk+1 − x(k+1)TAT (λk − λ∗)
− x(k+1)TATρkAxk + (x∗ − xk+1)T Q̄(xk+1 − xk) ≥ 0.
(14)
Using L(x,λ∗)− L(x∗,λ∗) ≥ 0 and Ax∗ = 0, we have
− x(k+1)TAT (λk − λ∗)− x(k+1)TATρkAxk + (x∗ − xk+1)T Q̄(xk+1 − xk)
≥ f(xk+1) + λ∗TAxk+1 − f(x∗) ≥ 0.
Now by plugging (8) into the left hand side of the above inequality, we can obtain
1
2 (‖ λ
k − λ∗ ‖2(ρk+1)−1 − ‖ λ
k+1 − λ∗ ‖2(ρk+1)−1) +
1
2 ‖ λ
k+1 − λk ‖2(ρk+1)−1 −
1
2 ‖ x
k+1 − xk ‖2
Q̄
− 12 ‖ Ax
k+1 ‖2ρk −
1
2 ‖ Ax
k ‖2ρk +
1
2 ‖ Ax
k+1 −Axk ‖2ρk −
1
2 ‖ x
k+1 − x∗ ‖2
Q̄
+ 12 ‖ x
k − x∗ ‖2
Q̄
≥ 0.
Noting ‖ λk+1 − λk ‖2(ρk+1)−1=‖ Ax
k+1 ‖2ρk+1 , the above inequality can be rewritten as
‖ λk+1 − λ∗ ‖2(ρk+1)−1 + ‖ x
k+1 − x∗ ‖2Q̄≤‖ λ
k − λ∗ ‖2(ρk+1)−1 + ‖ x
k − x∗ ‖2Q̄
−(‖ Axk+1 ‖2ρk + ‖ x
k+1 − xk ‖2−ATρkA+Q̄)+ ‖ Ax
k+1 ‖2ρk+1 − ‖ Ax
k ‖2ρk .
(15)
Recall that from Condition A, ρk+1  ρk and ρk (k = 1, 2, ...) are positive definite diagonal
matrices. So we have (ρk+1)−1  (ρk)−1 [58], and consequently ‖ λk − λ∗ ‖2(ρk+1)−1‖ λ
k − λ∗ ‖2(ρk)−1 ,
which proves Theorem 18. 
Theorem 18 established the relationship between iterates k and k + 1 in Algorithm 1. Based on this
relationship, we can have the following theorem which shows that Algorithm 1 converges to the solution to
MV I(Q,U).
Theorem 19. Let uk = (xk,λk) be the sequence generated by Algorithm 1, then we have
lim
k→∞
(‖ Axk+1 ‖2ρk + ‖ x
k+1 − xk ‖2−ATρkA+Q̄) = 0. (16)
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Proof: Let αk =‖ λk − λ∗ ‖2(ρk)−1 + ‖ x
k − x∗ ‖2
Q̄
. According to Theorem 18, we have
αk+1 ≤ αk+ ‖ Axk+1 ‖2ρk+1 − ‖ Ax
k ‖2ρk −(‖ Ax
k+1 ‖2ρk + ‖ x
k+1 − xk ‖2−ATρkA+Q̄)
≤ ...
≤ α0+ ‖ Axk+1 ‖2ρk+1 − ‖ Ax
0 ‖2ρ0 −
k∑
i=0
(‖ Axi+1 ‖2ρi + ‖ x
i+1 − xi ‖2−ATρiA+Q̄)
≤ α0+ ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2ATρk+1A −
k∑
i=0
(‖ Axi+1 ‖2ρi + ‖ x
i+1 − xi ‖2−ATρiA+Q̄).
(17)
The last inequality comes from the fact that Ax∗ = 0 and ‖ Axk+1 − Ax∗ ‖2ρk+1 can be written as
‖ xk+1−x∗ ‖2ATρk+1A. Recall that ρ
0  ρk  ρk+1  ρ̄ holds and Q̄−AT ρ̄A is positive definite. Moving
the term ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2ATρk+1A to the left hand side of the above inequality, we have
lim
k→∞
(αk+1− ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2ATρk+1A)
= lim
k→∞
(‖ λk+1 − λ∗ ‖2(ρk+1)−1 + ‖ x
k+1 − x∗ ‖2Q̄−ATρk+1A) ≥ 0
(18)
Since α0 is positive and bounded and ‖ Axi+1 ‖2ρi + ‖ x
i+1 − xi ‖2−ATρiA+Q̄ is nonnegative, following
Theorem 3 in [45], we have
lim
k→∞
(‖ Axk+1 ‖2ρk + ‖ x
k+1 − xk ‖2−ATρkA+Q̄) = 0. (19)

Given that ρk satisfies Condition A and Q̄ satisfies Condition B, we have that both −ATρkA+ Q̄
and ρk are positive symmetric definite. Then according to Theorem 19, we have Axk+1 = 0 and xk+1 = xk
when k →∞.
Therefore, based on Lemma 10, we have that (xk+1,λk+1) in Algorithm 1 converges to a solution to
MV I(Q,U), i.e., a saddle point of the Lagrangian function (3.15) according to Lemma 9. Since the objective
function is convex, we can conclude Theorem 1 [118]. 
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Now we prove that the convergence rate of Algorithm 1 is O(1/t). By plugging (8) into the left hand
side of (14), we can obtain
f(x∗)− f(xk+1)− λ∗TAxk+1 − 1
2
(‖ λk+1 − λ∗ ‖2(ρk+1)−1 − ‖ λ
k − λ∗ ‖2(ρk+1)−1)−
1
2
‖ Axk ‖2ρk
+
1
2
‖ λk+1 − λk ‖2(ρk+1)−1 +
1
2
‖ Axk+1 −Axk ‖2ρk −
1
2
‖ Axk+1 ‖2ρk −
1
2
‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2Q̄
+
1
2
‖ xk − x∗ ‖2Q̄ −
1
2
‖ xk+1 − xk ‖2Q̄≥ 0.
Summing both sides of the above inequality over k = 0, 1, ..., t, we have
(t+ 1)f(x∗)−
t∑
k=0
f(xk+1)− λ∗TA
t∑
k=0
xk+1 − 1
2
‖ λt+1 − λ∗ ‖2(ρt+1)−1 +
1
2
‖ λ0 − λ∗ ‖2(ρ1)−1
−
t∑
k=1
1
2
(‖ λk − λ∗ ‖2(ρk)−1 − ‖ λ
k − λ∗ ‖2(ρk+1)−1) +
1
2
‖ Axt+1 ‖2ρt+1 −
t∑
k=0
1
2
‖ Axk+1 ‖2ρk
−1
2
‖ Ax0 ‖2ρ0 −
1
2
‖ xt+1 − x∗ ‖2Q̄ +
1
2
‖ x0 − x∗ ‖2Q̄ −
t∑
k=0
1
2
‖ xk+1 − xk ‖2Q̄−ATρkA≥ 0.
Following the above inequality, It is easy to obtain
(t+ 1)f(x∗)−
t∑
k=0
f(xk+1)− λ∗TA
t∑
k=0
xk+1 +
1
2
‖ λ0 − λ∗ ‖2(ρ1)−1 +
1
2
‖ x0 − x∗ ‖2Q̄
+
1
2
‖ Axt+1 ‖2ρt+1 −
1
2
‖ Axt+1 ‖2ρt≥ 0.
Recall that in (19), we have proven lim
k→∞
‖ Axk+1 ‖2ρk= 0. Then the relationship ρ
0  ρk 
ρk+1  ρ̄ implies
lim
t→∞
(
1
2
‖ Axt+1 ‖2ρt+1 −
1
2
‖ Axt+1 ‖2ρt) = 0.
Therefore, there exists some constant c such that
1
2
‖ Axt+1 ‖2ρt+1 −
1
2
‖ Axt+1 ‖2ρt≤ c.
On the other hand, as our function is convex, we have
∑t
k=0 f(x
k+1) ≥ (t + 1)f(x̄t+1) where
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x̄t+1 = 1t+1
∑t
k=0 x
k+1. Therefore, we have
(t+ 1)f(x∗)− (t+ 1)f(x̄t+1)− (t+ 1)λ∗TAx̄t+1 + 1
2
‖ λ0 − λ∗ ‖2(ρ1)−1 +
1
2
‖ x0 − x∗ ‖2Q̄ +c ≥ 0.
By dividing both sides by −(t+ 1), we can obtain
f(x̄t+1) + λ∗TAx̄t+1 − f(x∗) ≤ 1
t+ 1
(
1
2
‖ λ0 − λ∗ ‖2(ρ1)−1 +
1
2
‖ x0 − x∗ ‖2Q̄ +c).
Combining the above relationship with the Lagrangian function (3.15), we can conclude Theorem 2.

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Appendix B Proofs of Theorems in Chapter 5
B.1 Proof of Lemma 2
According to the update rules in (5.6) and (5.7) , we have
Ohk+1i (x
k+1
i ) +
∑
j∈Ni
(λki,j + ρ(x
k+1
i − x
k
j )) + γiρ(x
k+1
i − x
k
i ) = 0 (20)
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , 2N .
Rewriting (20) in a compact form, we have
Ohk+1(xk+1) +ATλk + ρD̄xk+1 − ρ(D̄ −ATA)xk + ρU(xk+1 − xk) = 0 (21)
Adding and subtracting ρATAxk+1 from the left hand side of (21), we obtain
Ohk+1(xk+1) +ATλk + ρATAxk+1 + ρ(U + D̄ −ATA)(xk+1 − xk) = 0 (22)
Recall that λk+1 = λk+τρAxk+1 andQ = U+D̄−ATA hold, the above equality can be rewritten
as
Ohk+1(xk+1) + ρ(1− τ)ATAxk+1 +ATλk+1 + ρQ(xk+1 − xk) = 0 (23)
On the other hand, letting (x∗,λk+1∗) be the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) points for (5.13) at
iteration k + 1, we have
−ATλk+1∗ = Ohk+1(x∗)
Ax∗ = 0
(24)
which yields
Ohk+1(x∗) +ATλk+1∗ + ρ(1− τ)ATAx∗ = 0 (25)
It is worth noting that there may be more than one λk+1∗ satisfying (24). However, there is only one unique
λk+1∗ lying in the column space of A [65]. In the following derivations, λk+1∗ indicates the one lying in the
column space of A.
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Subtracting (25) from (23), we obtain
Ohk+1(xk+1)− Ohk+1(x∗) + ρ(1− τ)ATA(xk+1 − x∗) = −AT (λk+1 − λk+1∗)− ρQ(xk+1 − xk)
(26)
Based on Lemma 1, we have that
rk+1(x) = hk+1(xk+1) +
ρ(1− τ)
2
‖ Ax ‖2
is restricted strongly convex with respect to x∗, i.e.,
(Ohk+1(xk+1)− Ohk+1(x∗) + ρ(1− τ)ATA(xk+1 − x∗))T (xk+1 − x∗) ≥ mr ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2 (27)
Combing (26) and (27) leads to
−(xk+1 − x∗)TAT (λk+1 − λk+1∗)− ρ(xk+1 − x∗)TQT (xk+1 − xk) ≥ mr ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2 (28)
Moreover, we have the following equalities by using algebraic manipulations:
(xk+1 − x∗)TQT (xk+1 − xk) = 1
2
‖ xk+1 − xk ‖2Q +
1
2
‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2Q −
1
2
‖ xk − x∗ ‖2Q, (29)
(xk+1 − x∗)TAT (λk+1 − λk+1∗) = 1
ρτ
(λk+1 − λk)T (λk+1 − λk+1∗)
=
1
2ρτ
‖ λk+1 − λk ‖2 − 1
2ρτ
‖ λk − λk+1∗ ‖2 + 1
2ρτ
‖ λk+1 − λk+1∗ ‖2
(30)
Then using the above equalities, (28) can be rewritten as
mr ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2≤ −
ρ
2
‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2Q −
1
2ρτ
‖ λk+1 − λk+1∗ ‖2
+
ρ
2
‖ xk − x∗ ‖2Q +
1
2ρτ
‖ λk − λk+1∗ ‖2 −ρ
2
‖ xk+1 − xk ‖2Q −
1
2ρτ
‖ λk+1 − λk ‖2
(31)
Recall that H = diag{ρQ, 1ρτ ID|E′|} and y
k = [xkT ,λkT ]T , the above inequality can be simplified
as
2mr ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2≤‖ yk − yk+1∗ ‖2H − ‖ yk+1 − yk+1∗ ‖2H − ‖ yk+1 − yk ‖2H (32)
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On the other hand, observe that for any constant u > 1, it holds that [65]
(u− 1) ‖ a− b ‖2≥ (1− 1
u
) ‖ b ‖2 − ‖ a ‖2 (33)
So we have
(u− 1) ‖ Ohk+1(xk+1)− Ohk+1(x∗) ‖2
= (u− 1) ‖ AT (λk+1 − λk+1∗) + ρQT (xk+1 − xk) + ρ(1− τ)ATA(xk+1 − x∗) ‖2
≥ u− 1
u
‖ AT (λk+1 − λk+1∗) ‖2 − ‖ ρQT (xk+1 − xk) + ρ(1− τ)ATA(xk+1 − x∗) ‖2
(34)
Since λk+1 and λk+1∗ lie in the column space of of A, we have [65]
‖ AT (λk+1 − λk+1∗) ‖2≥ Amin ‖ λk+1 − λk+1∗ ‖2 (35)
and
‖ ρQT (xk+1 − xk) + ρ(1− τ)ATA(xk+1 − x∗) ‖2
≤ 2ρ2Qmax ‖ xk+1 − xk ‖2Q +2ρ2(1− τ)2A2max ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2
(36)
where Qmax is the largest eigenvalue of Q, Amin is the smallest nonzero eigenvalue of ATA, and Amax is the
largest eigenvalue of ATA.
In addition, we have
‖ Ohk+1(xk+1)− Ohk+1(x∗) ‖2≤ L2 ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2
according to Assumption 9. Therefore, based on (34)-(36), we can obtain
(u− 1)L2 ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2
≥ (u− 1)Amin
u
‖ λk+1 − λk+1∗ ‖2 −2ρ2Qmax ‖ xk+1 − xk ‖2Q −2ρ2(1− τ)2A2max ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2
(37)
Using algebraic manipulations, the above inequality can be rewritten as
(
uL2
ρτAmin
+
2ρ(1− τ)2uA2max
(u− 1)τAmin
) ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2 + 2uQmax
(u− 1)τAmin
ρ ‖ xk+1 − xk ‖2Q
≥ 1
ρτ
‖ λk+1 − λk+1∗ ‖2
(38)
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Adding
2uQmax
(u− 1)τAmin
1
ρτ
‖ λk+1 − λk ‖2
and
ρQmax ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2
to the left hand side of the above inequality, and ρ ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2Q to the right hand side of the above
inequality, we obtain the following inequality
2uQmax
(u− 1)τAmin
(ρ ‖ xk+1 − xk ‖2Q +
1
ρτ
‖ λk+1 − λk ‖2)
+ (
uL2
ρτAmin
+ ρQmax +
2ρ(1− τ)2uA2max
(u− 1)τAmin
) ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2
≥ 1
ρτ
‖ λk+1 − λk+1∗ ‖2 +ρ ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2Q
(39)
based on the fact
ρ ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2Q≤ ρQmax ‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2 .
Letting
δ = min{ (u− 1)τAmin
2uQmax
,
2mrρτ(u− 1)Amin
φ
} (40)
where
φ = u(u− 1)L2 + ρ2τAminQmax(u− 1) + 2ρ2(1− τ)2uA2max
we have from (39)
1
δ
‖ yk+1 − yk ‖2H +
2mr
δ
‖ xk+1 − x∗ ‖2≥‖ yk+1 − yk+1∗ ‖2H (41)
Using (32) and (41), we can get
1
δ
‖ yk − yk+1∗ ‖2H −
1
δ
‖ yk+1 − yk+1∗ ‖2H≥‖ yk+1 − yk+1∗ ‖2H (42)
which proves Lemma 2.
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B.2 Proof of Lemma 3
First, we have
‖ yk − yk+1∗ ‖H − ‖ yk − yk∗ ‖H≤‖ yk+1∗ − yk∗ ‖H (43)
On the other hand, we have
‖ yk+1∗ − yk∗ ‖H=
1
√
ρτ
‖ λk+1∗ − λk∗ ‖ (44)
‖ AT (λk+1∗ − λk∗) ‖=‖ Ohk+1(x∗)− Ohk(x∗) ‖ (45)
Therefore, using (35) one can obtain
‖ λk+1∗ − λk∗ ‖≤ 1√
Amin
‖ Ohk+1(x∗)− Ohk(x∗) ‖ (46)
Combing (43) to (46) leads to
‖ yk − yk+1∗ ‖H≤‖ yk − yk∗ ‖H +
1√
ρτAmin
‖ Ohk+1(x∗)− Ohk(x∗) ‖ (47)
which concludes the proof.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 12
From Lemma 4, we can obtain
√
1 + δ
k
‖ yk − yk∗ ‖H≤‖ y0 − y0∗ ‖H +
k−1∑
s=0
√
1 + δ
s
p(s) (48)
Dividing both sides of the above inequality by
√
1 + δ
k
, we have
‖ yk − yk∗ ‖H≤
‖ y0 − y0∗ ‖H
√
1 + δ
k
+
k−1∑
s=0
1
√
1 + δ
k−s p(s) (49)
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It is clear lim
k→∞
‖y0−y0∗‖H√
1+δ
k = 0 as δ > 0. Now our main goal reduces to proving lim
k→∞
∑k−1
s=0
1√
1+δ
k−s p(s) =
0. Recalling the relationship lim
k→∞
fαki → fα∗i from Assumption 9, we have lim
k→∞
hki → h∗i for all i =
1, 2, . . . , 2N . On the other hand, according to the definition of p(k) in (5.20), we know lim
k→∞
p(k) = 0 due to
the convergence of hk.
Therefore, we have that p(k) is bounded, i,e., there exists a B such that p(k) ≤ B is true for an
arbitrary k. In addition, we always have
∀ε1 > 0, ∃N1 ∈ N+, s.t. |p(k)| ≤ ε1, ∀k ≥ N1,
where N+ is the set of positive integers. Further letting η = 1√
1+δ
and F (k) =
∑k−1
s=0
1√
1+δ
k−s p(s), we can
obtain
F (k) =
k−1∑
s=0
ηk−sp(s)
=
N1∑
s=0
ηk−sp(s) +
k−1∑
s=N1+1
ηk−sp(s)
≤ B
N1∑
s=0
ηk−s + ε1
k−1∑
s=N1+1
ηk−s
= Bηk
η−N1 − η
1− η
+ ε1
η − ηk−N1−1
1− η
≤ Bηk η
−N1 − η
1− η
+ ε1
η
1− η
(50)
for k ≥ N1 + 2 and η ∈ (0, 1).
Therefore, we have lim
k→∞
Bηk η
−N1−η
1−η = 0 and
∀ε = ε1 > 0, ∃N2 ∈ N+,
s.t. |Bηk η
−N1 − η
1− η
| ≤ ε1, ∀k ≥ N2
(51)
Combining (50) and (51) leads to
∀ε = ε1 > 0, ∃N = max{N1, N2},
s.t. |F (k)| ≤ ε1 + ε1
η
1− η
=
1
1− η
ε1, ∀k ≥ N
(52)
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which proves lim
k→∞
F (k) = 0 and further
lim
k→∞
‖ yk − yk∗ ‖H= 0
based on (49). Given
‖ xk − x∗ ‖Q≤‖ yk − yk∗ ‖H
we have lim
k→∞
‖ xk − x∗ ‖Q= 0 as well, which concludes the proof.
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Appendix C Proofs of Theorems in Chapter 7
C.1 Proof of (7.19) in Theorem 14
To prove (7.19) in Theorem 14, we first introduce two lemmas:
Lemma 13. Let pk = [pkT1 ,pkT2 , ...,pkTN ]T and λk = [λki,j ]ij,ei,j∈E be the iterates generated by GS-ADMM
following (7.15) and (7.16), then the following inequality holds for all k:
f(p)− f(pk+1) + (p− pk+1)TJTATλk+1 + ρ(p− pk+1)TJT (−ATH +HTH + I)J(pk+1 − pk) ≥ 0,
∀p ∈ {[pT1 ,pT2 , ...,pTN ]T |pi ∈ Pi,∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}},
(53)
where A is the edge-node incident matrix defined in (7.10), H = min{0, A}, and I is the identity matrix. (In
the following, we only consider p belonging to the set {[pT1 ,pT2 , ...,pTN ]T |pi ∈ Pi,∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}}, so we
leave out this constraint in the following lemmas and proofs.)
Proof: Denote by gi the function
gki (pi) =
∑
j∈N̂i,j≥i
(λkTi,j (Jipi − Jjpkj ) +
ρ
2
‖ Jipi − Jjpkj ‖2)
+
∑
j∈N̂i,j<i
(λkTi,j (Jipi − Jjpk+1j ) +
ρ
2
‖ Jipi − Jjpk+1j ‖
2).
(54)
From the update rule in (7.15), we know that pk+1i is the optimizer of g
k
i + fi in the closed and
convex set Pi. Since fi and gki are convex, and gki is differentiable, following the proof of Lemma 3.1 in [49]
(which is also mentioned in Lemma 1 in [81]), we can get
fi(pi)− fi(pk+1i ) + (pi − p
k+1
i )
TOgi(p
k+1
i ) ≥ 0. (55)
Substituting Ogi(pk+1i ) with (54), we have
fi(pi)− fi(pk+1i ) + (pi − p
k+1
i )
T (
∑
j∈N̂i,j≥i
(JTi λ
k
i,j + ρJ
T
i (Jip
k+1
i − Jjp
k
j )))
+ (pi − pk+1i )
T (
∑
j∈N̂i,j<i
(JTi λ
k
i,j + ρJ
T
i (Jip
k+1
i − Jjp
k+1
j ))) ≥ 0.
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Noting λi,i = 0, using (7.16) leads to
fi(pi)− fi(pk+1i ) + (pi − p
k+1
i )
T (
∑
j∈Ni
JTi λ
k+1
i,j +
∑
j∈N̂i,j≥i
ρJTi (Jjp
k+1
j − Jjp
k
j )) ≥ 0.
Noting λi,j = −λj,i, from the definition of A, we can rewrite the above inequality as
fi(pi)− fi(pk+1i ) + (pi − p
k+1
i )
T (JTi [A]
T
i λ
k+1 +
∑
j∈N̂i,j≥i
ρJTi (Jjp
k+1
j − Jjp
k
j )) ≥ 0, (56)
here [A]i denotes the columns of A associated with cluster i.
Summing both sides of (56) over i = 1, 2, ..., N , and noticing that the following two equations
hold [118],
N∑
i=1
(pi − pk+1i )TJTi [A]Ti λk+1 = (Jp− Jpk+1)TATλk+1,
N∑
i=1
(pi − pk+1i )T (
∑
j∈N̂i,j≥i
ρJTi (Jjp
k+1
j − Jjpkj )) (57)
= ρ(Jp− Jpk+1)T [(−A+H)TH + I](Jpk+1 − Jpk),
we can get the lemma. 
Lemma 14. Let pk = [pkT1 ,pkT2 , ...,pkTN ]T and λk = [λki,j ]ij,ei,j∈E be the iterates generated by GS-ADMM
following (7.15) and (7.16), then the following equality holds for all k:
− (Jpk+1)TAT (λk+1 − λ∗) + ρ(Jp∗ − Jpk+1)T (HTH −ATH + I)J(pk+1 − pk)
= − 1
2ρ
(‖ λk+1 − λ∗ ‖2 − ‖ λk − λ∗ ‖2)− ρ
2
(‖ HJ(pk+1 − p∗) ‖2 − ‖ HJ(pk − p∗) ‖2)−
ρ
2
(‖ Jpk+1 − Jp∗ ‖2 − ‖ Jpk − Jp∗ ‖2)− ρ
2
‖ HJ(pk+1 − pk)−AJpk+1 ‖2 −ρ
2
‖ Jpk+1 − Jpk ‖2
(58)
Proof: Since for a scalar a, aT = a holds, and recall λk+1 = λk + ρAJpk+1, we can get
(pk+1)TJTAT (λk+1 − λ∗) = 1
ρ
(λk+1 − λk)T (λk+1 − λ∗). (59)
In addition, as (p∗,λ∗) is the saddle point of the Lagrangian function L(p,λ) = f(p) + λTAJp,
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we have AJp∗ = 0. So we can establish the following relationships using algebraic manipulation:
(λk+1 − λk)T (λk+1 − λ∗) = 1
2
‖ λk+1 − λk ‖2 +1
2
(‖ λk+1 − λ∗ ‖2 − ‖ λk − λ∗ ‖2), (60)
(pk+1 − p∗)TJT IJ(pk+1 − pk) = 1
2
‖ Jpk+1 − Jpk ‖2 +1
2
(‖ Jpk+1 − Jp∗ ‖2 − ‖ Jpk − Jp∗ ‖2),
(61)
(pk+1 − p∗)TJTHTHJ(pk+1 − pk)
=
1
2
(‖ HJ(pk+1 − p∗) ‖2 − ‖ HJ(pk − p∗) ‖2) + 1
2
‖ HJ(pk+1 − pk) ‖2,
(62)
(pk+1 − p∗)TJTATHJ(pk+1 − pk)
=
1
2
‖ HJ(pk+1 − pk) ‖2 + 1
2ρ2
‖ λk+1 − λk ‖2 −1
2
‖ HJ(pk+1 − pk)−AJpk+1 ‖2 .
(63)
Then (58) can be proven by plugging equations (59) to (63) into the left part of (58). 
Now we proceed to prove Theorem 14. Set p = p∗ in (53), and recall AJp∗ = 0, then we have
f(p∗)− f(pk+1)− p(k+1)TJTATλk+1 + ρ(p∗ − pk+1)TJT (−ATH +HTH + I)J(pk+1 − pk) ≥ 0.
(64)
Adding and subtracting the term λ∗TAJpk+1 from the left side of (64), we can get
f(p∗)− f(pk+1)− λ∗TAJpk+1 − p(k+1)TJTAT (λk+1 − λ∗)+
ρ(p∗ − pk+1)TJT (−ATH +HTH + I)J(pk+1 − pk) ≥ 0.
Now by applying (58) into the above inequality, the following inequality can be obtained:
f(p∗)− f(pk+1)− λ∗TAJpk+1 − 1
2ρ
(‖ λk+1 − λ∗ ‖2 − ‖ λk − λ∗ ‖2)
−ρ
2
(‖ HJ(pk+1 − p∗) ‖2 − ‖ HJ(pk − p∗) ‖2)− ρ
2
(‖ Jpk+1 − Jp∗ ‖2 − ‖ Jpk − Jp∗ ‖2)
−ρ
2
‖ HJ(pk+1 − pk)−AJpk+1 ‖2 −ρ
2
‖ Jpk+1 − Jpk ‖2≥ 0.
Summing both sides of the inequality over k = 0, 1, ..., t, we can obtain the following result after
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some re-arrangement:
(t+ 1)f(p∗)−
t∑
k=0
f(pk+1)− λ∗TAJ
t∑
k=0
pk+1
+
ρ
2
(‖ HJ(p0 − p∗) ‖2 + ‖ Jp0 − Jp∗ ‖2) + 1
2ρ
‖ λ0 − λ∗ ‖2
≥
t∑
k=0
ρ
2
(‖ HJ(pk+1 − pk)−AJpk+1 ‖2) +
t∑
k=0
ρ
2
(‖ Jpk+1 − Jpk ‖2) + 1
2ρ
‖ λt+1 − λ∗ ‖2
+
ρ
2
(‖ HJ(pt+1 − p∗)+ ‖ Jpt+1 − Jp∗ ‖2) ≥ 0.
In addition, as our function is convex, we have
t∑
k=0
f(pk+1) ≥ (t+ 1)f(p̄t+1), then we can get
(t+ 1)f(p∗)− (t+ 1)f(p̄t+1)− (t+ 1)λ∗TAJ p̄t+1
+
ρ
2
(‖ HJ(p0 − p∗) ‖2 + ‖ Jp0 − Jp∗ ‖2) + 1
2ρ
‖ λ0 − λ∗ ‖2≥ 0
Dividing both sides by −(t+ 1) yields
f(p̄t+1) + λ∗TAJ p̄t+1 − f(p∗)
≤ ρ
2(t+ 1)
(‖ HJ(p0 − p∗) ‖2 + ‖ Jp0 − Jp∗ ‖2) + 1
(t+ 1)2ρ
‖ λ0 − λ∗ ‖2 .
(65)
Combining the above relationship (65) with the Lagrangian function L(p,λ) = f(p) + λTAJp,
(7.19) in Theorem 14 is proven. 
C.2 Proof of Theorem 16
To prove Theorem 16, we first introduce two lemmas:
Lemma 15. Let pk = [pkT1 ,pkT2 , ...,pkTN ]T and λk = [λki,j ]ij,ei,j∈E be the iterates generated by J-ADMM
following (7.17) and (7.18), then the following inequality holds for all k:
f(p)− f(pk+1) + (p− pk+1)TJTATλk+1 + ρ(p− pk+1)TJT (−ATA+ Q̄T Q̄)J(pk+1 − pk) ≥ 0,
(66)
where Q̄ is defined in (7.21).
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Proof: Denote by gi the function
gki (pi) =
∑
j∈N̂i
(λkTi,j (Jipi − Jjpkj ) +
ρ
2
‖ Jipi − Jjpkj ‖2) +
ργi
2
‖ Jipi − Jipki ‖2 . (67)
Then following the proof of Lemma 13, we can get
fi(pi)− fi(pk+1i ) + (pi − p
k+1
i )
TJTi ([A]
T
i λ
k+1 +
∑
j∈N̂i
ρJj(p
k+1
j − p
k
j ) + ργiJi(p
k+1
i − p
k
i )) ≥ 0.
(68)
Summing both sides of the above relation over i = 1, 2, ...N , and noticing that the following two
equations hold,
N∑
i=1
(pi − pk+1i )
TJTi ρ(
∑
j∈N̂i
Jj(p
k+1
j − p
k
j ) + γiJi(p
k+1
i − p
k
i ))
= ρ(p− pk+1)TJT [−ATA+QC + I +QP ]J(pk+1 − pk),
N∑
i=1
(pi − pk+1i )
TJTi [A]
T
i λ
k+1 = (p− pk+1)TJTATλk+1,
we can get the lemma. 
Lemma 16. Let pk = [pkT1 ,pkT2 , ...,pkTN ]T and λk = [λki,j ]ij,ei,j∈E be the iterates generated by J-ADMM
following (7.17) and (7.18). Then the following equality holds for all k:
− (pk+1)TJTAT (λk+1 − λ∗) + ρ(p∗ − pk+1)TJT (−ATA+ Q̄T Q̄)J(pk+1 − pk)
= − 1
2ρ
(‖ λk+1 − λ∗ ‖2 − ‖ λk − λ∗ ‖2) + ρ
2
(‖ AJ(pk+1 − p∗) ‖2 − ‖ AJ(pk − p∗) ‖2)
− ρ
2
(‖ Q̄J(pk+1 − p∗) ‖2 − ‖ Q̄J(pk − p∗) ‖2) + ρ
2
‖ AJ(pk+1 − pk) ‖2 −ρ
2
‖ Q̄J(pk+1 − pk) ‖2
− 1
2ρ
‖ λk+1 − λk ‖2 .
(69)
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 14 and is omitted. 
Then following the proof of Theorem 14 (setting p = p∗ in (66) and applying (69)), we can obtain
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the following inequality:
f(p∗)− f(pk+1)− λ∗TAJpk+1 − 1
2ρ
(‖ λk+1 − λ∗ ‖2 − ‖ λk − λ∗ ‖2)
+
ρ
2
(‖ AJ(pk+1 − p∗) ‖2 − ‖ AJ(pk − p∗) ‖2)− ρ
2
(‖ Q̄J(pk+1 − p∗) ‖2 − ‖ Q̄J(pk − p∗) ‖2)
+
ρ
2
‖ AJ(pk+1 − pk) ‖2 −ρ
2
‖ Q̄J(pk+1 − pk) ‖2 − 1
2ρ
‖ λk+1 − λk ‖2≥ 0. (70)
Summing both sides of the above inequality over k = 0, 1, ..., t, we can get the following result after
some re-arrangement:
(t+ 1)f(p∗)−
t∑
k=0
f(pk+1)− λ∗TAJ
t∑
k=0
pk+1 +
ρ
2
‖ Q̄J(p0 − p∗) ‖2 + 1
2ρ
‖ λ0 − λ∗ ‖2
≥ ρ
2
‖ AJ(p0 − p∗) ‖2 + 1
2ρ
‖ λt+1 − λ∗ ‖2 +
t∑
k=0
ρ
2
(‖ Q̄J(pk+1 − pk) ‖2 − ‖ AJ(pk+1 − pk) ‖2)
+
ρ
2
(‖ Q̄J(pt+1 − p∗) ‖2 − ‖ AJ(pt+1 − p∗) ‖2) +
t∑
k=0
1
2ρ
‖ λk+1 − λk ‖2
≥
t∑
k=0
ρ
2
(‖ Q̄J(pk+1 − pk) ‖2 − ‖ A ‖2‖ Jpk+1 − Jpk ‖2)
+
ρ
2
(‖ Q̄J(pt+1 − p∗) ‖2 − ‖ A ‖2‖ Jpt+1 − Jp∗ ‖2).
Since ‖ A ‖2= αmax, Q̄ is a diagonal matrix with γ′i ≥
√
αmax, we can get that the right hand side
of the above inequality is greater than 0, which leads to
(t+ 1)f(p∗)−
t∑
k=0
f(pk+1)− λ∗TAJ
t∑
k=0
pk+1 +
ρ
2
‖ Q̄J(p0 − p∗) ‖2 + 1
2ρ
‖ λ0 − λ∗ ‖2≥ 0.
In addition, as our function is convex, we have
t∑
k=0
f(pk+1) ≥ (t+ 1)f(p̄t+1) and
(t+ 1)f(p∗)− (t+ 1)f(p̄t+1)− (t+ 1)λ∗TAJ p̄t+1 + ρ
2
‖ Q̄J(p0 − p∗) ‖2 + 1
2ρ
‖ λ0 − λ∗ ‖2≥ 0.
By dividing both sides by −(t+ 1), we can obtain
f(p̄t+1) + λ∗TAJ p̄t+1 − f(p∗) ≤ 1
t+ 1
(
1
2ρ
‖ λ0 − λ∗ ‖2 +ρ
2
‖ Q̄J(p0 − p∗) ‖2).
Combining the above relationship with the Lagrangian function L(p,λ) = f(p) + λTAJp, we can
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get statement (1) of Theorem 16.
In addition, from (70), we have
ρ
2
‖ AJ(pk+1 − pk) ‖2 −ρ
2
‖ Q̄J(pk+1 − pk) ‖2 − 1
2ρ
(‖ λk+1 − λ∗ ‖2 − ‖ λk − λ∗ ‖2)
+
ρ
2
(‖ AJ(pk+1 − p∗) ‖2 − ‖ AJ(pk − p∗) ‖2)− ρ
2
(‖ Q̄J(pk+1 − p∗) ‖2 − ‖ Q̄J(pk − p∗) ‖2)
− 1
2ρ
‖ λk+1 − λk ‖2≥ −f(p∗) + f(pk+1) + λ∗TAJpk+1 ≥ 0
Rewrite the above inequality as:
1
2ρ
‖ λk+1 − λ∗ ‖2 +ρ
2
‖ J(pk+1 − p∗) ‖2Q̄T Q̄−ATA
≤ 1
2ρ
‖ λk − λ∗ ‖2 +ρ
2
‖ J(pk − p∗) ‖2Q̄T Q̄−ATA −
1
2ρ
‖ λk+1 − λk ‖2 −ρ
2
‖ J(pk − pk) ‖2Q̄T Q̄−ATA
(71)
Then we have
lim
k→∞
(
1
2ρ
‖ λk+1 − λk ‖2 +ρ
2
‖ J(pk − pk) ‖2Q̄T Q̄−ATA) = 0 (72)
Following a similar proof of Theorem 1, we can obtain statement (2) of Theorem 16. 
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